Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

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Yaacov Ro'i
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JANUARY–FEBRUARY 1979



Central Asia and Soviet Manpower
Michael Rywkin

Soviet Diplomacy of Force
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Passion of Kampuchea
Joseph J. Zasloff
MacAlister Brown

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Problems of Communism

1

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Central Asia and Soviet Manpower

by Michael Rywkin

A critical element for Soviet leaders as they attempt to balance regional priorities and chart the future economic development strategy of the USSR is the question of the quantities and quality of manpower that will be available to work in industry. The particular dilemma facing the Soviet Union is that over the coming decades it will be the burgeoning rural Muslim populations of Kazakhstan and Central Asia that will provide the significant increments to the able-bodied population of working age. This would seem to leave Moscow a variety of unpalatable alternatives: trying to move this manpower to the labor-short traditional regions of Soviet economic growth; shifting investment priorities to favor growth of industry in labor-surplus Central Asia; or encouraging Central Asia's non-Muslims to migrate to labor-deficit areas.

Failure to do anything would have its own highly undesirable consequences. Deprived of adequate manpower, traditional industrial areas of the RSFSR may not be able to increase labor productivity sufficiently to meet production growth targets. This, in turn, could result in further deceleration of overall Soviet industrial growth. As for Central Asia, failure to achieve out-migration or effective local use of growing Muslim labor could result in unemployment or underemployment of this manpower. This, in turn, could sow the seeds of social unrest in this important border area. Hence, there is considerable pressure on Moscow to take some action.

Before examining the prospects for Soviet selection of one or another solution, it is perhaps useful to sketch in brief the underlying demographic developments.

Mr. Rywkin is Professor of Russian Area Studies, City College of New York (New York, NY). He has published widely on Central Asian nationalism and human rights, and his 1963 volume, Russia in Central Asia, *was recently reprinted in Turkish translation.* *The present article is a revised and updated version of a paper presented at the 1978 National Convention, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Columbus, OH.*

Demographic Trends

Broadly speaking, the USSR can be divided into three main areas according to the availability of manpower. The first is an area where local labor resources are insufficient to sustain accelerated economic development by traditional means of expanding labor inputs. It includes the Northwest and Siberia in the RSFSR, northern Kazakhstan, and (recently) Belorussia. By the 1970's Siberia alone was experiencing a shortage of 500,000 to 600,000 workers.[1] A second area is seen to have sufficient local labor resources to meet local needs. This includes the Volga, Ural, and Baltic regions. The third area is one in which labor supply generally exceeds demand. It comprises a southern tier of the country, running from the Ukraine and Moldavia through the Transcaucasus and Northern Caucasus to Central Russia, and particularly Central Asia.[2] In this last

1. V.A. Shpilyuk, *Mezhrespublikanskaya migratsiya i sblizheniye natsii v SSSR* (Inter-Republic Migration and the Drawing Together of Nations in the USSR), L'vov, Vishcha Shkola, 1975, p. 82. Earlier, Belorussia, Lithuania, and the cities of Moscow, Leningrad, and Odessa had been included among the USSR's areas of labor surplus.

On Soviet manpower prospects, see Murray Feshbach and Stephen Rapawy, "Soviet Population and Manpower Trends and Policies," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1976, pp. 113-54, especially pp. 128-30. The authors suggest that in this region, the Soviet Union, in addition to seeking increased labor productivity, will have to make more rational utilization of existing labor resources; induce more pensioners to return to work; and perhaps even import foreign labor for specific work tasks.

2. Shpilyuk, op. cit., p. 81.

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Muslims of Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, gather for Friday prayers.

—Paolo Koch/Photo Researchers.

area, labor productivity tends to be much lower than in other parts of the Soviet Union.[3] The labor-surplus area sometimes experiences localized shortages of manpower, but Soviet observers argue that these can be overcome by better use of manpower and accelerated village-to-city migration.[4]

While migration (both involuntary and voluntary) contributed to this maldistribution of manpower in the past, the major factor at present and for the future is the sharp differences in birthrates in the various portions of the USSR. These differences are generating a profound shift in the ethnic balance of the Soviet population. The Slavic peoples of the Soviet Union, standing on the threshold of a consumer society, have opted for a better material existence at the expense of having children. Even crash programs of apartment construction have failed to offset declines in birthrates among Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians. From 1958–59 to 1974–75 the gross reproduction rates in the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Belorussia dropped from figures in the range of 1.14–1.36 (1 = a roughly static population) to the exceptionally low range of only 0.98 for the RSFSR, 1.0 for the Ukraine, and 1.08 for Belorussia. By contrast, in Soviet Central Asia the Muslim majority—for the most part governed by different aspirations, life-style, and values—continues to look upon large families as living proof of improved material conditions. In 1974–75, the gross reproduction rates in the four Central Asian republics were in the range of 2.33–3.07.[5]

These differential rates have combined with other demographic factors to produce a sharp difference between the rates of population growth in the predominantly Slavic parts of the country and

3. For example, one study estimates the average annual rate of growth of factor productivity over the period 1961-70 to have been 2.4 percent for the Russian Federation and only 0.1 percent for Uzbekistan. See N. Bandera and Z.L. Melnyk, Eds., *The Soviet Economy in Regional Perspective*, New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1973, p. 157.

4. See, for example, Yu. V. Arutunyan, "Socioeconomic Conditions of the Development of Ethnic Processes in the USSR," *Sovremennyye etnicheskiye protsessy v SSSR* (Contemporary Ethnic Processes in the USSR), Moscow, Akademiya Nauk, 1974, p. 127.

5. A. Kvasha and G. Kiseleva, "Trends of Population Reproduction in the USSR," *Vozobnovleniye pokolenii nashey strany* (Rejuvenation of the Generations of Our Country), Moscow, Statistika, 1978, p. 7.

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in Central Asia. For example, in 1975, the population of the Russian Federation (RSFSR) grew only at 5.9 per 1,000, while that of Uzbekistan increased by 27.3 per 1,000.[6] Indeed, one recent Soviet study estimated that Soviet Central Asia now accounts for some 30 percent of all Soviet population growth (with Uzbekistan alone providing 20 percent of the total), and that by the year 2000 Central Asia would account for 50 percent of total population growth.[7]

Although some Soviet commentators question whether this momentum will continue,[8] for the present it seems likely to do so—as the data in Table 1 indicate. Between 1959 and 1970, the share of the five principal Central Asian Muslim nationalities in the youngest population group (age 0 to 9 in the 1959 census and 0 to 10 in the 1970 census) increased from 8.97 to 14.97 percent. The preponderance of Russians over Central Asians in this age group dropped from 6:1 to only 3:1 during the 11-year period.

The consequence of these developments is that by the 1980's the rapidly growing Central Asian populations will be the major source of increments to the able-bodied population of working age and, indeed, may even be serving to offset net declines in other parts of the USSR.[9] The critical issue is that these increments will become available in labor-surplus Central Asia, not in labor-deficit areas of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Soviet Muslims have shown little propensity to migrate out of their native republics, little enough out of Central Asia. According to the 1970 census, less than half a million Kazakhs (or roughly 10 percent of that ethnic group) lived outside of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and two thirds of those who did lived in contiguous areas of the RSFSR which Kazakh nomads formerly roamed. Only 3 percent of the Kazakhs and less than 1 percent of other Central Asian Muslim nationalities lived in portions of the Russian Federation exclusive of such border areas.[10] Therefore, migration would presumably have to be either encouraged by a combination of economic pressures and material incentives, or forced by the imposition of Stalinist methods of control and coercion.[11] Whether voluntary or not, such a migration might create more problems than it solves, in terms of Muslim discontent or interethnic strife in Slavic cities and regions.

It should be noted at this point that the above population trends will have an impact not only on the civilian economy but upon the complexion of military manpower. It has been estimated that by the year 2000, some 35 percent of all recruits are expected to come from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.[12]

Table 1. Dynamics of the Ethnic Structure of the Soviet Population 1959–70

(in percent)

	1959		1970	
	Age 0–9	(All ages)	Age 0–10	(All ages)
Total for main Central Asian groups	**8.97**	**(6.26)**	**14.97**	**(8.10)**
Uzbeks	4.23	(2.88)	7.10	(3.80)
Kazakhs	2.42	(1.73)	3.87	(2.19)
Kirgiz	0.69	(0.46)	1.13	(0.60)
Tadzhiks	0.97	(0.67)	1.70	(0.88)
Turkmen	0.66	(0.48)	1.17	(0.63)
Total for main Slavic groups	**72.06**	**(76.28)**	**64.40**	**(73.97)**
Russians	54.02	(54.65)	46.81	(53.37)
Ukrainians	14.56	(17.84)	14.12	(16.86)
Belorussians	3.48	(3.79)	3.47	(3.74)
All other groups	**18.97**	**(17.46)**	**20.63**	**(17.93)**

SOURCE: Lubomir A. Hajda, "Age and Nationality in Soviet Population Change," an unpublished paper of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1977.

6. *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1975 godu* (The USSR National Economy in 1975), Moscow, Statistika, 1976, pp. 42-43.

7. See O. Atamirzayev and A. Atakuziyev, "Problems of Population and Regional Demographic Policy," *Kommunist Uzbekistana* (Tashkent), No. 1, 1978, pp. 40-41. On this point, see also the well-known study by G.A. Bondarskaya, *Rozhdayemost' v SSSR: Etnodemograficheskiy aspekt* (Fertility in the USSR: The Ethnodemogrtaphic Aspect), Moscow, Statistika, 1977, p. 101, Figure 8.

8. Some Soviet authors predict that the birthrate of the Muslim portion of the Soviet population will begin to decline. See, for example, Ye. D. Grazhdannikov, *Prognosticheskiye modeli sotsial'nodemograficheskikh protsessov* (Prognostic Models of Social-Demographic Processes), Novosibirsk, Nauka, 1974, pp. 100-01.

9. See Feshbach and Rapawy, loc. cit., p. 128.

10. *Itogi vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda* (Results of the 1970 All-Union Census), Vol. 4, Moscow, Statistika, 1973, Tables 11-14 and 22-28. For discussion of the low propensity of Central Asians to migrate, see Ye. Chernova, "Labor Resources Tomorrow," *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya* (Frunze), June 29, 1977; and N. Khonaliyev, "Population Migration," *Kommunist Tadzhikistana* (Dushanbe), Mar. 17, 1977.

11. J.F. Besemeres has suggested that the model for such a policy might be the experiments carried out in Leningrad, Moscow, and other cities (as described in M. Feshbach and S. Rapawy, "Labor Constraints in the Five-Year Plan," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1973, pp. 541-43). The experiments involved "a strict system of labor control, computerized record-keeping, and an elaborate network of sanctions" aimed at reducing job turnover. See Besemeres' article, "Population Politics in the USSR," in *Soviet Union* (Pittsburgh, PA), Nos. 1-2, 1975, p. 62.

12. Feshbach and Rapawy, "Soviet Population . . .," loc. cit., p. 148.

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Lance Corporal Samarbek Abdyldayev is welcomed back to his native collective farm in Tadzhikistan in January 1977, after service in the Soviet Army.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

This trend may help free young manpower for employment in labor-deficit areas and "employ," if temporarily, surplus Muslim youths in military occupations. At the same time, it is unlikely that soldiers of Central Asian Muslim background would gravitate to labor-deficit areas upon demobilization as opposed to returning to their native republics. The anticipated change in the ethnic composition of the Soviet armed forces also has military and political significance, but these matters are beyond the scope of the present study and deserve consideration on their own account.

In 1970, V. Perevedentsev, a leading Soviet demographer, stirred up a controversy by openly discussing the above demographic trends and raising the possibility of migration of Central Asian Muslims to industrial areas of the RSFSR as a means of offsetting regional labor supply imbalances.[13] Over the ensuing years, there has been a considerable Soviet literature on this and other aspects of migration.[14] In assessing this debate and Soviet developments, Western scholars have arrived at two sharply opposed viewpoints concerning the probability of massive out-migration from labor-rich Central Asia to other portions of the Soviet Union.

Two Views on Muslim Migration

The first view anticipates heavy migration of Central Asian Muslims to other parts of the USSR. Such a proposition has been put forward by the American economic geographers Robert A. Lewis, Richard H. Rowland, and Ralph S. Clem.[15] They argue from a comparativist viewpoint that gives primacy to economic over sociopolitical and cultural considerations, i.e., they contend that like fellow Muslims elsewhere (e.g., in Turkey and Algeria), the Muslims of Central Asia—given the proper economic stimulus—will undergo the "universal experience" of migration to highly industrialized areas.

Lewis, Rowland, and Clem tend to talk of the Central Asian labor surplus less as an answer to manpower problems elsewhere in the USSR than as a problem on its own account, confronting Moscow with the possibility of widespread unemployment and welfare burdens in Central Asia if not solved. To prevent such a situation from arising, they suggest, Moscow has three options: (1) to launch a crash program of economic development in the region, (2) to institute birth control measures, or (3) to spur emigration of surplus labor from the region.

Looking at the potential for accelerating economic development in Central Asia, Lewis and his colleagues argue that expansion of the rural economy cannot absorb more than half the surplus unless the Soviet leadership abandons further mechanization in favor of more labor-intensive culture or drastically enlarges the acreage of land under irrigation. The first flies in the face of decades of Soviet practice. As for irrigation, these scholars feel that Soviet plans to expand irrigated lands are insufficient to absorb the growing rural manpower.[16] Moreover, at the time of their major study on the subject, they felt that the targeted expansion of irrigated lands (10 percent for

13. See V. Perevedentsev, "Population Migration and Utilization of Labor Resources," *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 9, 1970. He had already discussed some of these themes in an earlier article, "The Census Debate," *Literaturnaya gazeta* (Moscow), Jan. 1, 1967.

14. For a good Soviet bibliography on migration problems (including a list of 3 books and 14 articles by Perevedentsev), see V.I. Staroverov, *Sotsialisticheskiye problemy derevni. Metodologiya, metodika, opyt analiza migratsii sel'skogo naseleniya* (Socialist Problems of the Countryside. Methodology, Methods, and Experience from Analysis of the Migration of the Rural Population), Moscow, Nauka, 1975, pp. 263-83.

15. See Lewis, Rowland, and Clem, *Nationality and Population Change in Russia and the USSR. An Evaluation of Census Data, 1897-1970,* New York, NY, and London, Praeger Publishers, 1976, especially pp. 350-87.

16. Ibid., p. 357.

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1971–75) was itself overly ambitious in light of past performance and the limited availability of land suitable for irrigation.[17]

Nor do Lewis and his fellow researchers believe local industry can absorb the surplus rural manpower. They say that for it to do so would require an industrial growth rate of between 9 and 13 percent a year, as compared with an average of 8 percent in the period 1965–70. They further note that plans for increases in industrial labor productivity in the area indicate an expectation that in Central Asia industrial manpower will not grow as rapidly as production. They affirm that over the period 1971–75, increases in per capita fixed capital investments in Central Asia were below the average for the USSR—and they attribute this to the area's limited endowment of natural resources required for large-scale heavy industry and its remoteness from the main Soviet industrial centers.[18]

As for birth control, Lewis et al. suggest that it is already too late to have much of an impact on existing trends in the remainder of this century. Some 50 percent of the Central Asian population is under 15; hence, birth control measures would probably not significantly reverse the Muslim population explosion before the 1990's.[19]

The only remaining option, it is argued by Lewis and his associates, is for the Central Asians to migrate abroad or to other areas of the USSR. The former is viewed as highly unrealistic, the Jewish emigration being seen as a special case not likely to be dupli-

17. Between 1960 and 1970, the USSR increased its irrigated acreage by an annual average of only 0.5 percent. However, a 1977 report claimed that "during the last five years" the amount of irrigated land in Uzbekistan had increased 10 percent. See G. Ye. Trapeznikov, "Uzbekistan in the Epoch of Developed Socialism," *Voprosy istorii* (Moscow), No. 2, 1977, p. 11.

18. Lewis, Rowland, and Clem, op. cit., pp. 367-71.
19. Ibid., p. 358.



The laying of drainage pipes to open new irrigated lands on the Karshin steppe in Uzbekistan in 1973.

—Novosti from Sovfoto.

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Hand weighing of cotton on a collective farm in Uzbekistan.

—Paolo Koch/Photo Researchers.

cated. As for internal migration, rural areas of the USSR are hardly likely to seek unskilled Muslim farm hands with alien life styles and language problems when what these areas need are technically trained young men capable of fitting productively into the local environment.

Consequently, Lewis, Rowland, and Clem see the only solution to be out-migration of rural Central Asian Muslims to distant urban areas in the RSFSR. These researchers admit that poor Russian language training and lower educational and skill levels may impede the flow, but they argue that such factors will not be decisive "once local economic conditions begin to deteriorate."[20]

A contrary view (and one more widely held among Western experts than that of Lewis et al.) argues that the Muslims of Central Asia are more likely to stay at home in their native republics. In the words of Murray Feshbach, demographer with the US Department of Commerce,

. . . the overwhelming weight of the evidence—economic, demographic, and cultural, leads to the conclusion that there will not be a massive out-migration of labor from Central Asia to the labor-deficient areas of the USSR during the 1980's.[21]

In terms of economics, Feshbach points to current scattered symptoms of shortages of industrial manpower within Central Asia itself,[22] and he cites Soviet sources to indicate that Moscow has already resolved to bring new industry to Central Asia to absorb any surpluses of labor as they arise.[23] Moreover, he sees Muslims as unlikely to be attracted to other areas of the USSR, where the cost of living is higher than in Central Asia. Demographically, he goes on, the burgeoning Central Asian population includes large numbers of children and of women with large families (and thus unable to take jobs in distant parts of the USSR).[24] Finally, Feshbach stresses the linguistic and sociocultural impediments to large-scale out-migration.[25] Even were Moscow able to bring about such a migration to solve manpower shortages elsewhere, Feshbach concludes it would result in ghettoes and political friction in Russian cities and Soviet embarrassment before other Asian states because of the implicit admission of failure to solve Central Asia's unemployment problems on the spot.

Migration Mechanisms

In their debate about Central Asian migration, most Western specialists have overlooked a highly revealing book on patterns of Soviet internal migra-

20. Ibid., p. 361.

21. Murray Feshbach, "Prospects for Massive Out-Migration from Central Asia During the Next Decade," paper for the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, February 1977, p. 23.

22. For confirmation of this finding in the case of Uzbekistan, see R.A. Ubaydullayeva, "Labor Resources in the Regional Economy of Developed Socialism," *Obshchestvennyye nauki v Uzbekistane* (Tashkent), No. 2, 1978, p. 8.

23. Feshbach refers to V.G. Kostyakov, *Trudovyye resursy pyatiletki* (Labor Resources of the Five-Year Period), Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p. 56; and *Planovoye khozyaystvo* (Moscow), No. 11, 1976, pp. 19-22.

At the same time, it should be noted that natural gas and cotton—Central Asia's most important resources—are still exported to the RSFSR in raw form for processing. See Bandera and Melnyk, op. cit., p. 28.

24. This point is confirmed in the case of Uzbekistan by L. Sbytova, "Sources of Manpower in Contemporary Conditions," *Voprosy ekonomiki,* No. 6, 1978, pp. 36-37, 40.

25. Here, Feshbach draws on the work of the French cultural historian Alexandre Bennigsen, who has argued that modernization has led to a strengthening, rather than weakening, of Muslim cultural ties. See Bennigsen's chapter, "Islam in the Soviet Union. The Religious Factor and the Nationality Problem in the Soviet Union," in

(continued on page 7)

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The arrival in Surgut of new workers for the oilfields of West Siberia.

—Novosti from Camera Press.

tion, by A. V. Topilin.[26] Examining the period 1959–70, Topilin discovers that of a yearly total migration of some 12 million people (5 percent of the total USSR population) only 10–12 percent occurred on an "organized" basis, i.e., in response to conscious government policy.[27] The bulk of migration was thus "unorganized". As Topilin observes, some of this migration (perhaps 10–12 percent of the total) happened to coincide with state interests and hence could be considered "rational." Still other movements were neutral in effect. However, over 50 percent of all migration was unorganized *and* irrational. Thus, Topilin distinguished 70 separate migration streams into and out of Central Asia and Kazakhstan alone, and of these, 34 were "irrational," while only 13 could be classified as "rational" from the perspective of government interests. An obvious example of the former category would be migration from labor-deficit Siberia to labor-surplus Central Asia.[28]

Topilin examines the many factors—economic, environmental and climatic, ethnic, demographic, and moral-psychological—that contribute to or impede migration. He specifically notes the low inclination of Central Asia's rural Muslim population to move to the cities, little enough to other parts of

Bohdan Bociurkiw and John W. Strong, Eds., *Religion and Atheism in the USSR and Eastern Europe,* Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1975.

Findings of a low rate of intermarriage between Muslim women and Russian men lend further support to Bennigsen's contention that bilingualism (i.e., the learning of Russian by Central Asian minorities) does not necessarily lead to biculturalism. See Wesley Fisher, "Ethnic Consciousness and Intermarriage: Correlates of Endogamy among Major Soviet Nationalities," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), July 1977, p. 398.

26. A.V. Topilin, *Territorial'noye pereraspredeleniye trudovykh resursov v SSSR* (Territorial Redistribution of Labor Resources in the USSR), Moscow, Ekonomika, 1975, pp. 13 ff. and 122 ff.

27. Topilin contrasts this to some 30-40 percent in the 1930's. Organized migration includes *orgnabor* (organized recruitment, mostly of young singles and usually of persons with a profession, for jobs in not-too-distant areas); *pereseleniye* (organized resettlement of entire families, village-to-village movements in agriculture, or, more recently, movement of workers in the timber industry); and *obshchestvennyye prizyvy* (affecting unmarried graduates of technical high schools of professional institutions, and demobilized draftees).

28. According to Topilin, in the years 1959-70 approximately 113 persons entered Central Asia for every 100 who left. For the RSFSR, the imbalance was 124 to 100; for the Far East, 112 to 100; for East Siberia, 153 to 100; and for West Siberia, 159 to 100! Op. cit., pp. 44-45, 56, 92.

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the Soviet Union, and the resulting buildup of surpluses of actual or potential labor in the Central Asian countryside.[29] He attributes this low mobility to such factors as attachment to the native village, weak knowledge of Russian, peculiarities of the local cultural and religious patterns, and insufficient skill levels to compete.[30]

The irrational and unsatisfactory nature of much of Soviet population migration leads Topilin to advocate a more active migration policy, combining both "carrot" and "stick." He calls for an increase in the proportion of organized migration (to be planned and organized through the All-Union State Planning Committee—Gosplan); resettlement to more distant sites; and measures to bind the migrants to their new places of settlement and employment. Among incentives to "rational" voluntary migration, he lists the standard measures of offering better housing, more social services, higher wages, and better educational opportunities to offset climatic disparities.[31]

In discussing the possibilities of altering regional standards of living to achieve optimal migration patterns, Topilin does not rule out the artifical *lowering* of living standards in labor-surplus areas. Other Soviet specialists have openly discussed such an approach. For example, a 1978 article proposed to spur village-to-city migration by ending all privileges—relating to taxation, procurement prices, differential economic development, and social welfare assistance—still enjoyed by rural areas in formerly backward regions.[32] Central Asia clearly fits the definition.

The same article articulates another dimension of Soviet thinking concerning the manpower issue:

. . . the state is preoccupied not only with the number, but with the quality of its citizens. It is not indifferent to the kind of population, to the kind of labor force in question—whether highly or poorly trained, mobile or burdened with such circumstances as large family, language impediment, and attachment to a specific area.

Specifically, the article proposes limiting children's allowances to second and third children, existing benefits for larger families having the effect of favoring births among what the author clearly views as "overfertile" ethnic groups. Similarly, at a 1975 meeting on the socioeconomic aspects of population problems held under the auspices of the USSR Academy of Sciences, there were calls for an "active demographic policy" designed to achieve "optimal birthrates" that would allow Soviet women (presumably of all nationalities) to combine motherhood with outside employment.[33] It is not clear, however, to what extent Soviet authorities are inclined to attempt such "active," "regionally-variable" intervention in demographic processes, given its highly sensitive and controversial nature.[34]

Overlooked Factors

Before trying to draw a balance sheet on the debate, we should look at two additional aspects of the situation in Central Asia that have been neglected or insufficiently explored by all analysts and that are likely to have a significant impact on both migration and interethnic relations.

The first has to do with the place of the private sector in Central Asian life and related issues of the *real* (as opposed to *official*) standard of living there. Indeed, the combination of high levels of private activity and good climate which has made the Georgian republic so popular a place to live would seem to exist, to some extent, in Central Asia as well. Income from private plots and per family earnings in Central Asia are higher than in the RSFSR, as is the average pay of kolkhozniks.[35] Moreover, while the average square meters of urban housing per capita is lower in Central Asia than in the RSFSR,[36] the Central Asian republics have more *privately-owned* housing per capita than does the RSFSR (3.12 vs. 2.39 square meters).[37] One

29. For example, he reports that the Central Asian republics of the USSR had the highest percentages of nonworking able-bodied people of working age: 16-20 percent as against 7-10 percent for regions of the RSFSR. Op cit., p. 45.

30. Ibid, pp. 62-63.

31. Ibid., pp. 120-29, 153.

32. G. I. Litvinova, "The Impact of the State and of Law on Demographic Processes," *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo* (Moscow), No. 1, 1978, pp. 134-35.

33. As reported by R. Galetskaya, "Demographic Policy and Its Directions," *Voprosy ekonomiki,* No. 8, 1975, pp. 149-52.

34. Ye. Manevich, "Reproduction of the Population and Utilization of Labor Resources," ibid., No. 8, 1978, p. 40.

35. Jovan Pavlevski, *Le niveau de vie en URSS de la révolution d'octobre à 1980* (The Standard of Living in the USSR from the October Revolution to 1980), Paris, Economica, 1975, p. 155; and L. P. Kupriyenko, *Vliyaniye urovnya zhizni na raspredeleniye trudovykh resursov* (The Influence of the Standard of Living on the Distribution of Labor Resources), Moscow, Nauka, 1976, pp. 97 and 61.

36. This may be inferred from Lewis, Rowland, and Clem, op. cit., p. 366, which reports (from 1970 Soviet data) figures of 11.0 square meters for the USSR as a whole and 8.8 for Central Asia.

37. *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1975 godu,* pp. 16, 19-21, and 577.

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third of urban housing in Uzbekistan's cities is private, as compared with one fifth in the case of the RSFSR.[38] Central Asian cities also tend to offer more space *per family* as well as the additional benefit of the traditional courtyard. Other less measurable forms of private activity that seem particularly relevant in assessing life in Central Asia include the particularly rich kolkhoz markets, the extensive trade in second-hand (and not-so-second-hand) goods, and various black-market dealings.

These benefits come on top of a cost of living that, according to one estimate, is 16.8 percent lower than in metropolitan Russia, and of average wages which exceed regional cost-of-living equalization figures.[39] Thus, there is considerable economic incentive for Central Asians to stay put.

A second matter likely to affect the propensity of either the Muslim natives or the European settlers to migrate from Central Asia is the degree to which "social stratification" exists in this part of the USSR. To the extent that Central Asia's Muslims find or feel themselves in an inferior social position in their home areas there may be an incentive to migrate elsewhere in search of greater opportunities. To the extent that social stratification is absent, there is less incentive for Central Asians to leave and, perhaps, more inclination for one-time "colonial" nationalities to return to European Russia.

Comparing Central Asia to developing Third World nations, Robert Lewis and his associates have argued that the Muslims indeed suffer from "ethnic stratification." These scholars point to low levels of urbanization (from 14.6 to 31.0 percent of the Muslim groups) in Central Asia and the region's inferiority vis-a-vis European parts of the USSR in terms of per capita incomes, retail sales, services, health, culture and education, urban housing space, or numbers of specialists and technicians. In this apparent dominance of Muslims by Slavs, these scholars see the operation of a universal principle—namely, that "hierarchic ranking of nationalities along socioeconomic lines" results whenever a country (or areas) includes more than one ethnic group.[40]

Table 2. Share of Titular Muslim Groups Among Workers in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, 1959 and 1970

(in percent)

	1959	1970
Kazakhstan	44	63
Kirgiziya	22	39
Tadzhikistan	18	37
Turkmenistan	22	32
Uzbekistan	27	39[a]

[a] By the mid-1970's, the proportion had risen to about half. See G. Ye. Trapeznikov, "Uzbekistan in the Epoch of Developed Socialism," *Voprosy istorii* (Moscow), No. 2, 1977, p. 9.

SOURCE: Yu. V. Arutunyan, "Socioeconomic Conditions for the Development of Ethnic Processes in the USSR," *Sovremennyye etnicheskiye protsessy v SSSR* (Contemporary Ethnic Processes in the USSR), Moscow, Akademiya Nauk, 1974, p. 127.

However, this proposition demands further examination in the Soviet case. To be sure, we know that—on average—Europeans living in Central Asia enjoy higher salaries, more housing space, better access to higher education for their children, more skills, and better positions than the natives.[41] We also know that since Stalin's time certain controlling positions within the local party and government (including security) apparatuses have been in the hands of Russians and other Europeans. But while these privileges doubtless make the Europeans reluctant to move back from Central Asia, it is not clear that the Central Asians suffer from real or perceived discrimination which might spur them to move to remote centers of the RSFSR. Indeed, the great majority of managerial jobs in Central Asia would appear to have no de facto (little enough de jure) ethnic requirement. On the job market, Muslims are often given preference over Europeans, unless the latter are the only ones having indispensable skills (see, e.g., Table 2).[42]

Moreover, the gap between the European settlers and the Muslims has been narrowing in areas of health, education, skill levels, housing, living standards, and jobs. The Soviet authorities have

38. Ibid., p. 577. Specifically, in 1974 in the RSFSR there were 219.8 million square meters of private and 889.4 million square meters of public housing; for Uzbekistan, the figures were 17.6 million square meters of private and 31.2 million square meters of public housing.

39. Kupriyenko, op. cit., pp. 89-92. It is common knowledge that Central Asia is rich in fruits and vegetables (scarce in most of the RSFSR), and has a climate that requires less outlays for clothing, special heating, and covered housing space.

40. Robert A. Lewis, Richard H. Rowland, and Ralph S. Clem, "Modernization, Population Change, and Nationality in Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* (Ottawa), Nos. 2-3, 1975, pp. 295-98.

41. From discussions at the Conference on the Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia, held at Columbia University's Program on Soviet Nationality Problems, New York, NY, April 7-8, 1972.

42. See Michael Rywkin, "Religion, Modern Nationalism and Political Power in Central Asia," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Nos. 2-3, 1975, p. 279.

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Table 3. Muslims and Non-Muslims in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, 1970

	Total 1970 population (thousands)	Percent of all Muslim groups in republic population	Percent of titular Muslim group in population	Percent of titular group in population aged 0-10	Percent of all non-Muslim groups in population for 1970 (and 1959)	Percent of Slavs in 1970 population
Kazakhstan	13,116	41	32.6	43.8	59 (64.9)	47.7
Kirgiziya	2,968	60	43.8	53.3	40 (43.9)	33.5
Tadzhikistan	2,943	83	56.2	62.7	17 (19.1)	13.1
Turkmenistan	2,190	81	65.6	74.7	19 (24.2)	16.3
Uzbekistan	11,970	82	65.5	73.6	18 (18.4)	13.6

SOURCE: *Itogi vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda* (Results of the 1970 All-Union Census), Moscow, Statistika, 1973, Vol. 4, Tables 11-14 and 22-28; Lubomir A. Hajda, "Age and Nationality in Soviet Population Change," an unpublished paper of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1977; and Michael Rywkin, *Russia in Central Asia,* New York, NY, and London, Collier-Macmillan, 1963, p. 79.

clearly been working—and with considerable effect— to achieve economic equalization, not exploitation.[43] Symptomatic of the official effort is the routine practice of making capital transfers (subsidies) to Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and allocation of the totality (rather than the standard one fourth) of proceeds from the turnover tax originating in those republics directly to the republic involved.[44]

Moscow's reservation for Europeans of such positions as republic party second secretaries, heads of special sections, heads of republic security organizations, and director of factories of "all-Union" importance is a case of ethnic stratification of obvious political importance, but it involves only a few high-level positions. More telling, an even larger number of managerial jobs is reserved exclusively for Muslims (even if they are "assisted" by Russian seconds). These include positions of party first secretaries; party secretaries for agitation and propaganda; top positions in the governments and legislatures, in public relations and other highly visible fields; and directorships of most enterprises other than the "all-Union" ones mentioned above.[45]

While only limited social intercourse and little intermarriage occur between the Europeans and the Muslims, the latter encounter virtually no discrimination in hiring or housing. They enjoy equal or better opportunities within their own republics and equality elsewhere in the Soviet Union. There is, however, one condition: the natives are not supposed to challenge the basic premise of Russian rule over their areas. But that rule is not exercised by individual Russians over individual Moslems. Even a Russian second secretary who, behind the back of the native first secretary, watches over the latter's allegiance to Moscow's rule, grants him all required external signs of respect. Thus, social stratification à la Lewis is largely absent: there are no second-class citizens, no man-to-man superiority. Modern Muslim national-religious feelings may conflict with Russian domination, but individual Muslims, including those responsive to such feelings, do not suffer from person-to-person discrimination. Consequently, for the average Muslim there is no inherent pressure of social inequality or deprivation driving him to pick up stakes and move to the cities of the RSFSR.

Possibilities of Reemigration

While many have debated the chances for Muslim out-migration, there is little mention in Soviet or Western literature about the possibility that the non-Muslim, largely European settlers in Central Asia might migrate back to their home areas, thereby easing labor shortages in the latter areas and opening new opportunities locally for Central Asia's growing rural Muslim population.

There are, to be sure, a number of reasons why one might not anticipate such a reemigration. For one, these non-native settlers—who account for almost every fifth person in Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and every second person in Kazakhstan and Kirgiziya (see Table 3)—are said to possess exclusive qualifications for

43. Alec Nove and J. A. Newth, *The Soviet Middle East: A Model for Development,* London, Allen and Unwin, 1967, pp. 114, 120.

44. See Alexander Woroniak, "Regional Aspects of Soviet Planning and Industrial Organization," in Bandera and Melnyk, op. cit., pp. 99 ff.; and Hans-Jürgen Wagener, "Rules of Location and the Concept of Rationality: The Case of the USSR," in ibid., p. 272.

45. See Michael Rywkin, "Religion, Modern Nationalism . . .," loc. cit. For a study of ethnic recruitment to top party positions, see John H. Miller, "Cadres Policy in Nationality Areas. Recruitment of CPSU First and Second Secretaries in Non-Russian Republics of the USSR," *Soviet Studies,* January 1977, pp. 3-36.

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running the economy of the area. Their mass departure is viewed as potentially disastrous economically (the argument used by A. I. Mikoyan to reject pleas of the Volga Germans in the 1960's that they be allowed to return to their home areas).[46] Second, Moscow is said to shy away from letting the numerical ratio between European settlers and native Muslims deteriorate too much. In this century, the proportion of Europeans in Central Asia grew with every consecutive census (from 1897 to 1913, to 1926, to 1939, to 1959) until 1970, when it first became evident that growth in the Muslim birthrate combined with successful equalization of the mortality rates for Soviet citizens of European and Muslim nationalities was offsetting the effects of in-migration by Russians and other European groups. (On the migration balances of the Central Asian republics for 1961–70, see Table 4.) Moscow may be leery of seeing the Muslim "reconquest" of Central Asia accelerated by non-Muslim out-migration. And, finally, there are the obvious incentives of good climate and opportunities for better jobs and housing which spurred voluntary migration to the Central Asian sun belt. It is contended that these settlers will continue to compete successfully with rural Muslims for such jobs and other perquisites.[47]

Despite such arguments, one can also make a strong case for the eventual out-migration of European settlers from Central Asia. In the first place, many inhabitants of Central Asia and Kazakhstan belong to deported national groups and may be presumed anxious to return to more familiar surroundings.[48] Among such groups one would number nearly a million Germans (mostly from the Volga), including some 858,000 in Kazakhstan, 38,000 in Tadzhikistan, and 90,000 in Kirgiziya; some 250,000 Crimean Tatars (not listed separately from other Tatars in the 1970 census); various Poles, Lithuanians, and other former inhabitants of "western" regions acquired by the USSR in 1939, including some 75,000 now living in Kazakhstan; and more than 170,000 Koreans (deported from the Far East in the late 1930's).[49]

Table 4. Migration Balances for Selected Soviet Republics, 1961–70

(immigrants minus emigrants)

	1961–65	1966–70
Kazakhstan	602,000	90,000
Kirgiziya	105,000	25,000
Tadzhikistan	120,000	18,000
Turkmenistan	negligible	18,000
Uzbekistan	77,000	69,000
RSFSR	−861,000	−1,567,000
Ukraine	150,000	399,000

SOURCE: V. A. Shpilyuk, *Mezhrespublikanskaya migratsiya i sblizheniye natsii v SSSR* (Inter-Republic Migration and the Drawing Together of Nations in the USSR), L'vov, Vishcha Shkola, 1975, p. 76.

Moreover, many of the Slavs who inhabit Central Asia and Kazakhstan are themselves sons and daughters of deportees of the late 1930's, i.e., of involuntary migrants. Residual thoughts of returning to more familiar surroundings may be reinforced by the increasingly nationalistic spirit of the local Muslim majority (more on which presently).

Second, a good number of Muslims have acquired, or are in the process of acquiring, the necessary qualifications to function in an urban industrial society, as a result of considerable Soviet efforts to raise native skill levels.[50] This makes European reemigration from Central Asia and concomitant *korenizatsiya* (replacement of outsiders by natives) more feasible economically,[51] i.e., the local economy becomes increasingly less likely to fall apart should the Europeans leave.

There are already signs that Central Asia's European settlers are beginning to emigrate to other parts of the USSR. The 1970 census showed small positive balances for the RSFSR in its population exchanges with Kazakhstan and the four Central Asian republics (based on counts of new arrivals who had resided in the respective republics less than two years at the time of the census). The sur-

46. See Juozas A. Kazias, "Social Distance Among Ethnic Groups," in Edward Allworth, Ed., *Nationality Group Survival in Multi-Ethnic States. Shifting Support Patterns in the Soviet Baltic Regions*, New York, NY, and London, Praeger Publishers, 1977, p. 246. A text of Mikoyan's June 7, 1965, interview was published in Emma Schwabenland Haynes, *The Restoration of the Volga German Republic*, Work Paper No. 11 of the American Historical Society of Germans from Russia, Lincoln, NE, April 1973, pp. 13 ff.

47. One Soviet commentator has specifically acknowledged the apparent anomaly that because of "irrational utilization of labor" in the USSR, immigrants to labor-rich Central Asia have no difficulty finding jobs. See Yu. A. Bzhilyanskiy, *Problemy narodonaseleniya pri sotsializme. Politiko-ekonomicheskiy analiz* (Population Problems Under Socialism. A Political-Economic Analysis), Moscow, Mysl', 1974, p. 177.

48. There is already evidence that some of Central Asia's German population has begun to move to ethnically more akin areas in the Soviet Baltic. See Kazias, loc. cit., p. 246.

49. See *Itogi vsesoyuznoy perepisi . . .*, Vol. 4, Tables 11-14, 22-28. The figure for the Crimean Tatars is an estimate by the author.

50. See Mobin Shorish, "Soviet Development Strategies in Central Asia," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Nos. 2-3, 1975, pp. 410 ff.

51. See James Critchlow, "Uzbeks and Russians," in ibid., pp. 366-72.

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plus in the Russian Federation's exchange with Kazakhstan was 36,000; with Kirgiziya, 7,000; with Tadzhikistan, 11,000; with Turkmenistan, 7,000; and with Uzbekistan, 44,000. From the case of the exchange with Uzbekistan, we may posit that the immigrants to the RSFSR were not all Central Asian Muslims, since the positive balance of migrants in the RSFSR-Uzbekistan flows corresponded to the *total* number of Uzbeks reported living in the RSFSR in 1970 (one must assume that not all the latter were recent arrivals).[52] Other evidence tends to confirm the impression that it is predominantly non-Muslims who are migrating out of Central Asia. For example, in 1967, among those leaving Central Asia for the city of Kiev in the Ukraine, only 7–10 percent were Muslims; another 20–30 percent were Ukrainians; and the remainder were presumably also Europeans (Russians, Jews, Germans, etc.).[53] In addition, according to one source, 7.3 percent of all immigrants to the Soviet Far East in the 1960's came from Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and the Transcaucasus; yet the 1970 census showed very few Muslims residing in the Far East.[54]

Conclusions

The above discussion provides a basis for predicting how Soviet authorities are likely to deal with their regional labor supply imbalance in the coming years. Specifically, Moscow will not solve its manpower problems through massive out-migration of Central Asian Muslims to the existing industrial centers of the RSFSR. Some Muslims will be drafted for specific industrial projects, but this will be through temporary *orgnabor,* with the draftees returning home after acquiring improved labor experience.[55] The problem of surplus rural Muslim labor will be attacked largely in Central Asia through increased village-to-city migration (competing for all but the thinnest veneer of security and control jobs reserved for Europeans), a policy of importing labor-intensive light industry, some sort of restrictions on the migration of competing Siberian workers to the sun belt, and faster development of irrigation. To the extent that Central Asian Muslims move from their native areas at all, it will probably be to southern Kazakhstan. In turn, Kazakhs may be expected to peacefully "reconquer" Russian-populated areas in northern Kazakhstan or adjacent portions of the RSFSR.[56]

It is not the Muslims, but the European settlers who can be expected to migrate from Central Asia in significant numbers.[57] They will do so in response, on the one hand, to increased competition from trained native workers and the "Muslimization" of urban life in Central Asia, and, on the other hand, to a wide range of incentive measures designed to attract fresh manpower to labor-deficit parts of Russia proper.

Although this migration out of Central Asia by citizens of European nationalities may be expected to alleviate manpower shortages in the RSFSR, it will not be of sufficient dimensions to solve them. Thus, the Soviet government will need to increase labor productivity at a still more rapid pace if there is not to be a deceleration of production growth. The need will be even greater to the extent that the share of total Soviet investment going to Central Asia is increased, since this region has traditionally shown lower labor productivity than other parts of the USSR. Consequently, there will be objective pressures on the Soviet government to consider liberalization of managerial practices and of the general socioeconomic framework of its society.[58]

The implications for the Soviet political system of the anticipated pattern of responses to the problems of manpower supply are serious. If Central Asia's Muslims show a reluctance, and European settlers display a mounting inclination, to emigrate from the area, the widespread *korenizatsiya* of the Central Asian republics which is already occurring as a result of Muslim fertility (see Table 2) can only accelerate. This will increase the political impor-

52. See *Itogi vsesoyuznoy perepisi . . .*, Vol. 7, Moscow, Statistika, 1974, pp. 6-7, and ibid., Vol. 4, p. 44.

53. See V. V. Onikiyenko, *Kompleksnoye issledovaniye migratsionnykh protsessov. Analiz migratsii naseleniya Ukr.SSR* (Complex Research Into Migration Processes. Analysis of the Migration of the Population of the Ukrainian SSR), Moscow, Statistika, 1973, pp. 39, 152.

54. See L.L. Rybakovskiy, *Regional'nyy analiz migratsii* (Regional Analysis of Migration), Moscow, Statistika, 1973, p. 61.

55. There are indications of "Uzbek" labor being used in the non-black-soil zone of European Russia, but it would appear that most of the persons involved are Europeans residing in Uzbekistan. Communication to the author from Ann Shehy of Radio Liberty, Munich.

56. Bennigsen referred to this process as a *tache d'huile* ("oil-slick spread") in a conversation with the author in June 1977. To Bennigsen, transfer of substantial fractions of Central Asia's Muslims to faraway places seems incongruous with the entire Turkic-Muslim tradition; hence, the greater likelihood is for a gradual spreading of Muslim population northward, along the perimeter of its native lands.

57. This possibility was mentioned by two Soviet scholars in 1976. See B.S. Khorev and V.M. Moyseyenko, *Sdvigi v razmeshchenii naseleniya SSSR* (Shifts in the Location of Population in the USSR), Moscow, Statistika, 1976, pp. 82-83.

58. This point is raised by Besemeres, loc. cit., p. 62.

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A young Central Asian family attends a public celebration in Dushanbe, capital of the Soviet Central Asian republic of Tadzhikistan.

—Novosti from Sovfoto.

tance of the Soviet Muslims and of the republics in which they dwell within the broader political system of the USSR. Alexandre Bennigsen sees Moscow as already on the defensive against native pan-Turkic and pan-Muslim tendencies among members of the growing Muslim intelligentsia, who are struggling to be able to "control the development of their own regions."[59] What we are talking about is not active dissidence or instant separatism, but rather the peaceful accumulation of quantitative gains which will inevitably lead to future demands for qualitative change in the way decisions are made and priorities are set within the USSR concerning the development of Central Asia's economy and society.

Recognizing the divisive potential of the development of such nationality-based identifications and aspirations, Soviet authorities, in particular General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, have been promoting the concept of a "Soviet nation, a new community of peoples." However, as J.F. Besemeres has observed, its prospects for success are minimal.[60] Instead, there is a growing feeling of Muslim identity;[61] of linguistic solidarity;[62] of pride in technical, material, cultural, and educational achievements; and of numerical strength and youthful vigor. (One might note in this context that being a Muslim in Soviet Central Asia has little to do with practicing religion, and hence is not greatly affected by decline in religious observance.[63]) Edward Allworth also observes a reversal of tendencies toward *otdaleniye* (moving apart) of various Muslim native groups and a tendency toward local "interethnic integration," development of a new sense of an all-Central Asian homeland with a common destiny.[64]

Thus, the Soviet leadership will have to deal with real problems and solutions in Central Asia and cannot get by with ideological manipulation. While Moscow can be expected to maintain its chosen European personnel in the key control jobs in the Central Asian republics, the task of these representatives will doubtless become increasingly difficult. This is particularly true because Soviet Central Asia is located at a geopolitical crossroads where the Slavic world meets the Muslim and Chinese worlds, and in dealing with Central Asia's internal problems, Moscow must increasingly reckon with the reactions of external Muslim and Chinese competitors.

59. Bennigsen, "Islam in the Soviet Union . . .," loc. cit., p. 97.

60. Loc. cit., p. 79.

61. For example, it has been reported that in Turkmenistan 90 percent of children of Russian-Turkmen marriages are declared to be Turkmen. See Yu. V. Bromley, "Ethnic Aspects of Contemporary Nationality Processes," *Istoriya SSSR* (Moscow), May-June 1977, p. 31.

62. Arguments that the increasing knowledge of Russian as a second language contributes to a new sense of "Soviet" identity seem ill-founded. Mastery of the Russian language does not affect ethnic awareness. See Ronald Wixman, "Recent Assimilation Trends in Soviet Central Asia," in Edward Allworth, Ed., *The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia,* New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1975, p. 84.

Even turn-of-the-century Gadidists did not view learning of the Russian lingua franca and other European skills as akin to Russification. See Ismail Bey Gasprinskii, "Mebadi-yi temeddun-i Islamiyan-i Rus," trans. and annotated by Edward J. Lazzerini in "Gadidism at the Turn of the Century," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* (Paris), April-June 1975, p. 256.

63. Bennigsen, "Islam in the Soviet Union . . .," p. 99.

64. See his chapter "Regeneration in Central Asia," in Allworth, Ed., *The Nationality Question . . .*, especially pp. 9, 18.

Various Soviet sources have discussed the possibilites of *local* rather than all-Soviet merging of nationalities. See, for example, Bromley, loc. cit., pp. 29 and 32; and Klara Hallik, "The Role of Cultural Ties in Strengthening the Freindship of Soviet Peoples," *Kommunist Estonii* (Tallinn), No. 9, 1969, p. 36.

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Soviet Diplomacy of Force in the Third World

by James M. McConnell and Bradford Dismukes

One of the complicating factors of East-West relations in recent years has been the Soviet resumption, since the death of Yosip Stalin, of naval diplomacy in areas now part of the Third World—i.e., of the employment there of naval power directly in the service of Soviet foreign policy goals. Like all diplomacy, naval diplomacy can be either cooperative, in the form of goodwill port visits and humanitarian or technical assistance, or coercive, intended to imply or threaten pains and penalties for undesirable behavior. The coercive type, of course, can vary widely in content, ranging from a relatively risk-free port call to a friendly country experiencing domestic tension, through a show of force in international waters during a conflict between client states of East and West, to the ultimate step of actual politico-military intervention in the war zone. Shots may even be fired in anger. But as long as the political content of the action taken predominates over the purely military, tradition demands that the action be subsumed under the heading of coercive diplomacy rather than war.

It was during the mid-1960's, in our view, that Moscow first decided to adopt an operational doctrine for its diplomacy of force in the forward area—that is, outside Soviet defense perimeters—and since that time the Soviet navy has been found engaging in all the classic varieties of such diplomacy.

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For the decade between the six-day Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 and the Angola crisis of 1975-76, which was the cutoff point for our research, we have identified and examined 29 instances of Soviet coercive military diplomacy in the Third World, an empirical data base sufficiently large to permit us to make some tentative generalizations about the nature of the Soviet effort and the extent of the realistic ambitions of the Soviet Union. In the analysis which follows, we will first look at the significant turning points in Moscow's planning for a diplomacy of force, including the timing of the initial decision, its rationale, and the subsequent development of capabilities for the role. Then, after examining the actual establishment of a Soviet presence in the forward area and sketching out briefly some of the highlights of the Soviet practice of both cooperative and coercive naval diplomacy during the period under review, we will discuss the significance of the grounding of Soviet naval diplomacy on a local war doctrine and examine Moscow's view of "acceptable risks" in Third World diplomacy. We will conclude with a tentative balance sheet assessing the value of a Soviet diplomacy of force to the USSR and some of its implications for the West.

Needless to say, each step in our analysis is controversial. Since this discussion is founded largely on inferences from Soviet behavior and from Soviet statements not noted for their straightforwardness, there are few aspects of it which allow anything in the nature of settled convictions.

Planning for Naval Diplomacy

Clearly, one of the central preconditions of the diplomacy of force practiced by the USSR today was Soviet abandonment of the two-camp theory of the world, which prevailed in the Stalinist era, in

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Observation of a missile launching from a Soviet vessel by the late Marshal A. Grechko, right, USSR Minister of National Defense, and Admiral S. Gorshkov, commander-in-chief of the Soviet navy.

—Novosti photo serviced by Camera Press in 1971.

favor of a more positive approach to Third World nationalism. In the early 1950's, after a redefinition in the USSR of Soviet and Third World interests, the two sets of interests came to be regarded as parallel by Moscow's planners. Careful reflection on this new approach, together with what little direct and indirect evidence we have on the matter, suggests that a decision in principle for coercive naval diplomacy followed hard on this fundamental ideological-political reappraisal.

To begin with, as Thomas Wolfe first concluded in a paper published in 1973,[1] there seem to be no convincing reasons to doubt, and several good reasons to believe, the testimony of the Soviet navy's commander-in-chief, Admiral Sergey G. Gorshkov, that Moscow's decision of the mid-1950's radically redefining the path of naval development was aimed at building up capabilities not only for nuclear (world) wars, but also for conventional (local) wars and the "protection of state interests" abroad in peacetime.[2] In testing the credibility of Gorshkov's claim, one should note that with the single exception of coercive naval diplomacy, all the elements of Soviet policy in the Third World that we see in operation today had appeared by 1955: trade; cultural exchanges; political, economic, and arms aid; and even cooperative naval diplomacy. This suggests the existence even at that time of a carefully structured policy, with interrelated components, and it seems unlikely that the relevance of a diplomacy of force to this policy would have been overlooked—especially since the security of some policy instruments depended on a forward military presence. Trade and aid, for example, necessitated the development of a merchant marine, which, if only because of sensitive arms shipments, cried out for protection on seas and oceans dominated by the "imperialists." Just as important, it might have seemed imprudent to invest heavily in Third World regimes without the means to defend the Soviet "state interests" thus generated.

During the Suez crisis of 1956, only one year after the USSR's first extension of military aid to a Third World country, Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

1. Thomas Wolfe, "Soviet Naval Interaction with the United States and Its Influence on Soviet Naval Developments," in Michael MccGwire, Ed., *Soviet Naval Development: Capabilities and Context*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1973, p. 253.

2. On Gorshkov, see ibid. and the discussion on p. 21 below.

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(CPSU), twice threatened the British, French and Israelis with the introduction of Soviet "volunteers" into the area.[3] This was, at least in retrospect, obviously bluff, but it did testify to Moscow's appreciation of the potential of a diplomacy of limited force. An even longer stride toward employment of such a diplomacy was taken the following year, during the first phase of the Syrian-Turkish crisis, when Damascus enthusiastically accepted Marshal Georgiy Zhukov's offer to send a Soviet naval contingent to Latakia.[4] The contingent was withdrawn, however, before Khrushchev himself opened the second phase of the crisis, and for a full decade afterward, until the June War of 1967, no recognized instances of Soviet coercive diplomacy based on forces in the forward area occurred.

Given the apparent Soviet and the obvious Arab appreciation of the utility of coercive diplomacy, Moscow's reluctance to practice it during this period is not readily explicable on any other grounds than lack of faith in the capabilities of the Soviet navy. These would take years to build up by introducing features of the "revolution in military affairs" such as nuclear submarines, missiles, and advanced electronics. As a matter of fact, circumstantial evidence, though not conclusive, suggests that Zhukov's role in sending the naval contingent to Syria in September 1957 provided the foundation for the charge of "adventurism" leveled against him a month later, at the time of his fall from power.[5] In the Soviet lexicon, adventurism indicates the mismatch of inadequate means to worthwhile ends. Given Soviet naval capabilities in 1957, it is understandable how the charge might have been made.

Some analysts, contending that the surface ship is supreme and the submarine useless in naval diplomacy, have taken Khrushchev's outspoken preference for submarines as evidence of his indifference to this naval mission.[6] But theirs is a mistaken contention, which uses visibility rather than credible combat capability as the main index of political effectiveness. In the Soviet view, the primary obstacle to the advance of Soviet interests in the Third World is the United States carrier task group; and the most credible instrument to counter this obstacle is the Soviet anticarrier task group, the key unit of which is a cruise-missile submarine, supplemented by torpedo-attack submarines. More-

3. Oles M. Smolansky, *The Soviet Union and the Arab East Under Khrushchev*, Lewisburg, PA, Bucknell University Press, 1974, pp. 46-47.

4. George Dragnich, "The Soviet Union's Quest for Access to Naval Facilities in Egypt Prior to the June War of 1967," in Michael MccGwire et al., Eds., *Soviet Naval Policy*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1975, pp. 243-44.

5. We are indebted to Robert Weinland of the Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, VA, for this hypothesis.

6. For Khrushchev's views, see Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott, London, André Deutsch, 1974, pp. 29-34.



A Soviet Juliet class submarine shown under way off the coast of Spain in May 1972. Such submarines, armed with surface-to-surface missiles, often form part of Soviet anticarrier task forces.

—Official US Navy photo.

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over, even the surface ships that are standard components of Soviet anticarrier task groups are normally equipped with modern surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles; only exceptionally are they the traditional gun cruisers and destroyers on which Zhukov had to rely in the Syrian crisis and which Khrushchev later dismissed as fit only for official harbor displays. It is certainly worth noting that almost every class of surface vessel making up the permanent or crisis-generated Soviet presence in the forward area right up to the present is the result of a production decision made under either Khrushchev or his predecessors, not under CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, who happened to take power when earlier production decisions were coming to fruition.

In short, there is little reason to impeach Gorshkov's testimony. By 1954 Moscow evidently realized both the need for a diplomacy of force to round out its new Third World policy, and the need for patience and restraint until the proper capabilities for this role could be developed. Since it is generally held that the gestation period for naval hardware from conception to deployment is on the order of 8–12 years, it is perhaps no coincidence that the actual decision to begin employing force for political purposes, apparently made at the turn of the year 1965-66, took place when it did.

Practice of Naval Diplomacy

Once suitable capabilities exist, the first step in naval diplomacy is to "establish a presence," and the course followed by the USSR was no exception in this regard. All of the connotations of the word "presence" may not be clear, but we are tempted to treat it as essentially a matter of implanting in a given geographic area a series of artificial "islands" which bristle with weaponry, one of the highest attributes of sovereignty. Since sovereignty tends to be indivisible, the establishment of such "islands" makes an external power a regional power and a factor in all regional calculations. President Anwar Sadat of Egypt once said essentially the same thing when he characterized the superpower fleets in the Mediterranean Sea as "no more than floating borders," that is, "a piece of American or Soviet territory on the borders of our territorial waters. . . ."[7]

7. Sadat interview in *October* (Cairo), Jan. 1, 1978, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa* (Washington, DC), Jan. 4, 1978, p. D/13.

A Soviet Kynda class guided-missile cruiser and a Soviet tanker rendezvous in the Atlantic Ocean in July 1969.

—Official US Navy photo.

In the dozen years between 1964 and 1976, the scale of Soviet out-of-area forward operations—i.e., of Soviet presence—expanded by a factor of almost 14, from less than 4,000 ship-days annually to nearly 48,000. The peak was reached in 1974, after which there was a slight decline. Despite this dramatic increase, however, the normal rate of Soviet deployment beyond home waters remained well below that of the US navy. On an "average" day in 1975, for example, less than one tenth of available Soviet forces were out of area. This was in marked contrast to the 30 percent yardstick usually applied to the US navy's general-purpose deployments.

The motivations behind the establishment of a Soviet out-of-area naval presence have, of course, been much debated. It has been argued that the presence is essentially tied to strategic defense of the homeland against missile and carrier-based air strikes from the sea. Given the primacy of these war-related tasks, according to this line of argument, there is no surplus capability available for the practice of diplomacy of force. At best, the latter may emerge as a byproduct of defensive deployment—and a relatively insignificant byproduct at that, except insofar as the payoff from naval diplomacy improves the strategic-defense infrastructure (e.g., via the establishment of bases).

Such a thesis, however, seems less and less tenable as evidence accumulates on Soviet mis-

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Two Soviet guided-missile destroyers at anchor in Bombay harbor during a 1968 goodwill visit to India. In the foreground is the Indian tricolor.

—David Channer/Camera Press.

sion priorities, the types of ship classes in the Soviet presence, and their actual behavior in crisis situations.[8] In fact, Soviet motives seem to have been both strategic and political. The USSR's forward presence has served the country's direct confrontation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as Moscow's "state interests" in littoral countries, with the particular accent varying from region to region. The initial submarine presence established in the Mediterranean in 1958 was oriented exclusively against NATO, with the Soviets carefully avoiding any implications of a Third World role at that time.[9] The same was true of the presence reestablished in 1964, following an interruption caused by the Soviet rift with Albania. However, beginning in 1966, after the Soviets had resolved on a diplomacy of force, Soviet naval presence came to serve political interests on the sea's southern littoral as well as military interests on the NATO flank. The concrete benefits that Moscow derived from naval diplomacy in the heyday of Arab-Soviet friendship did improve the naval infrastructure that served both missions; but more important, they also took the form of increased Soviet influence in the Arab world and especially in Egypt, the political key to the Middle East.

In 1968, Soviet warships moved further afield, into the Indian Ocean, and they have remained there, via relief contingents, with no break in continuity since the follow-up deployment of 1969. The impact of this presence has clearly been more politico-military and local than strategic, if only because the Soviets themselves know that the Indian Ocean is not a patrol area for US Polaris submarines. Although the focal point of Soviet presence is within the arc of strategic concern sometimes drawn at Polaris or carrier-based air range around the USSR, it is also on the water's edge of a zone of special Soviet political concern. In crisis after crisis in the Middle East and South Asia, Moscow has shown its sensitivity to events on the USSR's southern borders.

In 1969, the Soviets expanded their forward-area activities still further, when they introduced the practice of periodic sorties to the Caribbean. And in 1970, in the Eastern Atlantic, the nucleus was established for what turned out to be a permanent West African patrol. While the Carribean deployments initially seemed to have political overtones for the rest of the western hemisphere, the actual long-run implications have been more politico-military and strategic in the context of Soviet and joint Soviet-Cuban confrontations with the United States. In the Eastern Atlantic, in contrast, while there was a strategic-reconnaissance payoff from the West African patrol, compensation for the domestic and international services that the patrol performed for Guinea turned that country into a *point d'appui* for the extension of Soviet political and politico-military influence elsewhere in the region, e.g., in Angola.

Since 1966, the USSR has followed a fairly standard pattern. Very shortly after the establishment of a presence, the Soviet navy has begun to practice both the cooperative and coercive forms of naval diplomacy.

Total instances of cooperative diplomacy have increased dramatically. Cooperative diplomacy, of course, had been employed earlier in the post-

8. James McConnell, "Strategy and Missions of the Soviet Navy in the Year 2000," in James George, Ed., *Problems of Seapower As We Approach the Twenty-First Century*, Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute, 1978, pp. 43-44, 47-48, 52-54.

9. See John Chomeau, *Seapower as a Political Instrument*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1974, p. 72; Dragnich, loc. cit., p. 246.

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Stalinist period, the first instance being the dispatch of a Sverdlov class cruiser to the 1953 coronation review of Queen Elizabeth II at Spithead, England. Between 1953 and 1966, however, the Soviets made only 37 identifiable diplomatic port calls, primarily to Western Europe. During the ten years that followed, in contrast, more than 170 such visits took place to 48 different countries, mostly in the Third World. In addition, on two occasions the Soviet fleet has given technical assistance in Third World areas—mine-clearing in Bangladesh harbors in 1972 and in the southern approaches to the Suez Canal in 1974. There has only been a single case of humanitarian assistance, during the Mauritian cyclone disaster of 1975.

Of far greater consequence has been the Soviet practice of coercive naval and military diplomacy. In times of crisis, either through fleet augmentations or the manipulation of its on-scene presence, Moscow has demonstrated its concern over situations in which Soviet interests might be jeopardized. When Soviet interests have in fact been threatened, the USSR has demonstrated a resolve to protect them through changes in fleet posture or other methods of politico-military signaling. Finally, on a number of occasions when lesser measures have failed, Moscow has authorized politico-military interventions in areas of actual or potential armed conflict. These initiatives must have given the Soviet leadership some anxious moments; yet, whatever its misgivings, the leadership evidently felt that the necessity of protecting Soviet interests outweighed attendant burdens and risks. Since the first case of coercive Soviet military diplomacy during the June War of 1967 in the Middle East, not a single year has elapsed without at least one repeat performance (see Table 1 on the next page).



Three Soviet ships—from left to right, a Kildin class guided-missile destroyer, a Kynda class guided-missile cruiser, and a Kashin class guided-missile destroyer—at dockside ceremonies in Havana. The vessels were part of a naval group that visited Cuba in the summer of 1969.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

The Resolve Behind Naval Diplomacy

Some analysts, basing their view on Khrushchev's diplomacy of bluff during his tenure, when Soviet general-war capabilities were stretched to cover Third World situations they could not handle, continue to doubt whether the USSR is prepared to use force on behalf of interests that are less than vital. But much has changed since Khrushchev's day, and it would be a great mistake to think that there is no resolve behind the Soviet diplomacy of force. In 1972, writers from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), one of Moscow's "think tanks," openly acknowledged that, at the time when they were writing, the Soviet armed forces did have the mission of "active counteraction of the aggressive aspirations of imperialism on a world scale," but admitted in the same breath that "neither in the period when the strategy of 'massive retaliation' prevailed in the US [1954–61], *nor in the first years* after it was supplemented by the strategy of flexible response [in 1961], did the Soviet armed forces have to carry out such a function." The authors might have been implicitly supplying the reason for the change of mission that had taken place when they noted that strategic weapons are "of extraordinary importance from the standpoint of preventing a general nuclear war, but. . . may not always and everywhere be effective in situations that can issue in limited wars," which require a local "military presence" made up of "mobile armed forces."[10] In Khrushchev's day the USSR had no such forces. After the mid-1960's

10. A.M. Dudin and Yu. N. Listvinov, "The Contradictory Character of the New Stage of the Arms Race," in V.M. Kulish et al., *Voyennaya sila i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya* (Military Force and international Relations), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1972, pp. 135-36. The emphasis in this and all other quotations is ours.

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Table 1: Cases of Coercive Soviet Military Diplomacy, May 1967-February 1976

Date	Place	Action
May-June 1967	Eastern Mediterranean	"Attentional" show of force by 2 anticarrier warfare (ACW) task groups, matching 2 US carrier task groups, during Arab-Israeli war.
June 1967	Syria	Threat of Soviet airborne intervention to deter Israeli march on Damascus.
July-September 1967	Egyptian ports	Soviet combatants put into Port Said and Alexandria to deter Israeli attacks.
October 1967-October 1973	Egyptian ports	Combatants return to and maintain presence in Port Said and Alexandria after Israeli shelling of Port Suez.
1967	Yemen	Soviet pilots help quell royalist insurrection.
January-February 1968	Sea of Japan	"Attentional show of force against US fleet reacting to North Korean seizure of USS Pueblo.
January-February 1969	Gulf of Guinea	"Compellent" show of force off Ghanaian coast during negotiations on release of detained Soviet trawlers.
April 1969	Sea of Japan	"Limiting" show of force against US naval reaction to North Korean downing of US EC-121 aircraft.
December 1969	Somali ports	Soviet ship visits to demonstrate support for new post-coup regime in conditions of domestic tension.
April-May 1970	Somali ports	USSR extends ship visits to Somali government that felt threatened by internal opposition allegedly in league with Ethiopia.
April-August 1970	Egypt	Intervention by Soviet air defense units in "war of attrition," to force cessation of Israeli deep-penetration air raids.
1970	Sudan	Soviet helicopter pilots assist government in putting down black autonomy movement in southern Sudan.
September-October 1970	Eastern Mediterranean	"Limiting" show of force by 4 Soviet ACW task groups against US 6th Fleet during Jordanian crisis.
December 1970-1971	Eastern Atlantic	Soviet West Africa patrol established to deter further naval attacks on Republic of Guinea from Portuguese Guinea (Bissau).
1971-present	Eastern Atlantic	West Africa patrol continues, apparently to provide domestic support to unstable government of Republic of Guinea.
May 1971	Sierra Leone	Soviet port call at Freetown during period of domestic instability.
December 1971	Indian Ocean	Soviet ACW task group deployed, apparently to counter British carrier task group during India-Pakistan war.
December 1971	Indian Ocean	Additional Soviet ACW task group deployed during war to counter US carrier Enterprise task group.
May-June 1972	South China Sea	"Attentional" show of force in reaction to US mining of Haiphong harbor.
April-July 1973	Mediterranean	Protected sealift of Moroccan troops to Syria.
Summer 1973	Arabian Sea	Protected sealift of South Yemeni troops from capital to eastern region bordering Oman, for probable use in Dhofar rebellion.
October 1973	Eastern Mediterranean	Deterrent show of force by 5 Soviet ACW task groups, matching 5 US attack carrier and amphibious task groups, during Arab-Israeli October war.
October 1973	Eastern Mediterranean	Soviet combatants steam into war zone off Syrian coast after Israeli attacks on Soviet ships in Tartus.
October 1973	Syria	Threat of Soviet airborne intervention to deter Israeli advance on Damascus.
October-November 1973	Gulf of Aden	Soviet "attentional" show of force against US naval reaction to Arab blockade of Bab el Mandeb straits in Red Sea.
November 1974	Latakia, Syria	Soviet combatants temporarily put into this port in connection with tension surrounding Syrian refusal to renew mandate for UN troops on Golan Heights.
November 1975-February 1976	Eastern Atlantic	Combatants deployed off the coast of Congo (Brazzaville) to protect sealift of military supplies to favored faction in Angolan civil war.
January-February 1976	Central Atlantic	Soviet ACW task group deployed in connection with Angolan civil war, to counter anticipated US carrier task group, which did not appear.

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they did: a fleet in the forward area for credibility at sea, and airborne troops for power projection ashore. Local-war doctrine apparently began to emerge quickly after the USSR developed local-war capabilities.

The implicit statements just cited are neither the only nor the most compelling testimony that the introduction of Soviet local-war doctrine followed the US adoption of a flexible-response strategy by no more than a few years. The evidence points to a decision in late 1965, taken in the course of a doctrinal review that appears to be standard practice for each new five-year plan. One tip-off was the addition at that time of "military support" to the other types of support—ideological, political, and material—that the USSR would render to peoples resisting aggression.[11] Another was the extension in 1966 of the "international mission" of the Soviet armed forces from the community of socialist states to the Third World.[12]

Perhaps the most telling indicator, however, was a change in the standard formula concerning the conditions for escalation from local conventional war to world nuclear war. In the first half of the 1960's it had been stressed that any local war in which both superpowers participated would "inevitably" escalate. This probably meant, in the entire context of Soviet discussions, that Moscow should avoid becoming involved unless the local conflict touched on the USSR's "fundamental interests,"[13] which are surely few and far between in the Third World. In late 1965, this formula was qualified in a major way by General Colonel N. Lomov, when he declared that escalation was inevitable only in "certain circumstances."[14] These circumstances may have been specified in Marshal M.V. Zakharov's 1968 statement that "escalation is more likely with the participation in the local war of states having nuclear weapons, and *especially when the vitally important interests of these states are infringed upon* in such a war."[15] The implication is that escalation is less likely if vital interests are not at stake; this would generally be the case in the Third World.

Although such qualifications of the doctrine of inevitable escalation have been taken by some to apply to wars in Europe, this would seem an impermissible inference, in view of the Soviet definition of "local war" as involving only "two or a few states" on a limited extent of territory.[16] Because of alliance obligations, wars in Europe would engage NATO and the Warsaw Pact organization, and, as Lomov pointed out in his 1965 article, a clash between them "would be a world nuclear war, in which both warring sides will pursue the most decisive political goals, with all the consequences that flow from this."[17] In short, the unlimited ends of coalition wars dictate their unlimited means. A local war can be fought conventionally, because its goals are limited. A "world war" between the two European coalitions, on the other hand, might have an initial nonnuclear phase but cannot be fought through to the end without escalation, for "such wars know no political compromises and are waged with the maximum use of all forces and means at the states' disposal."[18]

Within this context, Admiral Gorshkov's statements in 1967 stressing for the first time the capabilities of his navy "both in a nuclear-missile war and in a war without the use of this weapon"[19] become fully comprehensible. He was referring to coalition world wars in the first case and Third World local wars in the second. The point was further confirmed in 1968 by the naval theoretician K.A. Stalbo. After pointing out that "a war against the Soviet Union or one of the countries of the socialist camp . . . will inevitably assume the character of a coalition world nuclear war," he added that "Soviet military doctrine also recognizes the

11. Compare V.D. Sololovskiy, Ed., *Voyennaya strategiya* (Military Strategy), 2nd ed., Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1963, pp. 228-29, with ibid., 3rd ed., Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1968, p. 222.

12. N. Zagorodnikov, "The Military Might of the Socialist System and the World Revolutionary Process," *Kommunist vooruzhënnykh sil* (Moscow), No. 16, 1966, pp. 43-44, 48-49; an editorial entitled "The Leninist Course in Domestic and Foreign Policy," ibid., No. 17, 1966, p. 5; S.G. Gorshkov, "Our Mighty Ocean-Going Fleet," *Pravda* (Moscow), July 30, 1967; N. Sergeyev, "On Guard Over the Motherland's Maritime Frontiers," *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), July 30, 1967; N.P. Pankratov, "V.I. Lenin on the International Character of the Armed Forces of a Socialist State," in M.V. Zakharov, Ed., *V.I. Lenin i voyennaya istoriya* (V.I. Lenin and Military History), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1970, p. 223.

13. N. Talenskiy, quoted in "U.S. Ed. Note 4: Some Soviet Views on Limited War," in V.D. Sokolovskiy, Ed., *Soviet Military Strategy,* Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1963, p. 290; Sokolovskiy, *Voyennaya strategiya,* 2nd ed., pp. 232, 242; I. Zav'yalov et al., "Against Libels and Lies," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), Nov. 2, 1963.

14. N. Lomov, "The Influence of Soviet Military Doctrine on the Development of Military Art," *Kommunist vooruzhënnykh sil,* No. 21, 1965, p. 16; also V. Larionov, "The Political Side of Soviet Military Doctrine," ibid., No. 2, 1968, p. 16.

15. M.V. Zakharov, Ed., *50 let vooruzhënnykh sil SSSR* (50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1968, p. 522.

16. S.G. Gorshkov, *Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva* (Sea Power of the State), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976, p. 381.

17. Lomov, loc. cit., p. 15. See also pp. 18, 21.

18. Larionov, loc. cit., p. 14.

19. S. G. Gorshkov, "Development of the Soviet Naval Art," *Morskoy sbornik* (Moscow), February 1967, p. 20.

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Soviet AN-12 aircraft such as those shown here onloading paratroopers provide the USSR with a long-range military transport capability. The photo was released in conjunction with Soviet Army and Navy Day, February 23, 1976.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

possibility of local wars arising, conducted without the use of nuclear weapons" and assigning an important place to combat at sea.[20] Gorshkov later implied that any participation by the USSR in local wars would stem from the need to protect "state interests" in the underdeveloped world.[21]

Assuming that Soviet actions are based on Soviet doctrine, it is interesting to note that, as far as is known, in no Third World crisis has Moscow increased the readiness level of either strategic forces or general-purpose forces other than those—essentially naval units and airborne troops—intended for use within the immediate crisis theater. We take this as reflecting a desire to localize crises and keep them at the conventional level, in line with Soviet definitions of local war.

Of course, the adoption of a local-war doctrine in no way means that the USSR is prepared to use force on every occasion when crisis occurs. Moscow recognizes that credible capabilities and the resolve to use them are prerequisites for politically effective threats, but it also perceives that these are not the only underlying factors and that to achieve one's ends without unacceptable risks, a diplomacy of force can be practiced only within a relatively narrow range of circumstances.

Soviet View of Acceptable Risks

Intuitively it would seem that success in a diplomacy of force and the avoidance of unacceptable risks in practicing it hinge on the presence in the conflict situation of some crucial factor that is asymmetrical in its effects on the two superpower con-

20. K.A. Stalbo, "Development of the Naval Art and Navies in the Postwar Period," in S.Ye. Zakharov, Ed., *Istoriya voyenno-morskogo iskusstva* (History of the Naval Art), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1969, p. 560.

21. S.G. Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace," *Morskoy sbornik*, February 1973, pp. 21-22.

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tenders. One government, say, has to have greater capabilities or greater national resolve behind it; or it must place a higher value on the interests at stake. But in the Third World, there have been no crucial asymmetries in any of these three factors. With respect to capabilities, both the US carrier task group and the Soviet anticarrier task group are credible in the sense that while neither is assured of victory or even stalemate, each can give a "good account" of itself and prevent the preparation of a fait accompli. In its crisis deployments, Moscow evidently finds it sufficient to match the US efforts, with one Soviet anticarrier task group assigned for each US carrier task group; and there seems little striving on the part of either superpower to arrive the "fustest with the mostest" to present the other with a fait accompli. As for national resolve, it is a moot point whether this ought to stand as an independent factor at all: it may be more a creature of other factors—capabilities, interests, etc.—than a determinant in its own right. But if it is an autonomous factor, its impact in conflict situations thus far has hardly been consistent. The overall impression is of equal toughness and equal caution on the two sides, but without either power displaying the same one of these traits at the same time. Sometimes Washington takes the initiative; sometimes, Moscow. A similar symmetry appears to apply regarding the interests at stake, which in the Third World are appraised as roughly equal and generally not vital to either superpower. The one obvious exception, oil, has to date played no role in crisis confrontations.

There is one factor, however, that has had a radically *asymmetrical* effect on almost every crisis. This factor is the differential relationships of the respective superpower patrons and their clients to the status quo ante. In peacetime and at the outset of a Third World conflict between clients, superpower forces neutralize each other because, as yet, no breach of the status quo has occurred to disturb the existing balance in strength of will. Asymmetry in this respect develops only in the course of the conflict, when one client turns into a winner and the other into a loser. In the respective superpower reactions to the breach, experience confirms what theory might already have postulated, given the greater legitimacy of the current international system as compared with that of the 1930's. By virtue of the sense of international legitimacy behind him,



A Kashin class Soviet missile destroyer takes a close look at the attack aircraft carrier USS Franklin D. Roosevelt in the Mediterranean Sea in September 1967.

—Official US Navy photo.

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the patron of a client defending an interest previously in his possession, i.e., defending the old status quo or status quo ante, has greater credibility in threatening action than the patron of a client in the process of successfully seizing that interest in violation of the original status quo. This disadvantage leads to an imbalance in strength of will, with the latter patron being inclined to stand aside and suffer the threat to his client. But he will stand aside on the spot, in a posture of readiness, to ensure that the opposing patron's defense of the old status quo does not itself turn into a breach of it, at which time the balance in strength of will would be expected to turn around. Thus, the presence of both global powers is ordinarily necessary in a crisis, with the first patron acting to defend his own client (or his own interest) against the opposing client, and the second patron reacting to defend his client against the opposing patron. The political impact of the first patron's "purposeful" show of force, whether to deter or compel, is offset to some extent by the second patron's "limiting" show of force, which confines to defensive ends a threat to his client that might otherwise be construed as open-ended.

This is not to say that Moscow on balance favors the status quo or that, without opposition, it will uphold it. Indeed, the status quo does not always command respect in and of itself; if there is no policeman, there may be no law. The point, rather, is that while in crisis confrontations Moscow may not feel the inertial weight of the status quo to the same extent as a Western power, the impulse of the USSR to expand its influence is still conditioned enough by the international system for Moscow to have developed some hesitancy in this regard. This puts the Soviet Union at a disadvantage in a test of wills with an armed opponent known for commitment to the status quo in the past and demonstrating all the conventional signs of continued commitment on the occasion in question.

The status quo, in the sense which pertains here, has three forms. The first rests on the principle of freedom of the seas. On four occasions since 1967 the Soviet navy has demonstrated an intention to protect maritime lines of communication, without any answering show of force by the US.[22] However, on no occasion has Moscow threatened the rights of others to common use of the sea.

The second form of the status quo relates to the sovereignty of established governments with respect to internal affairs. On six occasions, the USSR has demonstrated a readiness to use force or has actually employed force in support of established governments against domestic foes, without ever having to face an American politico-military response. The USSR has never made a show of force in support of a successful coup against an established government before time has proven the new regime's control and thus the emergence of a new status quo.[23] Moscow did carry out a naval demonstration against the established government of Ghana in 1969, but this was not in support of any domestic opposition. The action was taken on the basis of a recognized international principle—the protection of Soviet lives and property on foreign soil. More serious, in early 1976 Moscow violated the sovereignty of the people of Angola, at a time when they had no established government, by transporting Cuban combat units into the country to help a minority political faction seize control. To support this action, a Soviet naval show of force was mounted, apparently in anticipation of an American reaction. This never materialized, however, and it is our view that the indispensable factor behind Moscow's unprecedented boldness was a Soviet reading of the US attitude as one of ambivalence toward forces that many judged to be tainted by connections with South Africa.

The final form of the status quo relevant here is bound up with the integrity of states in international affairs. On numerous occasions Moscow has carried out purposeful shows of force or actual politico-military interventions in support of clients which were strategically on the defensive in war or which seemed likely to be attacked in a period of peace. Soviet naval combatants were put into Egyptian ports in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 and into Syrian ports in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 in order to deter the Israelis. Moreover, Soviet air defense units were introduced into Egypt on a large scale in 1970, during the Middle East war of attrition, to stop deep-penetration raids by Israel. In the course of both the June and October wars, Moscow used airborne alerts and naval movements to forestall feared Israeli marches on Damascus. All of these were credible shows of force. The credibility of the re-

22. The cases in question are the sealift of Moroccan troops to Syria (1973); the sealift of South Yemeni troops (1973); the October war sea and airlift to Syria (1973); and the deployment during the crisis in Angola.

23. Despite charges to the opposite effect, we find no evidence of a Soviet show of force on the morrow of the overthrow of King Idris in Libya in 1969, nor during the same year's successful coup d'etat in Somalia.

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solve behind the threat of CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev to intervene *on the Suez Canal front* in the October war, in contrast, seems questionable. Soviet airborne troops could have been quite effective in the point defense of Cairo and Aswan, but they would have been severely handicapped in desert maneuvering. Just as important, Tel Aviv had as yet committed no clearly actionable offense. Both belligerents, not just Israel, were in violation of the status quo ante—Cairo with troops still on the east bank of the Canal, and Tel Aviv with troops on the west bank. One interpretation of Brezhnev's threat, advanced at the time by the Washington Special Action Group, was that it may have been intended mainly to supply US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger with an argument powerful enough to force a froward client state to accept previously arranged superpower agreements on a cease-fire.[24]

We have investigated only one case where a Soviet show of force, while tactically defensive in form, had the effect of enabling a client movement to continue a strategic offensive across borders in violation of the status quo. This was the Guinea case of 1970, in which the Soviets mounted a naval patrol to deter further Portuguese attacks from their Guinea (Bissau) colony on the independent Republic of Guinea, where the headquarters of the Guinea (Bissau) insurgency were located. Here again, the outcome pursued by the USSR was attainable only because the US was not supporting the colonial status quo in the neighboring Portuguese colony. On the other hand, there have been numerous cases of Soviet counterdemonstrations against shows of force by US naval forces made when Soviet clients have disturbed the strategic status quo, e.g., in connection with the North Korean seizure of the Pueblo in 1968; the Jordanian, India-Pakistan, and Haiphong-mining crises of the early 1970's; and the Arab blockade of the Strait of Bab el Mandeb during the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973. However, it is unlikely that these Soviet counterdemonstrations aimed at deterring US action. Moscow would not have had the strength of will required for any such attempt, since strategical-

24. Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, *The Yom Kippur War*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1974, p. 408.

A Soviet Kashin class destroyer armed with surface-to-air missiles at anchor at Port Said on September 11, 1967. The Soviet vessel had put in at the Egyptian port—located at the northern end of the Suez Canal—after there were reports of fighting between Egyptian and Israeli troops at the canal's southern end.

—Wide World.

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ly its clients were the culpable parties. Soviet naval movements during these crises, rather, should be construed—depending on their vigor and the posture adopted—either as "attentional" shows of force, to signal an interest in the specific incident, or as "limiting" shows of force, intended to confine the US threat to defensive ends.

The Balance Sheet

Given this constellation of factors—equality of interests and national resolve, credible capabilities on both sides, and bias in favor of the status quo—the upshot of superpower diplomacy of force in the Third World is a tendency to maintain common rights to the sea, uphold the domestic authority of established governments, and limit the outcome of interstate conflicts. As long as both superpowers are committed to the causes of contending Third World actors—and this is an important qualification, as the cases of Guinea in 1970 and Angola in 1976 demonstrate—the realistic aim of the forward positioning of forces seems to be not to maximize gains, but to minimize losses. If the objective is to overcome the status quo without unacceptable risks, instruments other than the presence or use of armed forces of the superpowers have to be brought into play—subversion, say, or arms aid.

Surely it is a positive step when the USSR is transformed from a power totally confronting the international system from outside into a power "on the make" within the system, subject to the conditioning effect of its rules and checks and balances. Still, for a number of reasons, one ought to resist idealizing the situation as it now stands. First, while the two superpowers do seem to have had the same understanding, by and large, of just what the status quo ante was at all the critical junctures, their interpretations could diverge in the future, or they could show less restraint in their actions in ambiguous situations. Second, the orderly course that we have postulated for confrontations applies at the policy level, but there may be far less stability at the local level, where naval *instruments of policy* come into play. The "rules of the game" have to be enforced, and it is no reflection on the discipline of the American and Soviet navies to acknowledge the dangers inherent in the intermingling of two combat-ready fleets in high-tension situations, especially when the presence of other parties, whose actions could be erroneously attributed, is taken into account. Third, "maintenance of the status quo" has a nice ring to it, but we need to bear in mind two qualifications. On the one hand, fanaticism, irresponsibility, and crying injustice are also part of the status quo; on the other hand, the mere fact of the existence of a superpower commitment to the status quo on behalf of a client may be enough to assure the client of safety of action in violation of the status quo, for he knows that if his offensive fails, he will not lose everything. As every poker player is aware, if you lower the stakes, you increase the number of players. Prior to the appearance of the Soviet fleet in Third World areas, the US was in a better position to deal with both of these problems, no matter how much Washington's otherwise open-ended threats might have been vitiated by the traditional American sense of limits and by political and military realities.

Moreover, greater risks of a superpower clash, more Third World conflicts, and the greater security afforded irresponsible regimes do not exhaust the list of adverse consequences of the Soviet presence. Every Soviet show of force in support of the status quo and every Soviet action in breach of a status quo not defended by the US results in greater influence for a patron whose interests often conflict with those of the US within the system and which makes the US uneasy by continued avowal of an ultimate intention to overthrow the system. Maintenance of the status quo in the international legal sense, therefore, is perfectly compatible with a breach of the status quo in the central balance of power. Soviet-Cuban action, for example, recently restored the status quo ante in the Horn of Africa; but it created for the actors a presence and influence in Ethiopia that they had not had before.

One should not exaggerate Soviet gains from this source, either in the particular case of the Horn of Africa or with respect to the cumulative effect of all such cases. For one thing, it is difficult to know how to measure Soviet gains; most such calculations are simply made on the abstract assumption that services rendered ought to merit a return. In any case, Soviet influence is not the same as Soviet control. Communization has not been part of the payoff anywhere, and the access gained by the USSR to Third World policymaking circles has hardly proved permanent.

Nor should we conclude that Moscow's gains from naval diplomacy have, on balance, exceeded Washington's, or that naval diplomacy, in the Soviet view, is the central mode of competition. It is only one of Moscow's instruments of policy. Indeed, in the hierarchy of Soviet ranking terminology, the navy

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rates as only an "important" instrument of policy.[25] It is not a "most important" instrument, much less a "main" one.

But while we do not want to exaggerate Soviet gains, we must also take care that they not be qualified away. The Soviets have a new tool to affect the balance of power, and they are making the most of it, within the bounds of prudence. If, in the apparent Soviet view, the threat of force is not an all-purpose recourse but only an "ultimate remedy,"[26] it is still not to be disregarded—especially since the USSR competes better with it than with most other policy instruments, thanks to a real burden of defense that proportionately is at least twice that of the United States.[27] Third World countries have many needs, and the "ultimate remedy" is often one of them, however much these countries may abstractly reject the notion of dependence on outside powers. In some situations, Moscow has a definite advantage over Washington in offering its services. Perhaps Washington's least enviable situations arise when the US cannot support an unjust status quo but is committed to overturning it only through negotiation and compromise. In these cases, impatient peoples, despite misgivings, will often turn for help to the USSR, which has less scruples over the use of force. The more typical situation, however, is that of Soviet clients with hostile neighbors or Soviet clients which want to be saved from the worst consequences of their own aggression. Clients of the latter type may well know that the USSR cannot use its armed forces to help them make gains, but they also know that the USSR can do much to make sure that their losses are tolerable. Although sovereignty is precious, high-quality armed forces are scarce; thus, the great power willing to supply the latter to protect the former can command a high premium for its services. In time, clients may cease to demand this particular service, but it is questionable whether any of the others a patron can provide will have superior longevity.

Nor finally, in this world of flux, should one confuse the "impermanent" with the "ephemeral." For years, Moscow enjoyed the friendship of the Arab world as an element in the balance of power, and when the leading power in the Arab world abrogated this friendship, the USSR found another fertile field for military diplomacy in Africa. Even in the Middle East, it cannot be said that the "Soviet card" is no longer playable. It always exists as an option that influences the situation, and one of the conditions for its credibility is a Soviet military presence in the area. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that there have been no signs in Moscow of disenchantment with the Soviet military as a policy instrument. Both Soviet statements and Soviet practice suggest that the era of "gunboat diplomacy" is nowhere near over.[28]

This is cause for concern, but not for despair. Naval diplomacy is not a field abandoned to the Soviet Union. Moreover, the West can often compensate for disadvantages it faces in a diplomacy of force by superior capabilities in other spheres of policy, especially the economic sphere. In addition, while there is some reason theoretically to expect more Third World conflicts as a result of the presence and the commitments of both superpowers in Third World areas, a tendency to limit the outcomes of these conflicts has also become clear.

25. Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace," loc. cit., p. 24; Gorshkov, *Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva*, pp. 249, 403.

26. V.M. Kulish, "Military Force in International Relations," in Kulish et al., op. cit., p. 24.

27. See US Central Intelligence Agency, *Estimated Soviet Defense Spending in Rubles, 1970-1975*, SR 76-1012H, Washington, DC, May 1976, p. 16.

28. Gorshkov, *Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva*, p. 410.

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The Passion of Kampuchea

by Joseph J. Zasloff and MacAlister Brown

The overthrow of Democratic Kampuchea by a Vietnamese invasion force in January 1979 ended four years of rule by a regime that will probably turn out to be the most radical of the 20th century. In implementing their unlimited revolution, the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea had visited upon the Cambodian people untold hardship and prolonged the enormous suffering that the nation had endured during the devastating war from 1970 to 1975.

The Vietnamese army ousted this regime in a two-week blitzkrieg executed by more than 100,000 troops, powerfully supported by tanks, armored vehicles, and aircraft. In its place, the Vietnamese installed the People's Republic of Kampuchea, headed by Heng Samrin, an obscure former division commander of the Pol Pot army, who had defected to Vietnam in April 1978. The Vietnamese were not deterred from continuing their military operations by either a United Nations Security Council draft resolution which called upon "all foreign forces" (meaning the Vietnamese) to withdraw from Cambodia—and which the Soviet Union subsequently vetoed—or a similar resolution adopted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, comprised of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines).[1]

Vietnam's lightning invasion of the territory of its "fraternal revolutionary ally" was the culmination of a conflict that had been hidden from public view during the wartime collaboration of the Vietnamese and Cambodian revolutionaries. Tensions between Cambodia and Vietnam have deep historical roots—Cambodians look with fear and suspicion at Vietnam for having seized part of the Khmer Empire, which once stretched from the South China Sea (territory that is now southern Vietnam) to Thailand. From 1970 to 1975, these national animosities were muted by Cambodia's dependence upon Vietnam's assistance and by their mutual wartime interests. After the Khmer leaders came to power in April 1975, the tensions grew, and eventually produced violent border clashes during 1977. Vietnam, in February 1978, proposed negotiations, but the Cambodians rudely rejected the proposal. They charged Vietnam with a scheme to bring them into a Vietnamese-dominated federation of Indochina and admonished the Vietnamese to stop their aggression.[2] This provocative behavior of the Cambodians seemed curious in view of the great disparity of strength between Cambodia, a country of less than 8 million with military forces numbering only about 75,000, and Vietnam, a nation of 50 million with an army which was the most powerful in Southeast Asia, had been battle-tested against formidable enemies, and was fully equipped with modern weapons. It appears that the Kampuchean leaders were so wary of Vietnam's great strength, and so suspicious of Vietnamese intentions, that they deliberately rejected amicable relations, preferring to keep a hostile distance. Consequently, the Viet-

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1. See *The New York Times*, Jan. 21, 1979, and Rodney Tasker, "Condemnation but no Confrontation," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong—hereafter *FEER*), Jan. 26, 1979, p. 24.

2. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-APA*), Feb. 6 and 13, 1978.

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Armed forces of the Cambodian National United Front for National Salvation entering Phnom Penh on January 7, 1979.

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namese determined to replace them with a government that would be sensitive to Vietnamese interests. In light of subsequent events Kampuchean accusations of Vietnamese attempts at subversion during 1977[3] seem plausible. At any rate, in December 1978, after the close of the rainy season, the Vietnamese launched a massive military attack. Within two weeks, the invading Vietnamese forces captured Phnom Penh and the other major cities.

When the Vietnamese two months earlier had unveiled a Cambodian National United Front for National Salvation, located in territory adjacent to the western border of Vietnam, many Western analysts had interpreted this move as an indication of a Vietnamese intention to mount a slow campaign of "national liberation."[4] But the Vietnamese chose instead a rapid, decisive military thrust. There were probably several reasons for this decision. Although occupation of the border area might have contained Khmer attacks against neighboring Vietnamese villages, a costly war of attrition might have ensued. The Vietnamese leadership had to consider its weary southern population, distressed by the Cambodian raids and dissatisfied with its soldiers' involvement in yet another prolonged war.[5] In addition, they calculated that a longer-term strategy would give time to China, which had reinforced its troop concentrations on the Vietnamese border at the end of 1978, to exert military pressure on Vietnam through harassment, skirmishes, or even larger attacks at the frontier. Faced with the fait accompli of Vietnam's deposition of the Kampuchean regime and with the risk of retaliation by the Soviet Union (which had concluded a "treaty of friendship and cooperation" with Vietnam in early November

3. For an account of the Cambodian accusations against Vietnam, see a summary of the *Livre Noir* (Black Book), published by the Kampuchean Foreign Ministry, in Nayan Chanda, "The Black Book of Hatred," *FEER*, Jan. 19, 1979, pp. 19-22.

4. Based on personal interviews in Washington, DC, in December 1978.

5. See Nayan Chanda, "Cambodia: Fifteen Days That Shook Asia," *FEER*, Jan. 19, 1979, p. 13.

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Heng Samrin, President of the Cambodian National United Front for National Salvation, which seized power in Phnom Penh in January 1979.

—Camera Press.

1978[6]), the Chinese, the Vietnamese leaders felt (erroneously, it turned out), would be less likely to use military means to attempt a rollback of the Vietnamese or to punish them. Finally, swift military action by the Vietnamese diminished the effectiveness of any ASEAN or other international opposition that might have been organized against a slower campaign. In this regard, the Kampuchean regime had begun in late 1978 (with Chinese encouragement) to try to reduce its isolation by making overtures to its neighbors and even to Western powers. In short, the Vietnamese leaders apparently calculated not only that a rapid thrust would entail relatively lower costs than a slower method, but also that the former provided greater assurance than the latter that they would get the solution that they sought.

Whether Vietnam would eventually have moved to assert domination of Cambodia anyway is uncertain. Whatever Hanoi's long-term intentions however, it seems highly unlikely that the Vietnamese leaders, beset with economic and political difficulties at home, would have chosen to invade in 1978 if they had not encountered what they regarded as defiance by the Kampuchean regime.

An explanation of the Kampuchean leaders' provocative behavior toward Vietnam must be found in the very essence of their regime. The revolution in Kampuchea followed a radical totalitarian course so unprecedented as to defy existing political categories. Indeed, that this revolution occurred at all warrants very careful analysis. The peculiar political socialization of the revolutionary leaders during the period of the 1954 Geneva compromise and the raging violence of the guerrilla warfare of the 1970's seem to have convinced these leaders of the necessity of a rapid, total realization of their national aims. Moreover, along with the relatively brief existence of their movement, the suddenness of their final victory, their fear of counterrevolutionary forces, and the relative paucity and lack of sophistication of their soldiers and cadres went a rigid doctrine of economic self-reliance and a self-righteous puritanism. These congruent experiences and goals prompted the revolutionaries to force an entire nation into communes and to construct a tiny ruling organization whose contempt for the past was manifest in its willingness to enforce its vision of a new society by means of fear, suffering, and violence.

What follows is an exploration in depth of the nature of the regime. The discussion will seek to elaborate how and why a small band of revolutionary leaders imposed deadly work-camp conditions upon the Cambodian people and pursued a defiant, disastrous foreign policy against Kampuchea's powerful neighbor.

The Communist Revolutionary Movement

On April 17, 1975, about two weeks before the Vietnamese Communist troops captured Saigon, the military forces of the Khmer Rouge marched into Phnom Penh. To the bewilderment of the inhabitants, this army, a few hours after its victorious

6. For the text, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Nov. 6, 1978. Article 6, in part, reads: "In case either party is attacked or threatened with attack, the two parties signatory to the treaty shall immediately consult each other with a view to eliminating that threat, and shall take appropriate and effective measures to safeguard peace and the security of the two countries."

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entry, ordered a complete evacuation of the city—men, women, young, old, sick, and lame, from hospitals as well as homes. All were forced to leave immediately, with only what they could carry on their backs. Subsequently, the Khmer revolutionaries proceeded to liquidate large numbers of their former enemies and initiate a total restructuring of the economy and society. Their most cherished goals were declared to be self-reliance and independence. They were ready to wipe the slate clean of old values and to create a new Khmer culture and a new Khmer personality.

In September 1977, the Cambodian people was informed for the first time that the Communist Party of Kampuchea had been leading the Khmer Rouge revolution. At a rally in Phnom Penh on September 27, it was disclosed that Prime Minister Pol Pot (earlier known as Saloth Sar), was also the Secretary General of the party. Pol Pot made a five-hour speech in which he announced the 17th anniversary of the founding of the party and gave a rambling history of the party's revolutionary struggle and an outline of its strategy.[7]

In bringing the party out of secrecy, the leadership rewrote its history, to remove the Vietnamese Communist role in its founding and earliest years. Pol Pot, in his September 27 speech, did not mention that the forerunner of the Communist Party of Kampuchea was the Revolutionary Cambodian People's Party (Pracheachon), founded in 1951 as an offshoot of the Indochina Communist Party, which was under the direction of the Vietnamese. His brief allusions to the Cambodian revolutionary struggle before 1960 included an elliptical criticism of the Vietnamese party leaders and perhaps of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC), for pressuring the Indochina countries to conclude the Geneva agreement of 1954. The lesson that Pol Pot had drawn from this costly

7. Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian, Sept. 28, 1977, in *FBIS-APA*, Oct. 4, 1977.

Some of the Khmer Rouge soldiers who seized Phnom Penh in April 1975.

—Wide World.

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experience was that the Cambodian people must follow a correct party line, a line that "should be based on the principles of independence, initiative, self-determination and self-reliance, which means that we must rely primarily on our own people, our own army, our own revolution and on the actual revolutionary movement of the masses in our own country."

The early Communist organization of the 1950's had expanded into a fighting force which gained victory in the 1970–75 war.[8] Prior to 1954, the few Cambodian Communists, linked either with the Viet Minh or with a separate Cambodian resistance group, opposed both the French and Prince Norodom Sihanouk, whom they considered a French "puppet." Some of these individuals remained underground in Cambodia after the Geneva Conference in 1954, and others, variously estimated at 2,000–6,000, went to North Vietnam. Following the US and South Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia in 1970, the cadres in North Vietnam rapidly infiltrated back into Cambodia.

Probably the most important source of future leaders, however, was students who had been in France, many during the 1950's. Reflecting upon the ills of their country while participating in student politics in Paris, many Cambodian students intensified their nationalism and embraced Marxism. A few, including Khieu Samphan and Hou Youn, completed advanced degrees in France[9] and came back in the late 1950's to posts at the French university faculties in Phnom Penh. Others completed university undergraduate studies and returned in the late 1950's and early 1960's, many taking posts as teachers in the elementary and secondary schools while continuing their intense pursuit of politics. Several (among them Khieu Sampan and Hou Youn) accepted invitations from Prince Sihanouk, during his attempt in the early 1960's to disarm the opposition left-wing intellectuals, to join his government in ministerial posts. Others who sensed danger from Sihanouk's police during the same period (Ieng Sary, Son Sen, and Saloth Sar), quit Phnom Penh to join forces with the maquis. Following the Samlaut rebellion of March 1967, for which the Communist Party claimed credit, Sihanouk cracked down on the left-wing leaders, and many more fled to the maquis, who later sent some of them to China, then in the throes of the Cultural Revolution. Whatever their various times of arrival in the countryside, these radicalized young elements apparently found it most expedient to unite their revolutionary effort under Communist party discipline.

When Lon Nol and the discontented elite associated with him ousted Prince Sihanouk in March 1970, the revolutionary movement gained a strange bedfellow. Furious at the treachery of his erstwhile associates and determined to avenge himself, the prince threw in his lot with the group he had once derisively dubbed the Khmer Rouge. Though many of the Khmer Rouge leaders had fled to save themselves from his wrath and were committed to extirpating his royal regime, they welcomed him to the revolutionary organization. Sihanouk's participation added legitimacy to the Khmer Rouge cause, and his endorsement brought support from many of his followers (subsequently known as Khmer Rumda), who would otherwise have been unwilling to accept the revolutionary leadership. The prince was a useful spokesman for the revolutionaries abroad, and the government of which he was the titular head (called the Royal United National Front Government of Kampuchea or GRUNK, its French acronym) was almost successful in replacing his Phnom Penh successors at the United Nations.

Although Sihanouk's participation was useful to the revolutionary organization, neither he nor his followers had a significant influence on its decisions during the war. The prince himself seemed to understand that even his public prominence would be short-lived, telling an interviewer in 1973: "When I shall no longer be useful to them [the Khmer Rouge], they'll spit me out like a cherry

8. For analyses of the composition of the Khmer Rouge, see Elizabeth Becker, "Who Are the Khmer Rouge," *The Washington Post,* Mar. 10, 1974; David Brown, "Exporting Insurgency: The Communists in Cambodia," in Joseph J. Zasloff and Allan E. Goodman, Eds., *Indochina in Conflict,* Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1972, pp. 125-35; Richard Dudman, *Forty Days with the Enemy,* New York NY, Liveright Press, 1971; J.L.S. Girling, "The Resistance in Cambodia," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), July 1972, pp. 549-63; Kenneth M. Quinn, "Political Change in Wartime: The Khmer Krahom Revolution in Southern Cambodia, 1970-1974," *Naval War College Review* (Newport, RI), Spring 1976, pp. 3-31; Timothy M. Carney, *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea: Documents and Discussion,* Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Southeast Asian Program Data Paper, January 1977; Patrice de Beer, "Who Rules in Cambodia?" *Le Monde* (Paris), May 10, 1975; François Ponchaud, *Cambodge année zéro,* Paris, Juillard, 1977, Chap. 10.

9. The assertion made by Frank Snepp and others that Khieu Samphan's dissertation had made known years in advance that the Khmer Rouge "would raze the cities and turn the society into a great rural estate" does not hold up in a reading of the actual dissertation (dedicated to Prince Sihanouk) as submitted to the Law Faculty of the University of Paris, May 1959. The dissertation merely advocates the "methodical organization" of the peasantry "into mutual help teams and from there gradually into cooperatives," as well as the later "expansion and development of industry and trade." Cf. F. Snepp, *Decent Interval,* New York, NY, Random House, 1977.

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Phnom Penh in 1970 before the onset of war, revolution, and more revolution.

—Pictorial Parade.

pit."[10] Although his role in the revolutionary movement was deemphasized after 1971, Sihanouk's resignation and departure from public life were not officially announced until April 1976. No public word was then heard from him until January 3, 1978, when a message he is said to have sent to the "esteemed and beloved" Central Committee of the Communist Party was broadcast on Radio Phnom Penh. This message expressed his "seething indignation at the unwarranted, massive and coordinated invasion" by the "aggressor Vietnam."[11]

The Doctrine

The Khmer leaders drew their fundamental doctrine from several sources. Important among them, even though they hid it from public view until late 1977, were Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. Prerevolutionary Khmer society, they believed, was engaged in a class struggle between an oppressor class—"imperialist, feudal and capitalist"—and an oppressed class—the workers and peasants. The worker-peasant class (comprising 95 percent of the Cambodian nation, according to the new constitution's preamble, and made up of "workers, poor farmers, middle farmers, lower-level farmers and other laborers in the countryside and in the cities") had expelled the French colonialists and defeated the American imperialists and the Cambodians who served them—the feudal landlords, reactionary capitalists, and comprador bourgeoisie. The former oppressor class would be replaced by the worker-peasant class ("the people"), which was now in command.

Along with their Marxist ideology, the Khmer leaders displayed a fundamentalist belief in independent national development, somewhat akin to that in Maoist thought. They revered national self-reliance and independence. "What we are trying to bring about has never occurred before," declared Ieng Sary. "We are not following any model, either Chinese or Vietnamese."[12] Though the Khmer

10. Interview by Oriana Fallaci, *The New York Times Magazine*, Aug. 12, 1973.

11. Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian, Jan. 3, 1978, in *FBIS-APA*, Jan. 4, 1978. As the conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam deepened during 1978, a photo showing Prince Sihanouk attending a state banquet in Cambodia was distributed by Foreign Secretary Ieng Sary during his worldwide diplomatic tour in October. The distribution of the photo was apparently aimed at quelling rumors that the prince had been executed and thereby furthering Sary's campaign to improve Cambodia's image abroad. See *Newsweek* (New York, NY), Nov. 6, 1978, p. 72.

12. Tiziano Terzani interview with Ieng Sary, *l'Espresso* (Rome), May 8, 1977, in *FBIS-APA*, May 23, 1977.

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leaders' obsession with self-reliance was perplexing and costly, their seething anger against Western imperialism and culture seemed to impel them to rid their society of the corruption brought on by colonialists and to demonstrate their ability to go it alone.

An exploration of the Khmer Communists' attitude toward the cities suggests basic attitudes about how they intended to change their society. From the outset, Khmer leaders explained that the cities had been emptied to get the people rapidly into food production in the countryside because of the critical shortage of food. Phnom Penh, with its bursting population of about 2.5 million, had been almost wholly dependent upon US supplies by the end of the war, and the Communist leadership knew the difficulty they would confront in feeding the entire nation without calling upon outside assistance, a measure abhorrent to their rigid doctrine of self-reliance. An unspoken corollary was their vision of the Cambodian cities, particularly Phnom Penh, as cesspools of the old society, filled with a decadent royal court, a corrupt aristocracy, rapacious feudal landlords and comprador bourgeoisie, and an exploiting foreign mercantile class (of Vietnamese and Chinese). This oppressor class had collaborated with the US imperialists, who had unleashed a savage war of aggression against the Cambodian people. Thus, immediate evacuation of the unproductive, parasitical cities would eliminate potential centers of counterrevolution, as Pol Pot pointed out in his September 27, 1977, speech, and would also hasten destruction of the old society and prepare the way for the construction of a new one. Cities and towns would play a part in the new Khmer society, but, as Ieng Sary later affirmed for his cohorts, "we merely want to reduce them to human dimensions."[13]

In contrast with Vietnam and Laos, where there have been no accounts of systematic executions, in Cambodia there were numerous stories of executions of "enemies" of the new society to sometime in 1976, when the killings apparently tapered off for a brief period. Wartime pronouncements by the Khmer Rouge had stated that only "seven traitors" would be executed when the revolution was victorious, and Prince Sihanouk, who frequently joined in these pronouncements, had urged them to flee. At the same time, widespread reports had indicated that the Khmer Rouge were liquidating their enemies in areas they had captured during the war. Despite these reports, however, only a few in the most vulnerable circles appear to have sufficiently feared bloody retribution to leave the country at the end of the war. But, according to refugee accounts, the Khmer Rouge did in fact begin to execute designated categories of enemies soon after the seizure of power. First, the top government and military officers were summarily shot. Then, it appears, came the turn of large numbers of the officer corps of the Republican army and their wives, the old bureaucracy, the comprador bourgeoisie who had engaged in what was considered exploitative commerce, and the educated middle class.

The social doctrine of the revolutionary leadership also made an assault on Cambodia's past. The hierarchical society that had emerged with the arrival of Hindu infuences in the fourth century and that kingship, Buddhism, and folk belief had reinforced was a target for change.[14] The language was to be purified to eliminate references to social rank and privilege in favor of egaliterian terms, and offenders were criticized severely. Buddhism was displaced from its central role. The pagoda was no longer the communal center, and bonzes were often stigmatized as "parasites who eat the rice of the people."[15] The countryside was reorganized into "production cooperatives." Traditional practices of lavish weddings, funerals, and festivals were condemned, and mobilization for production was the rallying cry. People were to learn the primary value of labor. In short, the old society was being destroyed, and a new one, with a new type of person, was in the throes of creation.

Leadership and Party Organization

Unlike the Vietnamese, and even the Lao, leaders, the deposed Cambodian leaders are still young. Many were born in the late 1920's and early 1930's, too late to have been involved in anticolonial politics. Apparently, only a few former anti-French resistance fighters were to be found at the upper levels of leadership; moreover, no members of the top leadership—as far as present information indicates—came from the resistance fighters who

13. Ibid.

14. See David P. Chandler, "The Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia): The Semantics of Revolutionary Change," *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver, British Columbia), Fall 1976, pp. 506-15.

15. François Ponchaud, "Cambodia under the Lash," *Le Monde*, as excerpted in *Atlas World Press Review* (New York, NY), May 1976, p. 19.

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Leaders of Democratic Kampuchea, 1975–1979 (from left to right): Pol Pot, Prime Minister and Secretary General of the Kampuchean Communist Party; Ieng Sary, Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs; Khieu Samphan, Chairman of the State Presidium.

—Photos by Camera Press; Jean-Pierre Laffont/SYGMA; and Camera Press.

were in Vietnam from 1954 to 1970. Members of the latter group, whose participation had been welcomed in the wartime struggle, were suspect because of their close ties with the Vietnamese, and reports suggest that most were executed. Khmer mistrust of the Vietnamese was so long-standing and deep that even fellow revolutionaries, because they had been involved with the Vietnamese for so long, were regarded as traitors.

A surprising number of the party and government leaders were related by marriage, thus appearing to belong to one clan. Pol Pot is the husband of Khieu Ponmary, the daughter of a prominent family, a former teacher at Lycée Sisowath, and the former chairman of the Association of Democratic Women of Kampuchea. Ieng Sary is married to Khieu Ponmary's sister, Khieu Thirith, who taught at Lycée Norodom after studying English literature in Paris and was Minister of Social Action in the ousted government. Son Sen's wife is another former teacher at Lycée Sisowath, Yun Yat, who was Minister of Culture and Education.

Despite their intellectual and middle-class background, the Cambodian leaders appeared to continue the austere habits they had acquired during the war. Wartime existence had involved self-sacrifice, egalitarianism, and rigorous discipline.[16] Cadres had lived communally, had had limited provisions, and had frequently been in personal danger. All had been required to work in the fields and do other manual labor. Titles of age, rank, or profession—subtly complex and important in pre-revolutionary Cambodia—had been forbidden. A single form of address for everyone had replaced them: *mit/mitt* ("friend" or "comrade"). Personal traits of "liberalism" associated with the oppressor and reactionary class, excesses in eating, drinking, gambling, or sexual freedom—all had been condemned. At regular meetings, criticism and self-criticism had exposed deficiencies and inculcated proper revolutionary behavior. Strict secrecy about the group's activities had been enforced, and cadres had had to take revolutionary names, both for personal security and to emphasize the importance of developing a new, revolutionary personality. Refugees suggest that the Cambodian leaders still imposed these values upon themselves and others after they attained power.

The Cambodian revolutionaries' obsession with secrecy had both political and psychological roots. Governing through a mysterious organization, Angkar, instilled fear. Cadres taught that Angkar must be trusted because "it has as many eyes as

16. See the translation of Ith Sarin, "Regrets for the Khmer Soul," in Carney, op. cit. Ith Sarin, an inspector of primary education who spent most of 1972 with the Communist movement as a candidate member of the party, describes, in a personal memoir, life in the Bureau of Information and Culture of a region near Phnom Penh.

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a pineapple" and could not make mistakes.[17] It also saw all wrongdoing. Because there were so few cadres for a country of 7.7 million—one estimate held that in 1975 the Khmer Rouge consisted of 70,000 military and only 1,000 cadres[18]—fear was a useful instrument to maintain authority. Furthermore just as the Vietnamese and Lao revolutionary leaders judged that their politically unsophisticated peasantry regarded "communism" and "Marxism-Leninism" unfavorably, the Cambodian rulers obviously deemed it politically desirable to hide their ideological affiliation. An anonymous ruling Angkar, instead of individual leaders, also served the cause of egalitarianism and collective leadership, to which the deposed Cambodian Communists were clearly committed. The denunciation of Stalin's "cult of personality" after his death in 1953 and the criticism of Maurice Thorez, leader of the French Communist Party, for "personalism," must have made a strong impression upon the future Cambodian revolutionary leaders, who were students in France during this period.

Several factors appear to have contributed to the party's decision to reveal itself in September 1977. Two and a half years after victory, the party leaders were now firmly in command of the country. It was now time, they must have judged, to remove some of the mystery of the party's role and introduce themselves to the Cambodian people. In addition, there were indications that the Chinese had encouraged the Cambodians to proclaim the leading role of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, believing it proper that there be open party-to-party contacts as well as government-to-government relations between the two countries.

During and immediately after the war, because of the diverse makeup of the Khmer Rouge, many analysts believed there was serious factional rivalry within the leadership. Speculation focused upon assumed "pro-Hanoi" and "pro-Peking" cliques as well as upon French-educated and veteran resistance groups. This speculation about factionalism was revived during the border disputes with Thailand and Vietnam in the summer of 1977, when frontier attacks were seen as a distraction from "convulsive seizures of sedition, factional revolts and purges within the party."[19]

There were reports of intermittent purges in the northwest region of the country during the first half of 1977: one round is thought to have taken place in February and another in April.[20] Certain province and district cadres were reported to have been executed, and some lower-ranking members of the army and militia, to have been disarmed and sent to other regions. A shake-up of the remaining personnel followed.

Although the extent of and the reasons for the purge remain obscure, several explanations have been offered. One view is that these measures might have been part of a rectification campaign to flush out older cadres who were not considered sufficiently zealous in ferreting out class enemies. Another is that local cadres in provinces near Thailand, who were engaged in barter with Thai elements in the search for critical supplies, were believed by morbidly suspicious party officials in Phnom Penh to have been engaged in subversive plots with CIA agents and purported Thai collaborators allegedly plotting sabotage in Cambodia. Still another hypothesis, also unconfirmed, is that a coup may actually have been planned by regional party officials distressed by the harshness of the central leadership and concerned by the disaffection of the people in their region.

After the Cambodian conflict with the Vietnamese burst into public view in the wake of the rupture of diplomatic relations by the Cambodians on December 31, 1977, Cambodian spokesmen intermittently denounced the Vietnamese for attempts at political subversion within Cambodia. The Cambodian Communist leaders' suspicions of the Vietnamese were compounded by their belief, as Pol Pot asserted, that "various spy rings working for imperialism and international reactionaries are still planted among us to carry out subversive activities against our revolution." He estimated that 1–2 percent of the population must be regarded as enemies of Democratic Kampuchea. "We must deal with them the same way we would with any enemy," he insisted, "by separating, educating and coopting elements that can be won over. . . neutralizing any reluctant elements. . . and isolating and eradicating only the smallest possible number of these elements who are cruel and who determinedly oppose the revolution and

17. Ibid.

18. William Shawcross, "Cambodia Under Its New Rulers." *New York Review of Books*, Mar. 4, 1976.

19. Richard Nations, "Inside the Bitter Border," *FEER*, Aug. 19, 1977, pp. 9-12.

20. Observations in this paragraph and the following one are based on personal interviews by the authors in Washington, DC, in December 1978. See also Nayan Chanda, "The Bloody War," *FEER*, Apr. 23, 1978, pp. 17-21.

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Son Sen (center), Deputy Prime Minister for National Defense of Democratic Kampuchea, discusses combat operations with military personnel. The photo was released by Peking's New China News Agency on January 3, 1979, at a time when Cambodia reported attacks on its eastern areas by Vietnam-backed rebels.

—Wide World.

the people and collaborate with foreign enemies to oppose their own nation."[21]

The new regime's obsession with the threat of counterrevolutionaries throws light upon the party leadership's initial decision to empty the cities in April 1975. Pol Pot cited this concern for security as the reason for the forced evacuation of the cities:

One of the important factors [for our success] is the evacuation of city residents to the countryside. This was decided before victory was won, that is, in February 1975, because we knew our strength was not strong enough to defend the revolutionary regime. Judging from the struggles waged from 1976 to 1977, the enemy's secret agent network lying low in our country was very massive and complicated. But when we crushed them, it was difficult for them to stage a comeback. Their forces were scattered in various cooperatives which are in our own grip. Thus we have the initiative in our hands. The enemy dare not attack from outside. They counted on especially the sabotage and trouble-making by their secret agents or traitors to our country, so as to strike together from within and without. If there are no enemy agents among us, the enemy outside dare not take reckless actions.[22]

In addition to speculation about the lack of cohesion among the revolutionary leaders, there were frequent assertions about lack of discipline within the ranks. The reports of widespread Khmer Rouge cruelty during wartime[23] and the harsh forced exodus from the cities were often attributed to angry young soldiers taking revenge on their enemies and on the decadent cities, acting without discipline or control from a central authority. While it is possible that some units and individuals acted spontaneously with violence, the bulk of the evidence points to effective planning and a disciplined organization responsive to the authority of the central leadership.[24] Although brutal in their methods, the Khmer Communist soldiers were apparently faithfully carrying out the policies of the central organization.[25]

As for the structure of the party, the latter was organized into committees that corresponded to the administrative units of the country: the center, region, sector, district, township, and village. Collective leadership within the committees was stressed, and the principle of democratic centralism was invoked. The party maintained control by assigning its cadres to guide policymaking within the governmental agencies and administrative units. Party cells operated within the army, and political commissars, in principle, shared command with military officers at company level and above, although it is not clear that party ranks were

21. See Pol Pot's Sept. 27, 1977, speech, loc. cit.

22. Pol Pot press conference in Peking. Radio Peking, New China News Agency in English, Oct. 3, 1977, in *FBIS-APA*, Oct. 3, 1977. It should be noted that Frank Snepp's account of the American evacuation of Vietnam describes the US network as follows: "despite extensive intelligence pointing to . . . a 'pastoralization' of the society under Communist rule, the last CIA planners in Phnom Penh had chosen to focus their stay-behind operations in the cities, establishing all of their secret radio terminals and clandestine spy cells there. When the cities themselves were cleared, the networks collapsed, leaving us almost no way of gathering intelligence in postwar Cambodia." Snepp, op. cit., pp. 339-40.

23. See, for example, Donald Kirk, "Revolution and Political Violence in Cambodia, 1970-1974," in Joseph J. Zasloff and MacAlister Brown, Eds. *Communism in Indochina*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Co., 1975, pp. 215-30.

24. See Roger Kershaw, "Cambodian National Union—a milestone in popular front technique," *The World Today* (London), February 1976, p. 62.

25. See the testimony of Charles Twining in US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, *Hearings on Human Rights in Cambodia*, 95th Congress, 1st sess., Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, July 26, 1977.

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Scenes from the economy of Democratic Kampuchea: left, work with hand tools, buckets, and wicker baskets on an irrigation project, 1978; right, transplanting of rice in southwestern Kampuchea, 1975.

—Wide World.

large enough to fulfill this requirement. Party cadres also directed the activities of a variety of front organizations. The party youth organization—the Alliance of Communist Youth of Kampuchea—performed auxiliary party functions and served as an important source of recruits for the party.

Party training concentrated heavily on political indoctrination and stressed strict discipline. The party insisted on punctuality, secrecy, and self-abnegation. It denounced the bureaucratism of past Khmer officialdom and taught cadres to "study from the people in order to be like the people." On the other hand, party cadres were admonished that they "should not let the people lead them by the nose either." Criticism meetings were conducted weekly. Cadres at all levels had to perform agricultural tasks (as the wartime leaders had), and life was Spartan. Cadres customarily wore simple black dress and were not to seek food rations or comforts above those of the common people.[26] Yet despite the slogan that cadres must "serve the people," refugees give the picture of a small number of relatively young cadres of peasant background, most of them illiterate, whose orders were feared and obeyed and who lived apart from the general population.

The Economy

In the economic sphere Cambodia ran a dead heat with Laos for the position of poorest country in Asia. Both states were estimated to have a per capita GNP of US$70. Cambodia had two times as many people and only slightly less arable land per capita (1.3 acres in 1971) than Laos, but it possessed no substantial mineral resources for development. The Cambodian literacy rate was estimated to be 55 percent (as compared with 12 percent in Laos), and the country had 10 times as many miles of highways as Laos and two major seaports. Its economic development under France had consisted of French-owned rubber plantations and some rice production for export. Light industries for the processing of rice, fish, and wood products and for textile production constituted the industrial sector. The agricultural sector contributed twice as much to Cambodia's GNP as the small industrial sector, and 85 percent of the population lived in rural communities engaged in traditional farming.[27]

When the fighting ended, the country was shattered by the dislocation and destruction resulting from brutal revolutionary offensives and American aerial bombardments. At the same time, the American airlift of food and all other US aid abruptly terminated. Moreover, the nation's one oil refinery was bombed during the ensuing S.S. Mayaguez incident. The Communists, by their own account, suddenly took control over "almost four million newly liberated people from Phnom Penh and

26. Ith Sarin, "Regrets for the Khmer Soul," loc. cit.
27. Donald P. Whitaker et al., Eds., *Area Handbook for the Khmer Republic (Cambodia),* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1973, Chap. 12.

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other provincial capitals."[28]

In the nearly four years after the termination of the civil war in Cambodia, the Angkar's fanatical self-sufficiency policy took a calamitous toll in human life. But the government did restore national self-sufficiency in rice, at a precariously low level of consumption, and it did resume export trade in a few products. Despite its desperate needs at the end of the war, it neither sought nor received any outside assistance from international organizations and accepted only the most meager bilateral foreign assistance. A few hundred Chinese technicians helped restore some industry and communications. Indeed, the PRC was for a time the only country with an aid program in Cambodia. Additional economic assistance was subsequently received from North Korea, Yugoslavia, and Romania. The economy was restricted largely to "cooperative agriculture," although light industries which served the agricultural sector were gradually restored to production. Relentless heavy labor was organized during the dry season to construct dikes, canals, reservoirs, and irrigation ditches. Dry-season rice cultivation was encouraged along with "strategic crops" that could be exported. This astounding national economic campaign was maintained at "great leap forward" speed through intense labor, which often continued both night and day. At the same time, the leaders took pride that "not a cent" had been spent on fertilizer because conservation of natural manure had become a national goal.[29] They operated the economy without the use of money, private property, or mass circulation newspapers. As for education, such elementary schooling as existed was an adjunct to the agricultural cooperative and emphasized practical knowledge. There was no higher education except in the field of medicine.[30]

The Cambodian leadership claimed that it had no previous models to follow but that it was learning through experience. The system of agricultural cooperatives which it had begun in the "liberated

28. Ieng Sary, address to the UN General Assembly, Oct. 5, 1976, in *FBIS-APA*, Oct. 15, 1976.

29. *FBIS-APA*, Apr. 18, 1977.

30. Tiziano Terzani interview with Ieng Sary, May 8, 1977, loc. cit.

A March 1976 photo of former townspeople doing forced labor in the Cambodian countryside.

—SYGMA.

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zones" in 1973 was extended throughout the entire country. The cooperatives varied in size from 50 to 2,000 families. During the dry season, brigades of workers were mobilized at various water conservation projects. The people pooled "their strength. . . to dig canals and reservoirs in the most seething manner, thus turning [the] countryside everywhere into worksites permanently pervaded by a festive atmosphere."[31] This enormous human labor, coming on top of what the leaders called the "untold hardships" of the immediate postwar period, was planned to be carried out without machines. As Khieu Samphan put it:

No, we have no machines. We do everything by mainly relying on the strength of our people. We work completely self-reliantly. This shows the overwhelming heroism of our people. This also shows the great force of our people. Though barehanded, they can do everything.[32]

Yet, the productive strength of the people of Cambodia was not inexhaustible. Malaria and other diseases obviously ravaged an overworked, frightened, and undernourished population during the first years after the war. Both Pol Pot and Ieng Sary said in 1976 that 80 percent of the peasants had malaria. Although Khieu Samphan, the Chairman of the State Presidium, proudly claimed in April 1977 that malaria had been reduced by 80 percent, the seriousness of the problem was evident in the fact that the government bought $1.6 million worth of DDT from US companies licensed by the US government to ship to Cambodia—the only exception to the US embargo.[33] So far as nourishment is concerned, Khieu Samphan's proud claims struck a grim note by Western standards:

. . . a sufficient amount of 3, 2½, or 2 small cans [of rice] is allocated daily. Moreover, there is dessert. In the past how many times did the poor or middle peasants eat sweet foods per month? Very rarely. They could afford only green guava and other fruits. Now on the average they eat dessert three times per month, which is sufficient to take care of their health and increase their weight.[34]

Nonetheless, by late 1978 this incredible Spartan workcamp of a nation was reaching the point at which it would have some products to export and could purchase some imports.

Suffering of the Cambodian People

The harsh regimentation of life was only one aspect of the enormous suffering that the Pol Pot government visited on the local population, thereby heightening the tragedy that had been under way in Cambodia since 1970. Though last to join the Indochina war, the Cambodians had experienced dislocation and devastation that soon rivaled, perhaps surpassed, that of their neighbors. The enormous US bombing and the intensity of the fighting had exacted a heavy toll in lives. According to the revolutionary side, the wartime population loss as a result of military service or as a result of bombing, terroristic attacks, displacement, disease, and malnutrition ran to 600,000 persons.[35]

As for deaths in the postwar period, outsiders have not had access to Cambodia, and it is impossible to calculate with confidence the number who perished in the evacuation from the cities and in the subsequent transplantation of population or who perished from disease, starvation, and execution. Francois Ponchaud has written that "at the end of the year 1975, unofficial diplomatic sources put forth the figure of 800,000 deaths, those from the American Embassy 1,200,000, and those from welfare agencies installed in Bangkok 1,400,000!"[36] The authors of a recent book on Cambodia estimated that "at a minimum, 1.2 million men, women and children died in Cambodia between April 17, 1975 and December 1976."[37] *Time* magazine claimed that 500,000–600,000 persons, or one twelfth of Cambodia's population, perished during the first year after the Communist takeover.[38] Two correspondents of the *Daily Telegraph* (London), reporting

31. Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian, Mar. 17, 1977, in *FBIS-APA*, Mar. 21, 1977; speech of Apr. 15, 1977, by Khieu Samphan, in *FBIS-APA*, Apr. 18, 1977.
32. Khieu Samphan, speech of April 15, 1977, loc. cit.
33. Bank of America, Asia Representative Office, Hong Kong, *Indochina Spotlight*, March 1977.
34. Khieu Samphan, speech of Apr. 15, 1977, loc. cit.
35. Foreign Minister Ieng Sary in 1977 said that "during the war, we lost at least 600,000 people, not counting the wounded and maimed." Interview with Tiziano Terzani, May 8, 1977, loc. cit. He had previously told the UN General Assembly that "more than one million of our people, or almost 13 percent of the Cambodian population were killed or wounded" in the achievement of the victory of Apr. 17, 1975. Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian, Oct. 8, 1976, in *FBIS-APA*, Oct. 15, 1976.
36. Ponchaud, *Cambodge année zéro*, p. 97.
37. John Barron and Anthony Paul, *Murder of a Gentle Land*, New York, NY, Reader's Digest Press, distributed by Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1977.
38. *Time* (New York, NY), Apr. 19, 1976, p. 65.

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from Bangkok, gave a figure of 800,000 deaths in the first year of Communist rule.[39] In testimony about Cambodia before the US Congress in 1977, US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke provided a cautious assessment that underscored the lack of precise information: "Journalists and scholars, some testifying before this subcommittee, guess that between half a million and 1.2 million have died since 1975. We have no way to confirm a precise figure but the number of deaths appears to be in the tens if not hundreds of thousands."[40] Robert Shaplen, Southeast Asian correspondent for *The New Yorker,* has reported that "most observers, including diplomats, now believe the total is at least a million" who have been killed or who have starved or died of disease as a result of the forced marches, including 200,000 executed.[41]

An interview that Khieu Samphan gave at the Colombo Conference in Sri Lanka in 1976 and that appeared in the Italian magazine *Familia Cristiana* raised press speculation as to whether Khieu Samphan was acknowledging the high rate of deaths. According to this account, Khieu Samphan stated that more than a million had died in the five years of warfare. When asked the present population of Cambodia, he replied, "five million," and in response to a question about the prewar population, he answered, "seven million." "If one million persons died in the fighting," the interviewer then queried, "what happened to the remaining million?" Khieu Samphan's published reply was:

It's incredible how concerned you Westerners are about war criminals. In any case, if you want to make a mathematical calculation, count those Cambodians who went to live in Thailand, France, the United States and in other countries.[42]

It seems unlikely that Khieu Samphan would have deliberately acknowledged, even if true, such a deadly toll under the new regime. (US government-sponsored sources, it should be noted, estimated the population at more than 7 million in *1972,*[43] so a reduction to 5 million by 1976 is hard to believe.) More likely, he misspoke, was not translated correctly, or was responding to an earlier question about treatment of war criminals.

An interview that Ieng Sary gave on May 23, 1977, seems to reinforce this judgment. Sary stated that *according to a recent census, Cambodia had 7.76* million inhabitants. He denied that there had been an extraordinary death toll since victory, claiming that "some 2,000 to 3,000 people died during the evacuation of the capital and as many again during the initial period in the paddies."[44] He denounced the charges that the new regime had massacred thousands, stating that "only top criminals were sent to the Angkar for trial."[45]

On balance, no fair-minded person can deny the enormous suffering of the Cambodian people both during and after the war. But how many persons died from various causes subsequent to the taking of Phnom Penh in 1975 will probably remain shrouded and subject to speculation in broad terms.

Assessment of Methods

Explaining the harshness and fundamentalist nature of the Khmer Communist revolution requires consideration of several interrelated factors. First, the Khmer Communist party has never had many members. Beginning with a small framework in the 1950's, the revolutionary organization grew modestly during the 1960's. Only during wartime, in the early 1970's, did it expand rapidly, largely with the admission of young, illiterate peasant boys and a few girls. By war's end, as already noted, there may have been a military force of 70,000 and only 1,000 cadres. Thus, the Khmer Communists did not undergo the gradual organizational growth of the Vietnamese or even of the Lao.

Moreover, with their increasing tendency, after 1970, to reject the advice and leadership cadres proffered them by Hanoi, the headstrong Khmer Rouge leaders embarked upon a perilous independent course which would require fanatical dedication and discipline to maintain. Not only did they spurn their erstwhile Vietnamese mentors, but they also disapproved of the Chinese champion-

39. *Daily Telegraph* (London), Apr. 8 and Aug. 15, 1976.

40. *Hearing on Human Rights in Cambodia,* July 16, 1977. See also the documents compiled by the US State Department, including interviews with refugees in Thailand and analyses of internal conditions in Cambodia by the American Embassy in Bangkok, submitted to the Division of Human Rights, United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, July 6, 1978, by US Ambassador William van den Heuvel.

41. Robert Shaplen, "A Reporter at Large (Indo-China Refugees)," *The New Yorker,* Sept. 5, 1977, pp. 33-36.

42. Rome ANSA in English, Sept. 24, 1976, in *FBIS-APA,* Sept. 28, 1976.

43. Donald P. Whitaker et al., Eds., op. cit.

44. Tiziano Terzani interview with Ieng Sary, May 8, 1977, loc. cit.

45. *Ibid.* Subsequently, in October 1978, Ieng Sary invited the Secretary General of the United Nations to visit Kampuchea to view the situation there. This followed a US and West European initiative against Kampuchea in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.

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ship of Prince Sihanouk. By 1973, the revolutionary leadership was committed to a radically independent course, in opposition to both US and Thai forces which would seek to preclude or reverse its seizure of power and to its historic adversary, the Vietnamese.

The launching of this colossal challenge by inexperienced, youthful peasant soldiers and only a handful of skilled cadres made the use of fear as a technique of political control both expedient and perhaps gratifying. As Kenneth Quinn observed after a close study of conditions in southern Cambodia before the taking of Phnom Penh, "a revolution is possible even in the absence of a motivated peasantry." After the Khmer Rouge strictly limited the movement of the population, "they cowed people and suppressed dissent and opposition through harsh and brutal punishments; and they constructed a governmental apparatus at the village and hamlet level which allowed them to exercise tight control over every family in the area."[46]

Khmer character must also not be overlooked. In prewar years, Cambodians were widely regarded in the West as a sweet, peaceful, gentle folk, "bons enfants," living simply in an abundant Garden of Eden, practicing an otherworldly Theravada Buddhism. But the wartime and postwar horrors have challenged such an image and forced a reexamination of the stereotype. Of particular note, the cruelties that the Lon Nol regime inflicted upon its enemies attest that excesses were not confined to the Communist side. Additional evidence of unbridled malevolence among Cambodians under non-Communist leadership was provided by the massacre in 1970 of thousands of Vietnamese residents of Cambodia—killings which the Republican military forces either directed or tolerated.

The Khmer national past contains periods of aggressive territorial expansion, especially from the 9th to the 14th century, when the Angkor Empire extended from the South China Sea to eastern Thailand. While the Khmer were successively defeated by their Vietnamese and Thai neighbors from the 14th to the 19th century and by the French in the late 19th century, one student of Khmer society attributes these defeats more to the negligence of its military leaders and to palace intrigue than to a diminishing spirit of the Khmer people.[47] Cambodian folklore is filled with accounts of grisly executions and mutilations of enemies. Although the Buddhism of the Cambodians preaches kindness, serenity, and pity for the unfortunate, the Cambodian mentality sees the notion of pardon, according to one author, as a sign of weakness, even an avowal of fault. Pardon risks a "loss of face." Indeed, the enemy is more likely to be regarded as evil; to recognize virtue in him makes one his accomplice.[48]

This Vietnamese News Agency photo identifies the three young Cambodians pictured as "Pol Pot troops" captured in Vietnam's Tay Ninh province on December 30, 1978. According to VNA, their ages ranged from 16 to 20, and two had been drafted within the previous six months.

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Another important factor was the deep-seated anger of the Khmer Rouge leaders as well as their lower-level cadres. When the leaders were students, they had blamed the Cambodian elite for becoming instruments of the imperialists to exploit the Cambodian people and degrade Cambodian society. Their anger became rage during their days in the maquis, as they saw their country decimated and as they struggled under great danger with short rations. Some reports suggest that the leadership hardened its ideology and rid itself of wavering factions during 1973, the height of US bombardment, and 1974.[49] Upon victory, the Khmer Rouge vented their rage on their adversaries—one Khmer Rouge cadre told a refugee that they felt "uncontrollable hatred."[50] It was in this environment that the early executions of Lon Nol officials and the harsh evacuations were carried out.

46. Quinn, loc. cit., p. 24, 19.
47. Ponchaud, loc. cit., p. 171.
48. Ibid., p. 172.
49. David P. Chandler, "Transformation in Cambodia," *Commonweal* (New York, NY), Apr. 1, 1977.
50. David P. Chandler with Ben Kiernan and Muy Hong Lim, "The Early Phases of Liberation in Northwest Cambodia: Conversations with Peang Sophi," Working Paper Series, No. 10, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia, November 1976.

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Confronted with bitter circumstances, and with counterrevolution so prominent in their minds, the deposed Khmer Communists were in a hurry. Their moves to eliminate swiftly the vestiges of the old society as they began building a new one reflected both ideological zeal and the perilousness of their situation. They were rigid ideologues with a dogmatic commitment to their own peculiar doctrine of self-reliance, they were defiant of the rest of the world, and they were single-mindedly determined to move their nation toward their own goals. The exclusion of almost all foreign assistance (except Chinese) was bound, in view of the war's vast destruction, to inflict great misery upon the Cambodian people, who were forced to substitute both a prodigious work effort and reduced consumption for foreign food and vital supplies.

Prospects

In light of the past, then, what can one say about the outlook for the future? The new People's Republic of Kampuchea has promised to terminate the onerous revolutionary policies of the Pol Pot regime. Its ruling Front has issued a program which calls for "freedom of residence, movement, association and religion," and pledges a planned economy with markets, banks, and a currency, as well as an end to forced labor.[51] As a symbol of its intention to abolish the communal kitchens and restore freedom to family life, the new regime gave a cooking pot to each family in some regions of its advance. This abandonment of the most oppressive measures of the former rulers will in all probability be welcomed by the people.

However, the new leaders still face great problems. Dependent upon the force of Cambodia's historic enemy, their regime will suffer from a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the Cambodian population. Furthermore, the deposed leaders have vowed to continue their resistance against the foreign invader, and China has announced its support for their aims. Prince Sihanouk, who was released from house arrest and dispatched by the Pol Pot authorities, via Peking, to serve as Democratic Kampuchea's spokesman at the UN Security Council, has endorsed resistance to the Vietnamese "puppet" regime, even though he is now publicly critical of the policies of the former government.[52] Vietnam, itself has to confront pressing economic problems at home which could be compounded by the loss of foreign aid as a result of international condemnation. Thus, it will be limited in the resources it can invest in the establishment of order and effective control by its client government and in the administration of the impoverished Cambodian economy.

While a stable, secure regime is not likely to emerge from the political forces which currently have the upper hand in Cambodia, neither will a powerful resistance movement develop easily. The initial resistance must come from the remnants of the Pol Pot military organization, and it is not clear how many of its units escaped decimation in the Vietnamese onslaught or how many of its soldiers will be willing to fight a guerrilla war under the defeated leaders. The insurgents will not enjoy an active sanctuary like the one that North Vietnam provided to southern insurgents in the Vietnam war; furthermore, supplies would have to be shipped by coastal craft or surreptitiously introduced from Thailand with the connivance of the Thai authorities. The Cambodian peasants, among whom new insurgents would have to be recruited, are exhausted. Moreover, it is not probable, despite the Cambodian distaste for the Vietnamese, that large

51. *The New York Times*, Dec. 5, 1978.
52. See ibid., Jan. 9, 1979; *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), Jan. 12, 1979.

Prince Norodom Sihanouk addresses the United Nations Security Council on January 12, 1979, during the debate on the invasion of Democratic Kampuchea.

—Brian F. Alpert/Keystone.

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numbers of peasants will respond enthusiastically to an appeal from the oppressive Pol Pot authorities for continuing revolution.

In all likelihood, Cambodian society will continue to confront political instability, violence, and social dislocation. Even if resistance is no greater in Cambodia than it has been in Vietnam and Laos since the Communists there seized power, it will absorb the government's resources and sustain the political mood of morbid suspicion that has poisoned the country during a decade of war and revolution. The new regime will probably ferret out and deal harshly with its enemies—which means a new round of purges. Dismantling the rural communes and a return to village life will require a nationwide reorganization of agricultural production. Repopulation of the urban areas will entail the reestablishment of small industry and commerce. The new regime faces these realities with few experienced administrators or technicians. Of Cambodia's prewar administrative class, thousands have fled, perished, or suffered execution. Cadres of the Pol Pot regime will be regarded, at best, as politically unreliable.

One probable attribute of the new regime may help to diminish the hardships. In sharp contrast to its predecessor, it will likely be open to foreign aid. Outside assistance will be critical to sustaining life. The Soviet Union and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, as Vietnam's principal allies, are logical candidates to provide emergency relief. Ultimately, the industrialized Western nations and international agencies may heed appeals for humanitarian aid, although continued occupation of Cambodia by Vietnamese troops would be a serious political deterrent to such assistance.

Thus, the once plentiful land—sometimes referred to as a Garden of Eden—still suffers turbulence and privation. Tragically, the passion of Kampuchea continues.

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Books

Roots of Brezhnev's Agricultural Policy

by Thane Gustafson

FËDOR TROFIMOVICH MORGUN. *Khleb i lyudi* (Bread and People) Moscow, Politizdat, 1975.

L.I. BREZHNEV. "The Virgin Lands," *Novyy mir* (Moscow), November, 1978, pp. 3–55.

MARTIN McCAULEY. *Khrushchev and the Development of Soviet Agriculture: The Virgin Lands Program, 1953–1964.* New York, NY, Holmes and Meier, 1976.

JAMES BRUCE. *The Politics of Soviet Policy Formation: Khrushchev's Innovative Policies in Education and Agriculture.* Denver, CO, University of Denver, 1976.

ROY A. MEDVEDEV and ZHORES A. MEDVEDEV. *Khrushchev: The Years in Power.* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1976. For the original manuscript, see *N.S. Khrushchëv: gody y vlasti,* Xerox, Ann Arbor, MI, University Microfilms, 1975. For a French version, see *Khroutchev: les années de pouvoir,* Paris, François Maspero, 1977.

ROY D. LAIRD et al., Eds. *The Future of Agriculture in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: The 1976–1980 Five-Year Plans.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1977.

ONE OF THE most interesting stories of the Brezhnev period is the leaders' effort to deal with the worst casualty of forced-draft industrialization, agriculture. For the past 15 years, agriculture, conservation, and related programs have been the fastest growing sectors of the Soviet economy. Their share of the country's capital investment budget now stands at 27 percent, twice what it was in the 1950's, and it is still rising.[1] This would be a remarkable shift of resources for any major industrial power, but it is especially so for a country which until recently gave agriculture the lowest priority and whose leaders built their careers almost entirely around industry.[2] The fact that the Brezhnev coalition has had the power and the determination to impose such a sweeping reallocation of resources and to persevere in the new course for 15 years suggests that we should not underestimate the vigor and adaptability of the Soviet political system.

What caused such a fundamental change? Officially, the new program dates from the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) held in March 1965, some five months after the fall of Nikita Khrushchev.[3] At that session, one bitter speech after another repudiated Khrushchev's agricultural policies. His last desperate reforms, particularly one that divided the party apparatus into separate agricultural and industrial wings, were annulled.[4] Within a year, agricultural reconstruction and reclamation began expanding phenomenally.

Yet the fact is most of the post-1965 programs actually began under Khrushchev, and their underlying strategy can be traced back to 1962 or even 1958.[5] What

1. See the speech of General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev to the July 1978 plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, "On the Further Development of USSR Agriculture," *Pravda* (Moscow), July 4, 1978.

2. Brezhnev himself is a partial exception. He was trained initially as a reclamation engineer and was heavily involved in agriculture as First Secretary of the party organization in the Moldavian Republic and then the Kazakh Republic.

3. See *Plenum Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 24-26 marta, 1965. stenograficheskiy otchët* (Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, March 24-26, 1965. Stenographic Report), Moscow, Politizdat, 1965.

4. See Werner G. Hahn, *The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960-1970,* Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins, 1972, pp. 117-67.

5. For example, central capital allocations for reclamation doubled between 1960 and 1965. See *Sel'skoye khozyaystvo SSSR*

(continued on page 46)

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Reviewers in this Issue

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THOMAS W. WOLFE—Senior Staff Member, The Rand Corporation (Washington, DC), and Professorial Lecturer at the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University (Washington, DC); author of *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads*, 1964, *Soviet Power in Europe*, 1970, and *The SALT Experience*, now in press.

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is new, then, is not so much new ideas as the steady, balanced, and vastly better-funded application of old ones. Largely gone are the gimmickry and quackery, the administrative tinkering and political pressure, the erratic funding of earlier years. The Soviet leadership has launched and maintained a major program of reclamation and conservation, efforts to modernize animal husbandry, and a program of sharply increased investment in the underlying structure required for modern agriculture. For the first time, it has begun a real environmental program to protect scarce land and water.[6] Plainly, not only have the leaders' investment priorities changed, but so have some of their most deeply ingrained habits and attitudes toward agriculture and natural resources.

Yet, to repeat, this transformation was well under way by the time of Khrushchev's fall, and the authors of the new policy were not new. By and large, they were Khrushchev's Politburo without Khrushchev.[7] During 1958–64, several of them had been noticeably cool to the idea of allocating more money to agriculture.[8] In fact, Leonid I. Brezhnev had to labor for five years after 1965 before there jelled a stable coalition in favor of higher agricultural investment.

What, then, brought forth the new coalition and the underlying change in the thinking in the Soviet leadership? To answer this question, we must look back to well before the plenum of March 1965, and in particular, we must look at Khrushchev himself.

KHRUSHCHEV'S role with respect to agricultural policy was disastrous and yet indispensable. By repeated and resounding failure, he discredited the worst of the Stalinist approach to agriculture, clearing the way for something new. To appreciate how important this is, we must look back to the 1950's. Traditional Soviet agricultural policy,

(Agriculture of the USSR), Moscow, Statistika, 1971, p. 361.

Similarly, the main outlines of the grain-oriented, Europe-centered irrigation policy which is now dominant were laid down in a memorandum by Khrushchev to the CPSU Politburo in 1963. See "On Development of Irrigated Agriculture in Order to Assure the Grain Harvest," in N.S. Khrushchëv, *Stroitel'stvo kommunizma v SSSR i razvitiye sel'skogo khozyaystvo* (The Building of Communism in the USSR and the Development of Agriculture), Vol. 8, Moscow, Politizdat, 1964, pp. 91-102. That program, in turn, was a revival of approaches which Khrushchev had proposed in the Ukraine in the 1940's. The Kakhovka irrigation power project in the Ukraine, ultimately completed in the 1960's, had been promoted by Khrushchev after the drought of 1946. At the time, it was rejected in favor of a plan to build a canal in the southern Ukraine. See Sidney Ploss, *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia: A Case Study of Agricultural Policy, 1953-63*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 36-37.

For the story of the expansion of chemical fertilizer production under Khrushchev, see Hahn, op. cit., pp. 114-16.

6. See two articles by the reviewer: "Transforming Soviet Agriculture: Brezhnev's Gamble on Reclamation," *Public Policy* (Cambridge, MA), Summer 1977, pp. 293-312; and "The New Soviet Environmental Program: Do the Soviets Really Mean Business?" ibid., Summer 1978, pp. 455-76.

7. The November 1964 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee removed the incapacitated F.R. Kozlov from the party Presidium (as the Politburo was then known) and added P.N. Demichev as a candidate member.

8. See Hahn, op. cit.; and Michel Tatu, *Le Pouvoir en URSS* (Power in the USSR), Paris, Plon, 1967.

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as inherited from Stalin, was a blend of pressure and impatience, of stubborn optimism, and of willful ignorance. Whatever their differences in detail, Soviet leaders had shared the belief that agriculture could be set in the right direction without a major restructuring, or a permanent increase in agriculture's share of the investment budget. This opened the way to gimmickry. Soviet leaders were easily won over by anybody who promised miracles for nothing, whether by exploiting new lands, the latest crop or cropping system, reorganization, or change of personnel. Loud promises got more support than sound agronomy.

In these views and ways, Khrushchev belonged to his generation. Over the years, there was little in the traditional arsenal that he did not try, and many of the traits for which we remember him best come from his endless schemes for the countryside: his colorful harangues and pungent scoldings, his love of the spectacular gamble, his tub-thumping campaigns and whirlwind inspection tours, his endless and frantic reorganizations, his weakness for miracle crops and agronomic nostrums, and especially his fatal habit of taking every good turn in the weather as a vindication of his policies.[9] Khrushchev may have carried this style to its extreme, but it was not different in kind from what the entire Politburo had grown up on.

Yet Khrushchev also differed from his rivals of the 1950's in one important respect—his passionate interest in agriculture. And because agriculture was his constant preoccupation, he kept the local party apparatus busy on agricultural problems and favored the careers of *apparatchiki* with agricultural rather than industrial experience. In this way, he contributed to the subsequent post-1965 majority for agriculture, for when his successors ended his bifurcation of the apparatus into separate industrial and agricultural branches, the men placed in the positions of first secretaries of the oblast party committees (as well as afforded membership in the CPSU Central Committee) were largely the prebifurcation incumbents of those posts, men with experience in agriculture.[10] By forcing his colleagues and the entire party apparatus to focus their attention on agriculture and by keeping them so focused for a decade, Khrushchev drove the entire Soviet leadership through a collective education.

NOTHING captures this painful and protracted learning process better than the Virgin Lands program lanched in 1954, Khrushchev's most famous agricultural gamble. He justified this bold move to open up tens of millions of acres of prairie land in Kazakhstan as an emergency maneuver, a temporary expedient to hold the line while mechanized, intensive agriculture developed in European Russia. This was Khrushchev at his daring and imaginative best. But in its military cast, its ambition and haste, its appeal to patriotism and youthful energy, it was a classic Stalinist venture, vulnerable to the classic Stalinist excesses. Like many another temporary measure, the Virgin Lands program soon became permanent, displacing what it had been intended to buy time for. As it expanded, it starved the rest of Soviet agriculture, especially in the non-black-earth zone in the northern half of the European USSR. What had been a good gamble until 1958 mushroomed into a very bad one by 1963. This was Khrushchev at his worst.

We have a remarkably frank front-line assessment of this sequence of events in the autobiography of Fëdor Morgun, now First Secretary of the CPSU's Poltava Obkom and a member of the CPSU Central Committee. From chairman of a state farm cut out of uninhabited prairie in 1954, Morgun rose by the mid-1960's to become head of agriculture for the entire Tselinnyy Kray in the Virgin Lands. While never mentioning Khrushchev's name, Morgun shows in devastating detail how the late leader's policies drove soil fertility steadily downward, leading eventually to the disastrous crop failure of 1963. Constant pressure from above to increase the area under

9. For a major, detailed study of Khrushchev, see the forthcoming work by George Breslauer, *Dilemmas of Leadership in the Soviet Union Since Stalin, 1953-76.*

10. On this point, see Tatu, op. cit., p. 269; and Jerry Hough, *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1969, pp. 201-03.

Khrushchev's use of the party apparatus to implement his agricultural policies reached such lengths that Tatu speculates that the First Secretary's Politburo colleagues may have acquiesced quite willingly in the 1962 division of the party because they hoped in this way that at least half of the apparatus could be turned to industry, with the latter half possibly becoming the preponderant one. If this was their hope, it was apparently a vain one. According to Hahn, 80 percent of the prebifurcation first secretaries of the oblast party committees (obkoms) were moved into agriculture, and 31 of the 39 obkom first secretaries named to the CPSU Central Committee in 1963-64 were from the agricultural side. Op. cit., p. 97.

Since 1964, the emphasis has shifted back to appointment of persons with industrial backgrounds as obkom first secretaries. See T.H. Rigby, "The Soviet Regional Leadership: The Brezhnev Generation," *Slavic Review* (Urbana, IL), March 1978, pp. 1-24.

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the plow led to a steady and ultimately fatal reduction in fallow. Soon the fields were infested with weeds. Attempts to deal with them by plowing them under only made matters worse. The steady, dry winds of Kazakhstan whipped up the soil into dust storms that reached as far as European Russia. Farm labor, discouraged by declining yields, migrated back to Europe. New arrivals, attracted at great expense, brought with them the agricultural habits of the Ukraine or Belorussia, ill-suited to the dry, fragile soils of the Virgin Lands. What kept the fateful cycle going, Morgun stresses again and again, was short-sightedness, agronomic stupidity, and willful disregard of facts—all due primarily to relentless political pressure from Moscow.

Leonid Brezhnev, as First Secretary of the party organization in Kazakhstan, was in charge of the Virgin Lands program in its first two years. In the reviewed segment of his autobiography, published last November in *Novyy mir*, he takes pains to show that his own approach was very different from Khrushchev's. Brezhnev writes that he and his Kazakh colleagues listened carefully to scientists. They responded to local conditions, heeded the advice of soil scientists in laying out the state farms, and planned for the future from the start. As early as 1955, Brezhnev was following the advice of the advocates of late sowing and ample fallow (pp. 12, 13, 35, 49–55). But what went wrong? "There is a more terrible enemy of the land than the plow and weeds," Brezhnev writes. "It's the practice of imposing on it every conceivable kind of 'recommendation' from above" (p. 52). Surprisingly, he mentions Khrushchev by name, but surprisingly too, he treats the late party leader rather gently, even though portraying Khrushchev as impulsive and impatient (pp. 14, 15, 43).

WAS THE GREAT gamble worth it? Morgun believes it succeeded, and so does Brezhnev. For a total investment of 21.1 billion rubles in Kazakh agriculture from 1954 to 1977, Brezhnev observes, the Soviet Union got more than 250 million tons of grain, and the Virgin Lands are now an established going concern.

But were there significant alternatives foregone as a result? Martin McCauley, in Chapter 7 of his work, *Khrushchev and the Development of Soviet Agriculture*, examines carefully all the possible alternatives and comes to the striking conclusion that there really were none. None, that is, that the leadership of the 1950's was prepared or in a position to pursue seriously.

Technically, the main alternative open after Stalin's death was to concentrate on raising yields in the European USSR—the strategy the Soviets call "intensification." G. M. Malenkov, Khrushchev's principal rival in 1953–55, favored this approach, yet there is no evidence that he or anyone else in the Soviet leadership during that period was willing to devote the time and resources to make it work.[11] Khrushchev in his memoirs claims that he too favored intensification, but that the country lacked the necessary supporting industrial base (for the manufacture of machinery, fertilizer, etc.) and skilled manpower. Meanwhile, a great crisis loomed, and something had to be done quickly.[12] Given those assumptions, the Virgin Lands scheme was tempting indeed.

Nevertheless, there was a great deal of opposition to it in 1953–55, and Brezhnev describes the issues in some detail. Some objected that the Virgin Lands program would make the country even more a hostage to bad weather than it already was; others felt that scarce manpower and equipment should not be drawn away from the European USSR, where they were already in short supply. "Here and there in the villages of Smolensk province," grumbled K. Ye. Voroshilov, "people are still pulling the plows themselves." But Voroshilov soon came around, Brezhnev writes, once he saw the results. "What a good thing [it is] we came here!" Voroshilov later exclaimed on a visit to Kazakhstan, "You should draw a yellow cross on those machines, the color of that wheat!" (Brezhnev, p. 23). What Brezhnev discreetly passes over is that the grumbling over the Virgin Lands continued throughout the party and government long after the venture was launched. Morgun mentions the sarcastic comments he heard on visits to party functions in Moscow, and McCauley (pp. 209–13) discusses a debate after 1964 over whether to scrap the whole program. But Brezhnev refers only to steady support from the CPSU Central Committee and Politburo (p. 42).

11. In his speech before the USSR Supreme Soviet on Aug. 9, 1953, Malenkov called for a policy of intensification but did not mention the additional investment that such a program would require. Malenkov's address to the same body the following year called for higher labor productivity in agriculture but again failed to mention any increase in investment (required to make higher productivity possible). McCauley, pp. 46, 65.

12. Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers. The Last Testament*, tr. and ed. by Strobe Talbott, Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Co., 1974, p. 122.

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The early opposition to the Virgin Lands decision is well analyzed in James Bruce's *The Politics of Soviet Policy Formation*. Bruce usefully brings together diverse Western accounts to reconstruct Khrushchev's difficulties in putting over the program. However, he seems to overestimate the obstacles when he asserts that the decison was a near thing. Khrushchev had the advantage of the initiative. He had a plan to meet a clear crisis; he caught the imagination and promised quick, tangible results. His opponents had nothing comparable to offer.

Here we have all the irony of Khrushchev's role in agricultural policy. It took a man of his style and temperament to whip up the circus atmosphere required to arouse enthusiasm, recruit volunteers, and jar loose funds for such an initiative in a hitherto neglected sector. Yet that same temperament also produced the high-pressure tactics and shortsightedness that led eventually to chaos and disaster. Khrushchev's most essential virtues in agricultural policy were also his worst faults.

The book by Zhores and Roy Medvedev dwells mainly on the faults. Though intended as a general political biography of Khrushchev, half the book deals with agriculture, and especially the chaos caused in that sector by Khrushchev's impulsiveness. The Medvedevs share McCauley's conclusion that the Virgin Lands program was a justifiable stopgap that got out of control because of Khrushchev's "enthusiasm." But where McCauley overwhelms the reader with facts, the Medvedevs make the same points with anecdotes, arresting pictures of ordinary mortals struggling to cope with the consequences of Khrushchev's schemes: unhappy Moscow agricultural bureaucrats commuting daily by bus to the state farm to which Khrushchev had suddenly relocated the USSR Ministry of Agriculture, and trying to communicate by long-distance telephone with the Ukrainian Ministry of Agriculture in exile on *its* state farm. The book also describes how agricultural machinery piled up unsold and unused after 1958 because the collective farms, which desperately needed it, had no money to buy it (p. 91). While the book thus helps us understand with what relief Khrushchev's colleagues finally hustled him off into retirement, from the Medvedevs one might have hoped for better, given their unique opportunities for insight into such an important topic.

In particular, the Medvedevs do not help the reader understand the evolution of Khrushchev's thinking on agriculture after 1960. As suggested above,[13] by then Khrushchev had finally come to accept, grudgingly, that there was no alternative to "intensification" in agriculture, i.e., a thoroughgoing reconstruction and modernization of the countryside. He had also come to accept that the only way to do this was through massive investment of money, trained manpower, technical knowledge, and time. This approach was to be the essence of the post-1965 program, and there is no understanding how that program came about without taking into account Khrushchev's role in preparing the way.

The volume edited by Roy D. Laird, Joseph Hajda, and Betty A. Laird shows strikingly how different the new policies have been, yet how stubborn old habits and old problems remain. The bias against the non-black-earth zone has ended, and the leadership is pouring money by the tens of billions into drainage, liming, and infrastructure. The production of fertilizers has now reached the levels that seemed so astronomical when Khrushchev trumpeted them more than 15 years ago.[14] Yet even while agreeing that in the last decade agriculture in the USSR (and Eastern Europe) has progressed faster than in any other part of the world, the contributors to this volume constantly ask, "At what cost? And with what real improvement?" If anything, the administration of agriculture has become even more centralized than before, and there has been no change in the fundamental structure of the Soviet farm. Without more basic changes, the authors feel, the Soviets will soon reach the point of diminishing returns, if they have not already. Yet the authors do not underestimate the achievements of the last decade, and their book is invaluable for showing how wide and deep those changes have been.

WHAT WILL BECOME of the agricultural program once Brezhnev is gone? During the spring and summer of 1978, one could observe initial skirmishing over the 11th Five-Year Plan, with Brezhnev attempting to nail down, as he had in the last two five-year plans, an assured position of priority for agricultural investment.[15] Subsequent speeches by both Brezhnev and Soviet Premier A. N. Kosygin suggest that the agricultural program retains high priority, but that the atten-

13. See fn. 5 above.

14. Hahn, op. cit., pp. 114-16.

15. See his speech at the July 1978 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, loc. cit.

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tion of the leaders is increasingly focused on the runaway costs of the program.[16]

Such signs, however, leave unanswered the fundamental question. Is the agricultural policy of the last 15 years simply a reflection of Brezhnev's own power and of the accident that he happens to be personally interested in agriculture, or does it express a major and permanent turning as the Soviet political system adapts to the new challenges of its third generation in power? While the answer to this question is not clear, one thing is for certain: the politics of the agricultural program will be one of the most important and interesting aspects of the coming Soviet succession.

16. See, notably, Brezhnev's speech at the November 1978 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, *Pravda*, Nov. 28, 1978. In this speech, he threatened to bring his ministers personally to account for the cost overruns and, in a rare direct reference to the mechanism, vowed to use the Central Committee Secretariat as his instrument. See also Kosygin's speech at the ceremony celebrating the 61st anniversary of the Great October Revolution, ibid., Nov. 5, 1978.

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The Soviet General Staff

by Thomas W. Wolfe

JOHN ERICKSON. *The Road To Stalingrad.* New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1975.

V. G. KULIKOV, Ed. *Akademiya General'nogo Shtaba* (Academy of the General Staff). Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976.

IN THE WINTER of 1935, the Soviet General Staff took under consideration a suggestion of Marshal M.N. Tukhachevskiy that a special war game be staged to investigate the situation that might arise out of a German attack on the Soviet Union. Tukhachevskiy, who was first deputy to Defense Commissar K. Ye. Voroshilov, had proposed a war-game scenario in which Germany would initiate operations with a surprise attack aimed at placing the forces of the Soviet side, caught on a peacetime footing, in a very unfavorable position early in the war. Marshal A. I. Yegorov, the then Chief of the General Staff, found this scenario too pessimistic for his taste and amended it to eliminate the element of surprise and thus allow the Soviet side to concentrate its forces prior to the opening of hostilities.

As it turned out, Tukhachevskiy's war-game scenario of 1935, as well as similar views of the coming war which he imparted to the members of the General Staff Academy the following year, proved to be somewhat prophetic. But Tukhachevskiy did not live to see the real thing in June 1941; nor for that matter did Yegorov. Both were among the victims of Yosip Stalin's purge of the Soviet officer corps in 1937–38.

WHETHER THE Soviet Union would have fared better in the difficult period between Adolf Hitler's attack on the USSR and the great turning point at Stalingrad in late 1942 and early 1943 had Tukhachevskiy and many other experienced Red Army leaders of his generation not been devoured by the purge is a question which John Erickson raises but does not try to answer in the opening passages of *The Road to Stalingrad,* the first volume of his two-volume study of Stalin's war with Germany.[1]

In a sense, this study picks up where Erickson's earlier classic, *The Soviet High Command,* left off. The opening account of the war games and studies conducted prior to the war by the Soviet General Staff, which includes coverage of a conference of high-ranking officers convened in December 1940 to assess changes required in the armed forces of the USSR in light of Red Army failures in Finland and the German military's blitzkrieg successes in Europe, serves to remind us of the central role long played in Soviet military affairs by the General Staff. Today, as at its foundation, this institution remains the seat of military professionalism in the Soviet Union.

The General Staff, which evolved out of a series of Red Army Staff arrangements beginning with the All-Russian Main Staff in May 1918,[2] was established under the leadership of Yegorov on September 22, 1935—the same day that traditional military ranks were restored in the army, and at a time when the Red Army's secret postwar military-industrial collaboration with the German Reichswehr was ending, to be replaced by strategic and operational planning for a possible war with Nazi Germany. Some six months later, the Voroshilov Academy of the General Staff also was set up.[3] According to *Akademiya General'nogo Shtaba,* a book recounting the Academy's history and edited by Marshal Viktor G. Kulikov, former Chief of the General Staff and now commander of Warsaw Pact forces, this institution was created to take over from the Frunze Military Academy such tasks as preparing officer cadres for higher

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1. The second volume is John Erickson, *The Road to Berlin,* New York, NY, Harper and Row, forthcoming.

2. *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya,* Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976, Vol. 2, p. 511.

3. The Academy did not actually acquire Voroshilov's name until Feb. 3, 1941.

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leadership responsibilities[4] and to collaborate with the General Staff in working out military-theoretical formulations bearing on important strategic and operational problems (p. 9).

Tukhachevskiy's ideas played a significant part in this collaboration during the Academy's first year. Out of the collaboration came military-theoretical work that contributed to an emerging Soviet military doctrine in the prewar years. As reflected in the Provisional Field Regulations of 1936 and again in the 1939 Draft Field Regulations, this doctrine stressed the decisive character of offensive operations to be launched at the start of a war to encircle and destroy the enemy's forces. Although the doctrine recognized the validity of the defensive, it did not, as later noted in the Pospelov history of World War II, count on having to conduct lengthy defensive operations, with the armed forces "withdrawing deep into the country,"[5] as actually happened in the first year and a half of the war.

Erickson's treatment of precisely this period necessarily retraces a good deal of ground already covered by other historians of World War II. His work, however, is tuned far more keenly than most to internal relationships and tensions among the agencies and individuals responsible for conducting the war effort on the Soviet side. Perhaps the central tension reflected in Soviet historical treatment of the war has been over the relative contributions of the Moscow center, on the one hand, and the front commands in the field, on the other, to the planning and successful conduct of major operations.[6]

The existence of strains between the center in Moscow and local interests is, of course, a phenomenon not unknown in Soviet life at other times and over other matters than the running of a war. But the period of the war covered by Erickson's account is one for which these tensions have been particularly well documented. The principal military agencies and actors at the center in the early stages of the war were *Stavka* (the short term for General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command), presided over by Stalin, and the General Staff, headed in turn by Marshals G. K. Zhukov, B. M. Shaposhnikov, and A. M. Vasilevskiy. Zhukov, Chief of the General Staff when the war began, was soon singled out by Stalin to serve as his primary professional military deputy in *Stavka;* but he was also called upon periodically to double as a trouble-shooting operational commander, as during critical periods of the battles for Leningrad and Moscow in 1941.

Tension between the center and the field commands was particularly marked during the first year of the war. In part, this was due to the ruthless way in which field commanders were made scapegoats for early disasters—disasters for which a good share of the blame actually could be laid at Stalin's door. General D. G. Pavlov, for example, commander of the key Western Military District opposite Poland, was recalled to Moscow and shot, along with members of his staff, after his troops were overrun and encircled by the initial German attack of June 1941.[7] Other commanders who suffered setbacks in the field, like Generals P. I. Golikov and I. K. Bagramyan, kept their lives but had their reputations at least temporarily sacrificed, as Erickson puts it, "in the cause of Stalin's exculpation" (p. 375).

By the late summer of 1942, the Soviet Union had weathered the first year of the war and Hitler's unsuccessful attempt to take Moscow, but was facing new perils as German forces in the south drove deep toward the Caucasus and Stalingrad. Zhukov and Vasilevskiy, who by this time had taken "increasing control of the operational destinies" of the Red Army (Erickson, p. 375), were sent by Stalin at the end of August to survey the worsening situation on the Stalingrad front, where Nikita Krushchev was the political commissar. Once back in Moscow, Zhukov and Vasilevskiy had an all-day working session at the General Staff on September 13, and then suggested to Stalin a plan for a counteroffensive against the extended flanks of the German salient at Stalingrad intended to lead to the encirclement and eventual capture of Marshal Friedrich von Paulus' forces. As Vasilevskiy said many years later, this suggestion to Stalin was "the 'kernel' from which our victory on the Volga grew."[8] Zhukov, in his memoirs, put it somewhat more bluntly, stating that "the basic

4. Among the Academy's early students were A.M. Vasilevskiy, A.I. Antonov, M.V. Zakharov, and S.M. Shtemenko, all of whom subsequently rose to the position of Chief of the General Staff, as well as A.A. Grechko, who became Minister of Defense.

5. P.N. Pospelov, Ed., *Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945: kratkaya istoriya* (Great Fatherland War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945: Short History), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1967, p. 50.

6. On this debate, see Timothy J. Colton, "The Zhukov Affair Reconsidered," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), April 1977, p. 199.

7. Pospelov, op. cit., p. 68.

8. V. Peskov, "The Command Post of the War," *Komsomol'skaya pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 30, 1975.

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and decisive role in the overall planning and execution of the counteroffensive at Stalingrad indisputably belongs to *Stavka* and the General Staff."[9]

The notion that the Moscow center deserved the credit for conceiving the counteroffensive that led to victory at Stalingrad has not been accepted, however, by some who served in the field. In his memoirs, for example, Marshal A. I. Yeremenko, who had commanded the Stalingrad front, claimed that the idea of the counteroffensive came to him in early August 1942, and that with Krushchev's help, he had worked out a plan and sent it to Moscow.[10] In addition, Marshal V. I. Chuykov, who had commanded an army at Stalingrad under Yeremenko and who later feuded in print with Zhukov, wrote disparagingly in his memoirs about intervention by Moscow,[11] while Marshal I. S. Konev, who had not taken part in the Stalingrad fighting, nevertheless asserted that the "basic weight" of planning and organization lay not at the center but in the field.[12] Krushchev, too, joined in this criticism of the center. In his memoirs, he argued that as a result of wanting "to regulate everything from Moscow," Stalin had "hamstrung his commanders and commissars at the Front."[13]

THE CENTER-VERSUS-FIELD controversy obviously became a factor of some consequence in post-Stalin Soviet politics, with the expression of anticenter sentiments most prevalent during the period of Krushchev's destalinization policy, while the resurgence of pro-center sentiments tended to parallel Stalin's subsequent partial rehabilitation. But whether Stalin's stock in retrospect happened to be up or down, the wartime reputation and prestige of the General Staff, which—largely through its Operations Administration—had provided daily support to Stalin and *Stavka*, apparently suffered no damage. Though some bias might be attributed to Marshal Kulikov, his appraisal of the General Staff's wartime performance would appear to be widely shared in the Soviet Union:

. . . the General Staff was in the fullest sense the brain of the army, its creative laboratory, where strategic concepts and plans of military operations were born and developed. At the same time it was the basic organizer of their practical translation into reality.[14]

Once the war was over and *Stavka* had gone out of existence, the General Staff was accorded a place in the bureaucratic structure of the Soviet government as a component element of the Ministry of Defense; but it remained the main locus of professional military planning and the agency through which operational direction of the armed forces was exercised. Together with the General Staff Academy, it also became the center of a large postwar research effort to digest and analyze the experience of World War II for the benefit of Soviet military theory.

It was not until 1953, when the General Staff and its Academy were instructed by the Ministry of Defense to begin studying nuclear weapons and their use in military operations, that military theoretical studies in the USSR were turned in a radical new direction (Kulikov, p. 129). The change of course, which came shortly after Stalin's death and which required "corrections" in the then existing five-year plan for military-scientific studies, probably cleared the way for ground-breaking Soviet articles, like those by General N. A. Talenskiy in *Voyennaya mysl'* in September 1953 and by Marshal P. A. Rotmistrov in *Krasnaya zvezda* in March 1955[15] that first addressed the doctrinal implications of nuclear weapons and nuclear surprise attack.

After these first post-Stalin efforts, major revisions of Soviet military doctrine finally came in the early 1960's, under Khrushchev. They developed in considerable measure out of seminar discussions in the General Staff and a top secret "Special Collection of Articles" on nuclear-age problems written by leading military authorities and published in the General Staff journal *Voyennaya mysl'* in 1960–61.[16] The widely known *Voyennaya strategiya* (Military Strategy) volume edited by Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy and published in three successive editions from 1962 to 1968 was also the work of a collective group of colonels and generals associated with the General Staff and its Academy. In addition, officers from these institutions, along with colleagues from

9. G. K. Zhukov, *Vospaminaniya i razmyshleniya* (Reminiscences and Reflections), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1969, p. 420.

10. Cited in Erickson, *The Road to Stalingrad*, p. 429.

11. V. I. Chuykov, *Nachalo puti* (Beginning of the Journey), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1962, p. 246.

12. Timothy J. Colton, loc. cit., pp. 199-200.

13. Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott, Boston, Little, Brown, 1970, p. 191.

14. V. Kulikov, "Strategic Leadership of the Armed Forces," *Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal* (Moscow), June 1975, pp. 14-15.

15. See Herbert S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1959, pp. 37-52.

16. For these details, see Frank Gibney, Ed., *The Penkovskiy Papers*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1965, pp. 227, 251.

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the Frunze Military Academy, have authored many other military-theoretical works less well known in the West.[17]

WHILE THE GENERAL STAFF has remained intimately involved with the evolution of Soviet military theory, it has likewise continued to play a major role in the practical management of Soviet military power. As the central organ of the military high command and a somewhat larger organization than the Ministry of Defense itself, it maintains direct controlling links with the main staffs of the various service branches, military districts, and operational forces. Under the command of Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, who succeeded Kulikov in January 1977, the General Staff directs military operations; develops strategic concepts, targeting, and war plans; runs a worldwide military intelligence network, the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU); provides high-level military representation at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the United States; and helps formulate general military policy.

At a time when another political succession in the Soviet Union may not be far off, it is interesting to recall that successful contenders in the past have found it helpful to ensure at least the tacit backing of the professional military command. Since the incumbent Defense Minister, Marshal D. F. Ustinov, is not, despite his rank, a professional soldier, it would seem likely that in any succession period ahead the General Staff—the "real" seat of military professionalism and leadership in the USSR—will find its authority enhanced.

17. Some of these, such as *Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs*, the *Dictionary of Basic Military Terms*, and *The People, The Army, The Commander*, have become available in translation in the West through the "Soviet Military Thought" series published under the auspices of the United States Air Force.

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Posture and Purpose of the Soviet Military

by Shane E. Mahoney

DAVID R. JONES, Ed. *Soviet Armed Forces Reveiw Annual*. Gulf Breeze, FL, Academic International Press, 1977.

LAWRENCE L. WHETTEN, Ed. *The Future of Soviet Military Power*. New York, NY, Crane, Russak and Co., 1976.

MICHAEL G. DEANE. *Political Control of the Soviet Armed Forces*. New York, NY, Crane, Russak and Co., 1977.

EDWARD L. WARNER, III. *The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Institutional Analysis*. New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1977.

THERE IS little disagreement among Western observers—the authors of the books under review here included—that the Soviet Union is engaged in a military buildup of considerable proportions. Technologically sophisticated intelligence techniques have made it relatively easy to document this development and to specify with precision some of its most important dimensions. Thus, the contributors to the volumes edited by David R. Jones and Lawrence L. Whetten can cogently review the most advanced armaments and the peacetime deployment of the Soviet military establishment. In general, all tend to agree with John Erickson's assessment in the Whetten volume, that the Soviet armed forces have acquired a so-called theater-warfare capability and the professional capacity to manage it. More precisely, the buildup and modernization of the Soviet armed forces, according to Erickson, have equipped the USSR to conduct a preemptive or blitz-type campaign, with conventional, nuclear, or combined arms, within a limited theater of operations.

If there is broad agreement on the buildup per se, however, the same cannot be said regarding explanations of the purposes behind it. Contributors to the Whetten volume such as William R. Van Cleave and Erickson see a great deal of rational articulation between Soviet military doctrine and the force posture to which it is related. In their view, Soviet defensive doctrine requires a relative superiority in "armament norms," if not in manpower. And while the purpose behind the push for relative superiority is not thought to be a plan for outright aggression, concern does exist that the "high visibility" of such a posture is something that the Soviets will probably learn to translate into at least indirect diplomatic and political advantage.

Michael Deane and Edward Warner, on the other hand, are more prepared in their monographs to interpret the emerging Soviet military posture as less related to doctrine and, rather, a result of trade-offs among competing groups or institutional forces within Soviet society. Warner states (p. 117) that "both the Soviet doctrinal guidelines for the application of its military power and the panoply of weapons possessed by the Soviet armed forces appear to represent the outcomes of extended bargaining and political maneuvering among a variety of interested institutions . . .," and he concludes that the doctrine that guides the application of military power reflects an accommodation to weapons systems purchased in response to various bureaucratic pressures as often as it serves to prescribe their acquisition (p. 118). By similar logic, Deane's application of the group politics model leads him to interpret the Soviet position on Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) as the result of a vacillating debate between pro-disarmament and anti-disarmament factions in the relevant leadership circles.

In general, those who focus on the growing threat posed by the buildup of Soviet arms are led to conclude that there is coordi-

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nated and deliberate—if not entirely rational—purpose behind it, while those who focus on the internal dynamics of Soviet society are impressed with a diversity of opinion of such magnitude that it would seem to defy much centralized manipulation. What is involved, of course, is a matter of differing perceptions. And as the somewhat polemical but nevertheless useful contributions of Leon Sloss and Colin Gray to the Whetten volume remind us, perceptions are important and not merely a matter of scholastic, methodological debate. They shape our understanding of Soviet intentions and contribute to the development of military programs and foreign policy.

IN ACTUAL FACT, our concrete knowledge of Soviet military decision-making processes is modest at best. Moreover, because we demand more of our analytic models than we did a few years back (probably more than we should expect them to produce), the problem has gotten worse rather than better. As long as Yosip Stalin's system remained clearly intact and East-West relations were adversarial on almost every count, the "totalitarian model" seemed to provide all the insight that was needed: it defined a threat. But since Stalin's death, Soviet society has changed. Its relationship with the West is now partially defined by elements of cooperation in such important areas as trade and arms control. Whether or not these developments reflect fundamental transformations in the Soviet system remains to be seen, but they have already prompted Western analysts to seek analytical models that will peer more deeply into the Soviet policy formulation process and intelligently organize its apparent complexity.

With their respective applications of interest group theory to the Soviet military establishment, both Deane and Warner endeavor to produce a better grade of analysis than might have been secured through use of the totalitarian model. As a consequence, both encounter enormous requirements for data. Warner, who draws heavily on Graham Allison's concepts of bureaucratic politics for his analysis,[1] is expressly sensitive to this problem. Nonetheless, he fails to resolve it successfully and is forced to engage in extensive Kremlinological speculation of a rather traditional sort. Deane, in contrast, utilizes the familiar technique of attempting to ascertain group loyalties and conflicts from the public statements and career biographies of major political and military leaders. Accordingly, he is led to attach great significance to "esoteric communications" and the incremental rise or fall of "military representation" on the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Though both Warner and Deane recognize the important role of the party in the development of the USSR's military policies and force posture, each ultimately conveys to the reader a view of Soviet policy formulation that comes closer to pluralist characterizations of the American legislative process than to the familiar images of totalitarian rule.

It would be difficult to argue that Soviet political and military decision-makers have no serious differences of opinion on policy matters. And it is clear that bureaucratic self-interest and service branch loyalties contribute to the differences which arise. Indeed, this has long been the case. Those who have carefully studied the memoir literature of the interwar and World War II periods must be impressed with the fact that even Stalin's regime is poorly described by the standard totalitarian model. Its decision-making dynamics were amply characterized by trade-offs, bureaucratic loyalties, factional disputes, and the influence of technical experts.[2] At the same time, however, this literature leaves no doubt that these "group" forces never operated autonomously, for Stalin retained the capacity to orchestrate them in the service of policies that he had already decided upon. Through networks of personally loyal and (ultimately) technically proficient prefects, he penetrated virtually all significant "group" and bureaucratic forces that contributed to the development of military doctrine, hardware, and operational tactics. And through ad hoc "institutions" such as the prewar Defense Committee and the wartime *Stavka* and State Defense Committee, he alone manipulated and galvanized these forces to serve ends that *he* had established, often after listening to much expert debate. More by the essential role that he played than by terror, Stalin successfully integrated technical expertise with political goals. To borrow a phrase from Herman Finer, he kept the

1. See Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Co., 1971.

2. See, for example, the memoirs of B.L. Vannikov, "The Soviet Military Establishment on the Eve of War," *Voprosy istorii* (Moscow), October 1968, pp. 116-23, and January 1969, pp. 122-35; and A.S. Yakovlev, *Tsel' zhizni: zapiski aviakonstruktora* (The Goal of Life: Notes of an Aircraft Designer), Moscow, Politizdat, 1966.

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professional and "group" forces in society on tap without letting them get on top.[3]

Thus, the post-Stalin appearance of "group" cleavages and bureaucratic interests may be deceptive. In the first place, it is by no means clear that these are new phenomena. However, their relative conspicuousness is new, which lends to the uncritical view that the situation has fundamentally altered. In the second place, the existence of such cleavages and interests—even when they can be accurately identified—in no way assures that transplanted theories of group or bureaucratic politics will reveal anything about Soviet military decision-making processes. While it is easy to concur with the contention that the totalitarian model tended to obscure the microdynamics of Soviet policy formulation, we must not unwittingly conclude that some sort of pluralist model is the only alternative to it. Nor should we automatically take failures in the use of the totalitarian model as indicating that changes have occurred in the system being investigated. Models of group and bureaucratic politics offer accurate explanations of behavior within American society and its complex organizations because powerful cultural forces provide a decisive amount of legitimacy to group autonomy and bureaucratic decentralization. American politics is characterized by private power, because its antifederalist traditions are very strong,[4] and because a related commitment to law and rules, as opposed to personal authority, generates a variety of strong decentralizing "pathologies" within its public bureaucracies.[5] Paradoxically, it is this very commitment to rules that often allows bureaucratic subunits to resist central control and to form protective alliances with other organized interests in society. The bureaucratic rules themselves frequently define standard operating procedures that work more to the advantage of subunit goals than to the attainment of policies defined by institutional elites. This is not to simplistically equate pluralism with democracy, but rather to argue that Western concepts of pluralism are tailored to a culturally specific set of circumstances that may not exist elsewhere.

IN ANY CASE, the political and bureaucratic culture of Stalin's system was different. Despite a plethora of rules and regulations, Stalin's regime was intensely personal. In addition to the party apparatus, complex networks of loyal plenipotentiaries working in every important area gave Stalin the power to circumvent formal rules and to define and redefine "standard" operating procedure at will. Aided by terror, tradition, ideological legitimacy, and the prefectural use of staff, he was able to draw on the resources of complex organizations and simultaneously prevent the genuine decentralization of decision-making power into the hands of groups of bureaucratic subunits.

As for Nikita Khrushchev, there is considerable evidence that he did not consider this operational mode to have been one of Stalin's crimes. Indeed, he emulated it. With respect to the military, his approach was personal; and the resulting control, quite thorough. Though the Zhukov affair would seem to contradict such a view, there is growing reason to believe that this was far more a matter of personal political rivalry than a reflection of army-party conflict.[6] Moreover, were one to judge from Zhukov's career biography, there would be good reason to categorize him as a military spokesman for the political elites rather than as a political spokesman for entrenched military interests—a matter that draws attention to the fact that reading the Politburo and Central Committee memberships for their functional group attachments is a hazardous endeavor. If, in American bureaucracies, where you "stand" depends on where you sit, it is quite evident that in Soviet organizations, where you sit is often a function of where you "stand."

Those who believe that there is something to be gained from the application of pluralist models or Western organization theory to analysis of the Soviet military can, of course, point out that both Stalin and Khrushchev are gone and that, with their passing, change has occurred. But this is an empirical judgment, and its validity is not clear—at least not to this reviewer. Political and bureaucratic cultures do not quickly fade once they have been firmly established. In this regard, it is

3. "Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government," *Public Administration Review* (Washington, DC), Summer 1941, p. 348.

4. On the political values of the American antifederalists, see Cecelia Kenyon's excellent essay, "Man of Little Faith: The Antifederalist on the Nature of Representative Government," *William and Mary Quarterly* (Williamsburg, VA), January 1955, pp. 3-43.

5. See, for example, the classic works of Robert Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," *Social Forces* (Chapel Hill, NC), May 1940, pp. 560-68; and Philip Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of Organization," *American Sociological Review* (Menasha, WI), February 1948, pp. 25-35.

6. See Timothy J. Colton, "The Zhukov Affair Reconsidered," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), April 1977, pp. 185-213.

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worth noting that many senior Soviet bureaucrats, including Defense Minister Dimitriy F. Ustinov, learned their management procedures under Stalin and Khrushchev. Furthermore the crisis experience of the Great Fatherland War is still regularly utilized as an explicit model by Soviet military professionals. The historical lessons of the war emphasize the need for well-equipped and intelligently led formations, and use of this model directs attention to a time when party personnel played a crucial role in rebuilding and cementing together the diverse components of a desperate military effort. In short, open tribute to the party by military personnel who held responsible command positions during the wartime period should be taken as more than a simple demonstration of obeisance to political elites.

Even if one grants that Brezhnev has introduced changes into Soviet military management practices—such as the enhancement of technical competence in the officer corps (especially in the General Staff), the development of scientific and cybernetic management systems, the redefinition of the role of ideology in military decision-making, and the elevation of technical-managerial skills of CPSU cadres in the armed forces and elsewhere—there is no reason to think that these reforms will encourage the development of any significant autonomy for military professionals. These measures have been initiated by the party elite, not by the military. Their thrust is toward a more efficient military establishment, capable of intelligently advising and obediently serving political-elite decisions. It is too early to tell whether these goals will be achieved. It should be noted, however, that the party has already demonstrated a considerable capacity for adapting to change. And with the scientific-technical modernization that it has promoted in the armed forces, the party seems to sense new opportunities to improve management and control of them.[7]

One cannot quarrel with the topics that Deane and Warner have chosen to address. Deane's interest in the role of the Main Political Administration (MPA) and Warner's focus on the spectrum of institutions that probably play a role in shaping Soviet force posture and military doctrine are certainly worthy areas of inquiry. But if our understanding in each of those realms is going to improve, then more than the application of Western group and organizational theory will clearly be required. Had these authors worked from the data to the design of appropriate models, it is possible that their conclusions would have been different at many crucial points. Deane, for example, would perhaps have given the MPA more credit for its positive capacity to integrate personnel in primary combat units and thereby stiffen the army's battlefield performance. From this perspective, the MPA is an integral part of the military. As it is, Deane's preconceptions lead him to conclude that a concurrence of the military and the MPA on any issue reflects the military's capacity to coopt its political overseers. Warner might have entertained the possibilities that the functioning of bureaucracy can be influenced by culture, that military professionalism is not an independent variable, and that the apparent diversity of institutional forces that act on Soviet military policy may in reality be rather well orchestrated.

AS YET, we do not know enough about decision processes in the Soviet military establishment to declare closure on the questions that are implicit in these observations. Until much more in the way of tedious, painstaking analysis is done—especially in the form of case studies—it seems unlikely that our understanding in this important area will improve. As always, progress will depend on the availability of data and the imagination used to organize them. The excellent bibliography of Soviet military literature which Jones provides, together with a translation of Lieutenant General P.A. Zhilin's discussion of this material in the same volume, addresses the first issue. The second remains a challenge for Western analysts.

7. See Erik P. Hoffman's excellent discussion of the broader issue in his "Soviet Views of 'The Scientific-Technological Revolution,' " *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), July 1978, pp. 615-44.

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Moscow and the Third World: Ideology vs. Power Politics

by Yaacov Ro'i

RICHARD LOWENTHAL. *Model or Ally? The Communist Powers and the Developing World.* New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1977.

WALTER F. HAHN and ALVIN J. COTTRELL. *Soviet Shadow Over Africa.* Coral Gables, FL, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1976.

IAN GREIG. *The Communist Challenge to Africa: An Analysis of Contemporary Soviet, Cuban and Chinese Policies.* Surrey, England, Foreign Affairs Publishing Co., 1977.

CHRISTOPHER STEVENS. *The Soviet Union and Black Africa.* New York, NY, Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1976.

AS EARLY AS the late 1940's, the Soviet Union was contemplating an alliance of convenience, on the basis of joint hostility to Western imperialism, with the underdeveloped countries of what was to become "the Third World." At this time, however, Moscow possessed neither the conceptual nor the material wherewithal to cement such a partnership. It was only in the mid-1950's, in the wake of opportunities created by the Korean war and the formation of a nonaligned bloc and of feelers and gestures on the part of Stalin's successors toward a number of carefully selected, strategically-situated countries, that the USSR made significant inroads into countries that it was wont to call "colonial and semi-colonial" or "dependent." These inroads came first in Asia and later in Africa.

Not surprisingly, this development bred a considerable Soviet literature designed to legitimize what was in essence a departure from the Stalinist concept of giving "fraternal" aid to Communist regimes only. In order to justify the major new expenditures for economic and military aid and the concomitant political commitment, Soviet analysts depicted favored countries as states embarked "on the noncapitalist path of development," as "national democratic states" or "revolutionary democratic" states. In other words, these countries were portrayed not as petitioners of Soviet assistance to meet temporary, immediate needs but as steadfast, permanent partners committed to "state," and even in some instances to "scientific," socialism.

Moscow made every effort to ensure that this assessment not only sounded good in theory but also conformed to reality. It did so first by trying to imbue the USSR's new allies with as much of the dogma and terminology of Marxism-Leninism as they could or would swallow, although it displayed some flexibility with regard to the precise demands it put to different countries. Soon, however, it became apparent to the Kremlin that imparting the substance of Soviet ideology to regimes that were little inclined to the sophistry of Marxist-Leninist (or any other) political theory was well-nigh impossible. Indeed, the pressing nature of these regimes' needs rendered irrelevant and absurd the acrobatics of recasting in a Marxist-Leninist framework the very pragmatic philosophies which had developed out of the specific conditions of their struggles. Moscow therefore devised a far more institutionalized and technical basis for its relationship with the countries in question. This involved links between the elite bodies of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the leading organs of the single parties that usually dominated these countries, as well as "party-to-party" ties at lower levels (regional and primary organizations) and in all walks of life (youth organizations, academies for training party cadres, scientific institutions, and the like). The very emergence of these intricate ties, which had no precedent in the history of the CPSU, demon-

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strated the great importance that the Kremlin attached to the "revolutionary democracies" of the Third World. Such links paralleled and supplemented those at the state-to-state level. They were designed to maximize Soviet involvement in and influence upon everyday life and conduct of affairs in these countries and to bring a wide range of indigenous officials into direct contact not only with Marxist-Leninist thought but also—and more important—with Soviet practice.

In this fashion, the USSR became in many ways the model for a growing number of client states as well as their benefactor. Yet even the duality of the Soviet role in these countries failed to ensure the success of the Soviet gambit. In one of them after another, local coups or other developments removed the leaders most committed to the Soviet connection, or altered the circumstances that had made such a liaison seem desirable, if not imperative; and many of them showed themselves no less adept than the USSR at fickleness and maneuverability. When opportunity presented itself, they had no compunction about ignoring or denying their indebtedness to Moscow and accepting Western economic, military, and political aid.

RICHARD LOWENTHAL'S new book, aptly titled *Model or Ally?,* deals with the dilemmas that the USSR has created for itself by the dichotomous image it has projected to the developing countries.[1] On the one hand, despite the plethora of well-sounding formulae propounded since Lenin by theoreticians and media alike, there has not necessarily been congruence between the USSR's theoretical and practical approaches to a given regime. The Soviet Union has given aid to governments that its own ideologists have been subjecting to considerable censure, that have clearly been neither nonaligned nor revolutionary, and that have been receiving aid simultaneously from the West. On the other hand, Moscow has tried to capitalize on the difficulties that confront these countries in their efforts to overcome their economic and technological backwardness. By stressing a shared commitment to modernization, its own considerable successes in modernization since October 1917, and its basic anti-Westernism, the USSR has made itself appear a natural colleague of the Third World in the latter's real and perceived struggles against the colonial or ex-colonial powers.

As Lowenthal describes with great insight, the attractiveness of the Soviet model has not inevitably extended to the ideology and system that it embodies. The USSR's own "dictatorship of development" is admittedly coupled with egalitarian and internationalist goals which have led to the formation of a comprehensive sociopolitical theory and instruments for its implementation, but the question has been how far the Third World would accept the linkage between forced modernization and the Soviet vision of utopia. Furthermore, Third World countries have not regarded monopolistic control of the state, of the economy, of all forms of social organization, and of channels of communication by the ruling party and the removal of all legal limitations on state power as essential prerequisites for partnership with the Soviet Union.

This state of affairs has created major problems for Moscow, and Lowenthal provides a bevy of specific examples. He begins with Kemal Ataturk's application of the Soviet model to achieve a goal which was limited in space and time and at all stages precluded any worldwide, utopian purpose. Perhaps the most instructive and carefully thought-out analyses, however, are those relating to Black Africa and the Arab countries. In the former, most founders of the parties that ruled single-party states during the 1960's were indeed consciously influenced by Communist organizational principles and by aspects of Communist ideology; yet none of these so-called "Afro-Marxist" parties accepted the doctrine of class struggle and the leading role of the proletariat, identified themselves as proletarian class parties, or were prepared to submit to an international Communist center. (Here it is unfortunate that the discussion, written originally in the late 1960's, was not updated to take account of recent developments in Africa.[2]) Moreover, most of the one-party regimes were unsuccessful in mobilizing and modernizing society or in establishing sufficient legitimacy to prevent widespread corruption and infighting. Finally, only a few (those in Ghana, Mali, Tanzania) entered into even a tem-

1. A few of the topics covered in Lowenthal's book—for example, Sun Yat-sen's China and Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang subsequent to the dismissal of Soviet political and military advisers; Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany—are of somewhat doubtful relevance to the theme of the Soviet model and its impact. Indeed, these sections interrupt the flow of discussion in an otherwise well-focused work.

2. In many respects, it is unimportant that the book consists largely of material that first appeared a decade or more ago in other sources. But to fail to treat the cases of Angola, Mozambique, and the Horn of Africa in a book published in 1977 is indefensible.

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porary working relationship with the CPSU.

In the Arab world, there has also been a tendency toward the creation of one-party regimes which often at first glance bear a considerable resemblance to the Soviet model. This is especially true given the conscious imitation of Soviet institutions and practices stemming from years of intensive party-to-party contacts. Yet here, too, Moscow has not enjoyed a great deal of success. This situation is partly because the ruling Arab socialist parties have by and large been instruments for military dictatorships and perhaps partly because—as Lowenthal suggests—Islamic cultural tradition is specifically inimical to the development of rational forms of procedural legitimacy.

THE PRACTICAL economic, political, and military-strategic considerations—as opposed to ideological orientations—that have of late undisguisedly guided Soviet relations with the developing world as a whole and Africa specifically in response to the setbacks that the USSR encountered in the 1960's are the topic of the three other books under review. Of the three volumes, the one by Walter Hahn and Alvin Cottrell is the most useful—not only because it is the shortest but also because it has a clear focus. While the books by Ian Greig and Christopher Stevens present an abundance of material, they contain little analysis, and they are somewhat chaotic in organization. The Greig volume is the much more up-to-date of the two and does boast a fairly good index (even if its categories are somewhat amateurish).

Despite the fact that the terminology Soviet sources use to describe Moscow's activities in Africa is often reminiscent of earlier efforts to find ideological allies, the criteria for choosing the most "progressive" local parties, as these three books attest, have become meaningless, and the verbal anticipations of the eventual socialist revolution are a mere lip service to old, well-worn catechisms. Promotion of the "national-liberation movement" is now synonymous with encouragement of opposition to economic dependence on the West and, particularly, assistance in denying valuable natural resources to the West. (Southern Africa, it should be noted, is particularly rich in those resources which the West needs for almost all aspects of its defense, and many of its civilian, industries.) It may also involve military aid and perhaps the acquisition of naval bases or facilities for the purpose of threatening the trade routes around the Cape of Good Hope on which the West is largely dependent.

At the same time, the USSR has sought to create relationships based on lesser commitments than past relationships entailed. For example, in the 1970's it has been giving relatively little economic, as compared with military, aid. This state of affairs reflects Moscow's recognition of the tenuousness of its support even in those countries which have seemed most likely—to quote Hahn and Cottrell—to "serve as surrogates in anti-Western activities." Changes in leadership and shifts in policy have often altered the relationships between such states and the Soviet Union almost overnight.

In addition, the Soviets have managed to make their weight felt in Africa particularly, and to avoid serious Western reprisals, by supplying increasingly sophisticated weaponry and logistical support to the Cubans. The direct interventions of the latter in hostilities in the various centers of tension in both Southern Africa and the Horn have almost certainly been Soviet-initiated. With regard to Angola, for example, the Soviets have preened themselves that "the African and nonaligned countries have had an opportunity to see for themselves" that the USSR gives precedence to its support of the national-liberation struggle and of "the peoples of young states" over its policy of the "normalization of relations with the capitalist countries and the relaxation of international tension."[3] In such ventures, the Cubans probably have been repaying long overdue debts to Moscow, and they have certainly obtained some new economic and military assistance from the USSR. Soviet use of Cubans in Africa has had the special advantage that Cuba can field combat soldiers who are black.

From the Soviet point of view, the outlook for the future in Africa seems quite rosy. Moscow's Cuban proxy appears to be untouchable by the West and is acceptable to African liberation movements. The USSR's alliance with a few strategically situated countries has vastly improved its concrete potential for controlling coastlines, ports, and vital sea routes, as well as brought it close to the mounting struggles in Rhodesia and Namibia and the nascent one in South Africa. Finally, Soviet espousal of radical African positions has made it harder not only for African moderates to negotiate compromise solutions

3. *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Dec. 26, 1975, as quoted by Hahn and Cottrell.

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but also for the US to adopt stances that look reasonable to Africans, and it has also encouraged extremists to seek Soviet backing.

All these gains have rendered Moscow's political support of so-called "revolutionary-democratic" or other "progressive" parties, groupings, and leaders increasingly cynical. Such support, which previously failed to produce long-term Soviet successes, has now become an undisguised tool for some very crass power politics.

South Asian Politics and the Great Powers

by Shirin Tahir-Kheli

BHABANI SEN GUPTA. *Soviet-Asian Relations in the 1970's and Beyond.* New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1976.

RICHARD B. REMNEK. *Soviet Scholars and Soviet Foreign Policy—A Case Study in Soviet Policy Towards India.* Durham, NC, Carolina Academic Press, 1975.

R. K. JAIN, Ed. *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh,* Vol. 2. New Delhi, Radiant Publishers, 1977.

DONALD C. HELLMANN, Ed. *Southern Asia—The Politics of Poverty and Peace.* Lexington, MA, D. C. Heath and Co., 1976.

W.A.C. ADIE. *Oil, Politics and Seapower—The Indian Ocean Vortex.* New York, NY, Crane, Russak and Co., 1975.

FERENCE A. VALI. *Politics of the Indian Ocean Region—The Balance of Power.* New York, NY, Free Press, 1976.

THE POLITICS of South Asia and the adjacent Indian Ocean littoral are exceedingly complex, reflecting not only the conflicting interests of states in the region but also the major influence on these relationships of great-power rivalry. The region has long been an arena of competition between East and West, and more recently it has witnessed persistent rivalry between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

In examining questions of security and stability in South Asia, the authors of the volumes under review all recognize this interplay between complex regional issues and the involvement of outside powers. As far as intra-regional relationships are concerned, they find the history, the present concerns, and the future of individual South Asian countries inextricably tied to those of other states of the region. Thus, one cannot discuss India's foreign policy goals and options solely on the basis of India's domestic sources of power and New Delhi's objectives and aspirations. It is necessary also to look at the concerns of Pakistan and at the dynamics of relations between the two countries. This sort of linkage is perhaps best illustrated in the volumes by Bhabani Sen Gupta and by Richard B. Remnek, both of which examine Indo-Soviet relations. For example, Sen Gupta states:

> *As long as the United States leans on China to improve its bargaining position with the Soviet Union, India will regard the Sino-US friendship as working against its strategic interests simply because the two adversaries of the USSR are friendly toward Pakistan. . . .* (p. 151)

Similarly, as R.K. Jain's book demonstrates, China's interaction with Pakistan and with Bangladesh cannot be separated

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from the relations of the latter two countries with India.

The other side of the coin is, of course, that regional politics do not occur in a vacuum; they also reflect great-power ambitions and interaction. Moscow, Beijing (Peking),* and Washington have all been key actors in South Asia, even though the intensity of their involvement may have varied over time. Today the region is an important arena for Soviet maneuvering, and as a consequence China and now also the United States show concern about accretions to Soviet power in the area and the implications for Moscow's global reach. Despite Soviet-American détente, the inherent conflict of interests between Moscow and Washington in this region is bound to surface. Similarly, in reflection of the poor state of Sino-Soviet relations, Beijing speaks out against Soviet "hegemonism" in the region, while Moscow counters with calls for "Asian collective security."

The result is an interplay between intraregional relationships and superpower rivalry. This is aptly summed up by Donald C. Hellmann in his study of South Asian politics:

In the increasingly pluralist world order that is likely to prevail in the future, regional patterns of conflict and cooperation will take on added importance for individual countries, and the superpowers will face a series of critical choices regarding the relevance of regional problems to the continuing global rivalry between Washington and Moscow. . .and [the] unpredictable involvement of China in the region. (p. 6)

AS SUGGESTED at the outset, in recent years Sino-Soviet rivalry has been a major element of the framework within which not only Moscow and Beijing but also the countries of South Asia themselves have operated in the region. While there was anticipation in some quarters, including the Soviet Union, of at least a degree of Sino-Soviet rapprochement after the death of Mao, there is now little to indicate that the intensity of this rivalry will decrease in the near future. The Chinese have viewed any Soviet conciliatory overtures as hypocrisy in light of the presence of a million Soviet soldiers on the USSR's border with the PRC and alleged Soviet strong-arm tactics in that frontier zone. Let us examine the interests of Moscow and Beijing in South Asia and the way in which the rivalry between the two Communist powers has affected the region's politics.

The history of Soviet diplomatic and economic involvement in India is, of course, an old one. Besides currently occupying a crucial place in the strategy of containing China,[1] Moscow's Indian tie has also served to counter the American presence in Pakistan and elsewhere and has also been used by the Soviet Union to demonstrate the advantages that can accrue to Third World states that choose to align themselves with the USSR.

In return, India derives certain advantages from its relations with the Soviet Union. As documented in Sen Gupta's book, the USSR has served as a major source of economic aid and military supplies and is the single most important source of assistance for the rapidly expanding Indian defense industry. These considerations make it difficult for any Indian government—even that of Morarji Desai (whose successful election campaign against Indira Gandhi in 1977 clearly promised a more balanced Indian foreign policy)—to alter New Delhi's pro-Moscow tilt. And as long as India's need for the USSR remains real and strong, Sino-Indian relations cannot improve much beyond the formalities of normalization.

If the Soviet-Indian tie has been strong, so has the link between China and Pakistan. Beijing recognized that the existence of the Sino-Indian quarrel was one factor motivating Soviet cultivation of India. Consequently, to offset Soviet influence in the subcontinent, China established extensive relations with Pakistan. The official documents of these ties are presented in the Jain book. China-Pakistan friendship has persisted despite Beijing's inability to prevent Islamabad's loss of East Pakistan in the 1971 Bangladesh war. Indeed, that conflict helped convince Pakistan of the validity of the Chinese thesis of "Indian expansionism and Soviet social-imperialism." Moscow has attempted to counter Chinese influence by repeatedly putting pressure on Pakistan to join the Soviet-sponsored

*In accordance with our adherence to the transliteration and transcription systems employed by the US Board on Geographic Names, we are adopting the pinyin system of Romanization for proper names and other Chinese-language references connected with the China mainland. To render this transition as easy as possible for our readers, we include the old Wade-Giles transcriptions in parentheses.—Eds.

1. Indeed, the importance of Sino-Soviet rivalry and the fact that in the case of South Asia Soviet policymakers were called on to combat China in the USSR's own back yard go a long way toward explaining why, as Remnek argues, Soviet scholars specializing on India were able to make little input to the foreign policy of the USSR toward that South Asian country. Assessments of the specifics of Indian politics or of that country's revolutionary potential clearly paled in importance before the primary Soviet concern with Beijing.

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"Asian collective security" scheme, a project that China perceives as providing conclusive proof of the Soviet quest for hegemony. Pakistan's refusal so far to participate undermines such "anti-China" undertakings. In addition, the friendship with Pakistan affords China access to conservative Muslim countries and provides a rationale for Chinese expression of concern over Soviet penetration of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean region.[2]

In turn, Pakistan derives from China a psychological, economic, and diplomatic boost. In particular, the tie with Beijing confers legitimacy on Pakistan's claims to be considered an important country despite the loss of half its territory in 1971. Beijing's concept of the world as divided into "three camps," the third of which it alleges is led by China, is also useful to Pakistan, which sees the Chinese claim as undermining any claim India might make to leadership of the Third World.

Soviet and Chinese interaction with Bangladesh is limited, reflecting Dacca's efforts to enlist help from a variety of sources to meet its grave economic needs. The help given by the Soviet Union in the formation of Bangladesh and in the USSR's diplomatic and economic support in the period immediately after independence did not buy Bengali goodwill for long. Relations had already cooled during the tenure of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and his death in August 1975 dealt a final blow to Soviet influence in Bangladesh. Mujib's successors have expressed a desire to cultivate good relations with China and have won recognition and aid from the PRC. Bangladesh will likely continue to pursue this policy, at least as long as Major General Ziaur Rahman remains president.

Turning to the politics of the Indian Ocean and the historical involvement of external powers in the area, we have the useful studies by W. A. C. Adie and by Ferenc A. Vali. Although Adie's treatment of the inability of the littoral states to defend both themselves and the region as a whole reflects a rather arrogant great-power perspective, he does highlight the main events which have made this area a potential arena for superpower competition. Vali's approach is more historical and more detailed. The author makes the very important point that, historically, a clear division of land and sea power between the possible contestants in the Indian Ocean area—e.g., between the naval might of Portugal and the land-based forces of the Moghul emperors—prevented major clashes there. This standoff eventually gave way to an era of undisputed British access to and control of the area.

When Britain's ability to maintain overseas commitments declined, so did British power in the region. The ultimate result was a general withdrawal. This end of *pax Britannica* in the Indian Ocean has provided another long-time contender in the region, the Soviet Union, with the opportunity to use its new naval power to make its presence felt on a temporary or, if possible, a more permanent basis.

One response of littoral states (e.g., Sri Lanka and Iran) has been to propose turning the Indian Ocean into a "zone of peace." The object is clearly to prevent superpower rivalries from being played out in that part of the world. Even so, many of the supporters of such a concept privately state that as long as the Soviet navy remains active in those waters, they feel more comfortable with having an offsetting American presence—a view also echoed in Beijing.

RECENT EVENTS only serve to highlight the South Asian security issues suggested above. The most salient of these developments was the coup d'état of April 1978 in Afghanistan which overthrew Mohammad Daoud and brought supporters of Moscow into power. The immediate increase of Soviet involvement and influence in Kabul has serious implications for neighboring countries. Islamabad is concerned with the effect this shift might have on the level of Afghan support for dissidents in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. New Delhi, too, is likely to be affected should there be a Pakistan collapse—which would bring Soviet involvement (albeit through Kabul) to India's borders. For its part, Tehran fears that the Marxist takeover in Afghanistan could encourage similar activities in Iran.

Iran's current problems likewise are of importance far beyond the borders of that country. The tactical alliance between leftist and rightist elements against the rule of the Shah seemed to threaten stability in the region and raised the spectre of new payoffs for the aggressive posture adopted by the USSR and its supporters in various countries of the region. Sensing the potential gain to Beijing's

2. Worry about such Soviet penetration has led the Chinese to encourage the United States (albeit through private channels) to maintain a presence in the Indian Ocean even though, as the contributions to the Hellmann volume point out, the US currently is only marginally concerned with the subcontinent per se.

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Soviet rival, Chinese leader Hua Guofeng (Hua Kuo-feng) paid a visit to Tehran from August 29 to September 1, 1978, for "warm" talks with the Shah. Moscow was quick to publish charges that Beijing was against "the freedom and independence of the peoples of the Near East" and was undermining "the general national liberation movement of the Arab peoples."[3]

Further Soviet successes, in Ethiopia and South Yemen, have intensified the concern of littoral states. Coming on the heels of the success in Afghanistan and accompanying signs of instability in Iran and domestic difficulties in Pakistan, these advances by the USSR call into question an important assumption underlying the policy of many Asian countries—that Soviet friendship is desirable and need not involve the payment of a high strategic or political price. Sen Gupta pinpoints a critical ingredient in the changing reality and resulting changes in Asian perspectives:

What limited but could not contain the Soviet Union in Asia for a quarter century was the might and power of the imperialist United States; what has helped the expansion of the Soviet presence in Asia in the 1970's is the disarrayed and clumsy retreat of that imperial power from much of Asia. (p. 354)

AS ONE PONDERS questions of South Asia's security and stability, what can be said about potential future courses of action of local and extraregional states? Turning first to countries of the region, one detects a promising process of normalization of relations both among these countries and between them and outside powers. Thus, one can point to improved India-Pakistan relations, which reflect the modest Sino-Indian rapprochement. Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh has had a positive impact on Bangladesh's interaction with China. Similarly, the improvement of Afghanistan's relations with both Iran and Pakistan prior to 1978 augured well for future peace and stability in the area. This last development has been jeopardized by recent events in Afghanistan. Whether or not normalization can resume is a question whose answer will significantly affect regional developments and superpower interaction with countries in the area.

A second encouraging trend observable in the South Asian region is a recognition of the interdependence of the region's countries often stressed by the studies under review and a resulting spirit of cooperation in responding to threats to regional security and political stability. For example, India has been concerned with the impact of the Kabul coup on Pakistan. Iran has been similarly concerned. Both India and Iran have been worried about domestic turmoil in Pakistan, just as Pakistan is alarmed by the deterioration of stability in Iran.

The countries of the region are well aware that instability and insurrection bring the involvement of outside powers into regional affairs and make the overall situation potentially even more explosive. For example, Soviet success in Afghanistan led to a show of Chinese support in Iran and also put pressures on the United States to react. The question is how to prevent the region from perennially serving as an area where superpower rivalry is played out. This of course, will remain difficult so long as the Soviet Union continues to support polarization of political forces in the area—to push the region closer to interstate and intrastate conflict.

What future courses of action are likely to be pursued in the region by the Soviet Union, China, or the United States—countries forming what Vali terms "the strategic triangle"? Since Moscow is most involved at this time, it is appropriate to consider its case first. The USSR has psychological, political, and strategic interests in the area. Psychologically, it sees its global status as enhanced by any reversal suffered by the United States or China. Politically, Moscow would like to increase its influence in the South Asia/Indian Ocean region. It has achieved considerable success in this regard through the coup in Kabul and improvement of the Soviet position in Aden. Strategically, Moscow's presence in the region serves not only as a reminder of Moscow's countervailing strength but also poses for any potential opponent in Asia the specter of being outflanked by a simultaneous Soviet confrontation from the south as well as the north. The distances involved in developing and maintaining such a presence are relatively short: the Arabian Sea is only 750 miles from the Soviet border; the Persian Gulf at its northwest tip, a mere 550 miles.

Of late, there has been a renewal of Soviet pressure on countries to adhere to the collective security scheme first announced

3. On Hua's visit, see *Peking Review* (Beijing), No. 36, Sept. 8, 1978, pp. 5-10. On Moscow's response, see *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), Aug. 30, 1978, and a Radio Moscow Arabic-language broadcast of Aug. 31, 1978, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Sept. 1, 1978, pp. F/7 and F/8-9 respectively.

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by Brezhnev in 1969. This policy could succeed if Moscow can convince various countries like Pakistan or Iran—who face external as well as internal problems that the only real guarantee of their security lies in associating themselves with the USSR's proposal.

Beijing's initiatives in this region will continue to aim at preventing encirclement by Moscow and establishment of Soviet hegemony. Chairman Hua's trip to Tehran sought to bolster Iran's will to stay outside the Soviet orbit and was a signal to Moscow that the Soviet success in Afghanistan cannot easily be duplicated elsewhere, although recent events in Iran may give the USSR an advantage there. In addition, Beijing can and does play its American card by privately seeking an American presence in the region so long as Moscow remains active and by constantly stressing to American policymakers that the Soviets are using détente to shift the balance of power in Moscow's favor. However, as the books reviewed here point out, China, despite its extensive and expanding interaction with South Asian countries, is in the final analysis unable to become very involved or even to challenge Soviet power because of domestic constraints as well as the presence of Soviet troops on China's borders.

Of the three external powers, the United States has the longest history of involvement, both political and economic, in the region. In recent years, American power and presence has been declining. Despite Washington's sporadic attempts to take a hard line vis-à-vis Moscow's role and the Soviet naval buildup, United States policy seems basically governed by the Nixon doctrine, announced in 1969. This stipulates that the conventional defense of Asia is the responsibility of the country directly concerned, with Washington assisting its allies in repelling threats only after assessing the United States' "own national interests" and "capacity to contain those threats at an acceptable risk and cost."[4] To countries fearing for their security and allied with the US, all this seems very vague and noncommittal. Given the evident reluctance of the American people and the US Congress to get involved in distant conflicts, future American involvement seems likely to remain limited unless American security itself appears directly threatened.

Such a threat just might emerge in the Indian Ocean. It is an area of strategic significance to the United States because its major resources and position astride a crucial sea route make it of unquestioned importance to the economic survival of the West. The Soviet Union today appears closer to establishing a strategic presence and power in the Indian Ocean region than ever before, and it may well be here that Soviet-American détente is really tested. Washington previously decided against openly combatting growing Soviet involvement in Somalia and South Yemen, but the coup in Afghanistan and developments in Iran may have alerted the US to the seriousness of the Soviet threat to security in the region. If so, the United States would be acknowledging what has long been contended in Islamabad and Tehran and is propounded in the six volumes reviewed here—namely, that US-Soviet competition is a reality and that destabilization in South Asia is a matter of not only regional but global concern. While the countries of South Asia and the Indian Ocean littoral might in the abstract hope to shape their own political future without external involvement, they appear to recognize that their destinies are in significant ways linked with the global competition of the superpowers.

4. See President Richard M. Nixon's Feb. 18, 1970, report to the Congress, "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* (Washington, DC), Feb. 23, 1970, p. 198.

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Chinese Political Culture

by Gordon A. Bennett

RICHARD H. SOLOMON. *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture*. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1971.

RICHARD H. SOLOMON. *A Revolution Is Not a Dinner Party: A Feast of Images of the Maoist Transformation of China*. New York, NY, Doubleday, 1978.

THOMAS A. METZGER. *Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's Evolving Political Culture*. New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1977.

DAVID M. RADDOCK. *Political Behavior of Adolescents in China: The Cultural Revolution in Kwangchow*. Tucson, AZ, University of Arizona Press, 1977.

WILLIAM KESSEN, Ed. *Childhood in China*. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1975.

ROBERT and AI-LI CHIN. *Psychological Research in Communist China, 1949–1966*. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1969.

DONALD J. MUNRO. *The Concept of Man in Contemporary China*. Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, 1977.

LUCIAN W. PYE. *Mao Tse-tung: The Man in the Leader*. New York, NY, Basic Books, 1976.

ALAN P. LIU. *Political Culture and Group Conflict in Communist China*. Santa Barbara, CA, Clio Press, 1976.

PAUL. J. HINIKER. *Revolutionary Ideology and Chinese Reality: Dissonance Under Mao*. Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1977.

JOHN BRYAN STARR. *Ideology and Culture: An Introduction to the Dialectic of Contemporary Chinese Politics*. New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1973.

RAYMOND L. WHITEHEAD. *Love and Struggle in Mao's Thought*. Maryknoll, NY, Orbis Books, 1977.

THIS WOULD appear to be an appropriate moment to take a critical look at studies of China's political culture. Hua Guofeng (Hua Kuo-feng),* Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, has declared an end to China's Cultural Revolution. The purge of the gang of four has cleared the way for a revival of traditional cultural expression. Factional divisions among the Chinese elite are hypothesized to have cultural roots: "while all current Politburo members desperately want modernization, Deng and his supporters are willing to transform China at greater cost to the core values of the Chinese revolution than are Hua and his supporters."[1] And beyond the elite, according to one sociologist, "the traditional Confucian ethos, with its stress on the sacredness of kinship, remains very much alive in rural China so that the giving and the receiving of patronage must continue to take place according to its moral idiom."[2]

Indeed, scarcely a discussion of current events in China now takes place without someone remarking how "traditional" it all sounds. Lucian Pye captures the spirit of the secrecy among the

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1. Kenneth Lieberthal, "Chinese Politics in 1978: Modernization and the Ghost of Mao," photocopy paper distributed by the China Council of the Asia Society (New York, NY), November 1978. Deng is Deputy Premier Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p'ing).

2. Richard Paul Madsen, "Revolutionary Asceticism in Communist China: Social Causes and Consequences of Commitment to the Maoist Ethos in a South China Village," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1977, pp. 359-60.

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top elite: "It may seem to be a peculiarly convoluted way of conducting politics but it fits well with Chinese cultural patterns."[3]

STUDIES of "political culture" have multiplied and have added a significant dimension to political analysis since Gabriel Almond coined the term two decades ago in hopes of advancing beyond the "national character" concept.[4] To be sure, the political culture approach has yet to achieve an identity of its own in theoretical terms, for each new author seems to feel compelled to present yet another conceptualization.[5] The difficulty is still to give the name a beast. But even in the absence of a formal, agreed-upon definition of what "political culture" is, interesting research has been done using the approach. Scholars employing it share a sense that political logics operate differently in different societies, and that different "cultures" place different valuations on similar political symbols and behavior. They assume that not all of these differences can be explained by variables such as level of economic development, type of regime, or social class. And they believe that culturally attributable political variations are not confined to trivial matters of style. As might be expected from an innovative intellectual enterprise, accumulation of findings has proceeded in fits and starts, yielding persuasive insight and freewheeling speculation in nearly equal measure. Moreover, authors regularly fall victim to one or more serious conceptual perils, such as psychological reductionism, pitting culture against change, or neglecting alternative, noncultural hypotheses. Still, their collective achievement is impressive.

Until a "political culture" concept is elaborated in appealing formal terms, I prefer to stick with a common-language meaning. Intuitively, the term suggests political values—relative, general, enduring preferences with implications for political life—that attract constituencies in a society.[6] "Age should be respected more than youth in the selection of leaders" would be a good Chinese example. This value is relative—preferring old to young. It is general. It has been around for a long time and does not fluctuate like an attitude. It has political implications. And it is probably held strongly by several groups of Chinese. A political value need not be "dominant" or "prevalent" to be part of a political culture; it need only enjoy an identifiable following—an elite, the army, Southerners, rural dwellers, intellectuals, or the like—from time to time. Moreover, it can blissfully coexist with other logically inconsistent values. According to this informal conception, a "political culture" is a set of salient political values found either in a society, such as that of China or of Shanghai, or in some other social aggregate, such as elites in single-party systems or peasants in developing agricultural economies.[7]

Characteristic "Chinese" cultural traits occur readily to anyone familiar with the country. Chinese are fiercely nationalistic, even while displaying strong regional loyalties. They go to great lengths to manifest status equality, even while actually preserving rigid hierarchical distinctions. They prefer to rely upon intermediaries when arranging marriages or when dealing with officialdom. Chinese stand fast on status issues at international negotiations, though they may compromise on important substantive matters. They are ever courteous in face-to-face conversation, though they may express themselves most immoderately in print. When

3. "Communications and Chinese Political Culture," *Asian Survey* (Ann Arbor, MI), March 1978, p. 243.

4. Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics* (Gainesville, FL), August 1956, pp. 391-409.

5. One of the most interesting recent studies offers this technical formulation: ". . . political culture refers to the set of informal, adaptive postures—behavioral and attitudinal—that emerge in response to and interact with the set of formal definitions—ideological, policy, and institutional—that characterize a given level of society." Kenneth Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems," *American Political Science Review* (Menosha, WI), September 1974, p. 1173. Unfortunately, such definitions exclude little and leave research on the subject unfocused.

6. James MacGregor Burns, in his 1977 presidential address to the American Political Science Association, made a persuasive case for the study of values: "Men and women will slowly and deliberately starve themselves to death—they will override the most powerful and primitive instincts of survival—to protest a wrong or champion an ideological, or even a highly parochial, cause. They will endure years of suffering in gas-filled trenches or on icy battle plains, suppressing every want and need in their bodies, and then march to their deaths in the cause of God or Fatherland or Proletariat. Editors will risk and suffer mob attack, religious heretics will go to the flame, rebels will slaughter their children, in the name of Liberty." "Wellsprings of Political Leadership," ibid., March 1977, p. 270. In part, his argument is inspired by psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg's concept of stages of moral development in children—from the most primitive form of reciprocity based on power and punishment, to higher stages of literal exchange and then recognition that positive social relationships are systems of reciprocity based on gratitude, empathy, and mutual expectations, and finally to a stage governed by abstract notions of justice that lie beyond palpable rules of the social order.

7. Two forthcoming works on Chinese values are Richard Wilson et al., Eds., *Values and Value Change in Chinese Society,* New York, NY, Praeger Publishers; and Ross Terrill, Ed., *The China Difference,* New York, NY, Harper and Row.

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evaluating a person's "politics," Chinese first consider character, then interests, and finally policy stands, whereas Americans are likely to proceed in exactly the reverse order. Chinese believe that morally superior persons should be recruited to hold public office, and that once in power it is proper for leaders to attend to the moral instruction of the community; that the welfare of one's family or other primary or secondary group should be put before one's individual welfare; that favors must be repaid equivalently, or one is under obligation; that decisions should be made by consensus; and that openly expressed opposition signifies disharmony and, by implication, the government's weakness.

The problem is to describe these traits precisely and to fit them into compelling explanatory propositions. The ultimate aim of the political culture approach should be to specify circumstances where such values help explain the inapplicability of generally valid relationships to a specific deviant case. For example, it is sometimes asserted that in authoritarian one-party political systems, "the winner takes all" in contests for high office and that losers disappear permanently from active politics. However, while this "permanent purge" effect is visible in China, it is limited. Purgees are not killed or forced into exile. Unless the CCP Central Committee brands a fallen member of the elite a historical political criminal and gazettes the decision in *Renmin Ribao* (Jen-min Jih-pao), he or she may return to influence within a short number of years. Is this variation uniquely Chinese, and if so, what explains it? Mao Zedong's (Mao Tse-tung's) famous dictum to "cure the disease and save the patient"? Weak factional development in China? Confucian optimism about the malleability of man?

Systematic comparative explanations have yet to be developed in the literature on China's political culture. But an interesting beginning has been made toward the identification of operative Chinese values.

IN A PIONEERING review article, John W. Lewis identified two competing contemporary images of the "average" peasant or "the Chinese peasantry": passive, unconcerned, conciliatory, easy-going farmers, on the one hand, and agitated, rebellious, easily organized, vicious revolutionaries, on the other.[8] To solve the apparent paradox, Lewis introduced a "modern-revolutionary scale," taking leaves from William Skinner's trilogy of articles on marketing and social structure in rural China and from Mao Zedong's "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan."[9] Lewis concluded that the "typical" peasant does not exist. In the "least modern" areas at one end of his scale, peasant mobilization against entrenched conservatism is difficult; in the "modern urban centers" at the other end, revolutionary mobilization is easiest but so is governmental control; and in "localities between the two extremes," where firm political loyalties are lacking, leadership techniques are crucial to the guided promotion of revolutionary forces.

Without challenging the capacity of Lewis's "modern-revolutionary scale" to divide peasant villages according to their propensity for political participation, Richard Madsen has fashioned a fourfold typology of rural activists that promises to be a superior instrument for unraveling peasant values. Madsen's "communist gentry" sees the village as a federation of small families bound together by overarching kinship ties which can be cemented through exchanges of favors made with appropriate expressions of good human feeling or *ren qing* (jen ch' ing). His "communist rebel" sees the village as an integrated community in which the interests of individuals are closely tied to the good of the community as a whole. His "idealistic revolutionary" depends for his/her power and prestige upon meeting to an extraordinary degree the political ideals promulgated by the government's propaganda media. And his "peasant technocrat" depends for his/her status on an ability to fulfill expectations of officials of the state apparatus, an ability gained through schooling outside the village.[10] It remains to be investigated whether villages falling in different reaches of Lewis's modern-revolutionary scale might accommodate different mixes of Madsen's activist types. But an implicit hypothesis in Madsen's work is that the level of modernization makes little difference.

Madsen's "idealistic revolutionary" is typically not a pure peasant at all but an educated youth transferred to a rural village to help bridge the urban/rural gap. The concern of the political cul-

8. "The Study of Chinese Political Culture," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), April 1966, pp. 503-24.

9. See G. William Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China," *Journal of Asian Studies* (Ann Arbor, MI), November 1964, pp. 5-10; February 1965, pp. 211-23; May 1965, pp. 363-99. Also see *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1965, Vol. 1, pp. 23-59.

10. Madsen, op. cit.

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ture approach is how such idealism is generated, and under what conditions it can be sustained. This is familiar as the *socialization* problem, which requires attention not only to the substance of political values but also to family, friends, workplace colleagues, schools, the mass media, small study groups, model experiences, "labor reform," and mass campaigns—that is, to various socialization *agents* that transmit values to succeeding generations.

Richard Solomon addresses the problem most straightforwardly in the older of his two books under review here. (The 1978 volume is a briefer, popularized, profusely illustrated version of the earlier study.) He concludes that the Chinese pattern of childrearing, emphasizing fear of direct contact with a stern father and encouraging considerable anxiety about parental instructions, leads Chinese children to view government in a parallel way, as their home writ large. "From such a childhood pattern of relations with family authority seems to grow the adult Chinese concern for the presence of a strict, personalized, and unambiguous source of (political) authority who will impose order on potentially unruly peers and provide a clear source of guidance for all" (p. 52).

Thomas Metzger finds this argument to be fundamentally flawed, because it drastically oversimplifies the nature of public authority in late premodern China. At elite levels, neo-Confucian scholar-officials related to their superiors not as son to father but "in terms of a fragile bond full of mutual distrust and disappointment" (p. 180). Nor was any father in danger of losing "heaven's mandate" or *tian ming* (t'ien ming). But Metzger's objections are not completely to the point, since he is talking only about an elite of high officials and their political superiors, not about the common people who are said to "follow what heaven has decreed." For nonelites, Solomon still might be on the trail of reality. Some explanation is needed, after all, for Paul Hiniker's finding that "it appears relatively easy to induce a Chinese to comply overtly with authority; but it appears relatively difficult to induce a Chinese to internalize the principles advocated by the authority."[11]

Unfortunately, Solomon's evidence is only suggestive, not persuasive, that significant details of the childrearing practices he characterizes as "Chinese" are either distinctively Chinese (as opposed to Russian or Japanese or American) or nearly universal in China. Only 65 percent of his 91 respondents identified childhood as a golden age where "you don't have to worry about anything: if you are hungry, your parents give you food; if you need a haircut, they give you money. You just have to study well, and if there is anything you need they give it to you" (p. 39). Yet a childhood of opulent indulgence within clear and disciplined boundaries lies at the heart of Solomon's projections to the adult world of political authority. Moreover, all of his respondents had been young children before the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, with 45 percent of them having passed through this stage before the May Fourth (1919) period; and only 15 percent of the respondents were from landless peasant families.

Thus, it remains to be determined how well Solomon's arguments about childhood in China actually apply to the majority rural sector under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party. Solomon acknowledges the problem of variations within Chinese society but then slips back into holistic cultural characterizations: "Our basic interpretation. . .remains that the strong appeal of childhood for the respondents taken as a group reflects a general cultural identification with the security and forms of nurturance and pleasure known most fully in the first years of life" (p. 40).

In contrast with Solomon's sample, all 35 of the interviewees discussed in David Raddock's book experienced childhood in the early years after 1949 and were adolescents by the time of the Cultural Revolution. Also, in contrast with Solomon's use of a questionnaire and thematic apperception test (TAT) methodology, Raddock opted for open-ended questions and often encouraged his interviewees to free-associate.[12] His conclusions reflect these contrasts.

Raddock's analysis of participation in the Cultural Revolution stresses a key variable—interaction between father and son—and in terms of this variable he is able to hypothesize an

11. *Chinese Attitudinal Reactions to Forced Compliance: A Cross-Cultural Experiment in the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, Cambridge, MA, Center for International Studies, MIT, 1965, p. 58.

12. These interviews were conducted in Mandarin, the official dialect that students were required to use in school, not in their local Cantonese. This raises a serious problem since—as I am reminded by anthropologist James Watson, who is fluent in both dialects—Cantonese speakers are far more likely to be open and personal when conversing in their own dialect. In South China, Mandarin is the spoken language of authority and political orthodoxy.

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important shift in Chinese political culture. The more "horizontal" the relationship between father and son—that is, the more the relationship is characterized by mutual respect and encouragement of the son's autonomy, and the less by authority dependence—the more overt competitiveness the son displays toward the father. As family relationships become more horizontal over time in the People's Republic, "then both father and son alike should develop a sensitivity as well to the new political values and ideals" (p. 137). Dissenting explicitly from Solomon's analysis of childbearing, feeding customs, and dependency, Raddock argues that the Chinese child today does not unconsciously respond to parental punishment by regressing to infantile dependency; on the contrary, he rejects food (p. 189).

The volume edited by William Kessen and reporting the informed impressions of a delegation of American child psychologists who toured China in late 1973 suggests important cultural change in child-family-school relationships. Noting the very active role of schools nowadays, the group observes that "if we remember the power of parents over children in traditional Chinese family life, no change the Communist regime brought about is more startling than the apparently diminished power of parents" (p. 48). Still, the group was puzzled by the consistently orderly behavior of Chinese children in the classroom, street, park, and home—a sharp contrast with the American norm—and concludes the report unable to hazard a guess as to "how such order is established and maintained, and at what cost to individual variety and creativity" (p. 221).

Robert and Ai-li Chin's detailed review of the research problems and analytical concepts that occupied Chinese professional psychologists before the Cultural Revolution reinforces the conclusion that distinct cultural influences are at work. After an early phase of pursuing the Pavlovian concerns of Soviet psychology, Chinese psychologists around the time of the Great Leap Forward began to orient their work toward questions of learning moral principles, developing optimistic and pessimistic attitudes, changing individuals in desirable socialist directions, and practicing therapy in small groups. Thus, the discipline in China has developed somewhat contradictory "activist, Chinese" and "scientific" strains.[13]

Predictably, two authors who adopt nonpsychological approaches are more given to analyzing agents of socialization beyond the family. Donald Munro, building on a previous work on early China,[14] broadly mines the traditions of Chinese philosophy in search of behaviorally relevant assumptions about individuals and society (or the state). He discovers three—involving "social nature," malleability, and motivation—and shows where these characteristic Chinese assumptions differ from comparable ones in liberal democratic or in Soviet Marxist societies (pp. 15–25). First, individuality—i.e., self-expression, self-fulfillment, or private gain—is illegitimate ("selfish") in Chinese thought; individuals are supposed to find meaning for their existence only through serving or bringing benefit to their family or other primary group. Second, in what amounts to a contemporary departure from the Confucian moral code, there is an absence of any belief in innate characteristics, including private attributes, that should be immune from manipulation. This opens the way for extensive "molding." By emphasizing the mental aspect of malleability, argues Munro, Maoists are thinking of "changes that may take place during a short period of time in individuals. They are not necessarily referring to long-term changes in the natures of the species or of social groups, as did Marx" (p. 23). Third, since people are not self-regarding, they need not be motivated by private acquisition of goods or by the maximization of pleasure for themselves. According to Munro, "the problem of man's psychological capacity for autonomy is left rather muddy in the Chinese works. . ." (p. 25). As for socialization agents, the elaboration of Munro's arguments is especially interesting in his chapters on the role of schools and on the use of models for emulation.

The other writer coming to the subject from a nonpsychological starting point is Metzger. His intent is to revise the thesis made famous by Joseph Levenson that Confucian ideology had become dogmatic, ritualistic, and lifeless by the time the imperial system fell in 1911. Metzger marshals impressive textual evidence pointing to an intellectual revival in the late Qing (Ch'ing) period, during which many writers firmly rejected both Confucian fundamentalism and institutionalized

13. Cf. Munro under review, pp. 61-68. This discusses the relevance of psychological research for his ideas about malleability.

14. Donald J. Munro, *The Concept of Man in Early China*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1969.

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Confucian thought. He argues that Qing scholars, reflecting a fundamental tension between self-cultivation and political action in the Confucian tradition—strands represented respectively in the differing emphases of neo-Confucianists Wang Yangming (Wang Yang-ming—"knowledge and action are one") and Ju Xi (Chu Hsi—"if there is something not right in the affairs of the world, it is set right by the sage")—found themselves in a paradoxical "predicament." On the one hand, they believed that individuals can and should summon a flow of moral power within themselves; on the other hand, they agonized over the realization that they would be unable to do so. Song (Sung) dynasty thinkers had pondered remorsefully that more than a thousand years had passed "without a true Confucian" (pp. 49 and 159), and Metzger contends that by Qing times a sense of "moderate realism"—that is, a conscious recognition of the imperfectability of the political center—had spread among neo-Confucianist scholars and rendered their philosophical debates, if anything, even more applicable to real problems of the age, including the Chinese government's response to the West.[15]

Metzger's difficult journeys through the dense bog of Confucian metaphysics ultimately leave one unconvinced that these rarified scholarly debates breathed as much life into Chinese political culture as he concludes, but his analysis does yield some important critical issues to raise with Solomon. Did Mao's self-assertiveness really stand in sharp contrast with China's traditional cultural pattern? Should 20th-century anti-Confucian rhetoric, however filled with diffuse hatred and identified with violent class struggle, be taken at face value any more readily than similar rhetoric of centuries past when violent uprisings erupted many times against corrupt elites? Does authoritarian quashing of political dissent leave Chinese people no alternative but to "swallow" their anger?

Lucian Pye, the author of the seminal work that inspired Solomon's empirical investigations,[16] turns, in the book under consideration here, to a search for cultural origins in the distinctive elements of Mao's leadership style. He focuses on three psychological themes: the pleasures of secure and comfortable nurture that Mao's mother engendered in him, coupled with the hurt of abandonment when she died; the reverence for willpower and respect for strategy that Mao gained from successfully rebelling against his father, coupled with a suspicion that others could be as willful and could apply the same tactics against him; and the understanding that Mao acquired of the potency of personal emotions as a manipulable object of leadership, coupled with a distrust of their sincerity or durability. For all the weaknesses in the psychobiographical approach, Pye's effort succeeds better than any other has in finding cultural bases for Mao's leadership style.

It is worth mentioning that Pye has subsequently contributed a shorter piece of some interest to the political culture literature.[17] Focusing on the symbolization of political issues in China's mass media, and especially on "the ways in which Chinese leaders utilize the media in their elite power relations," he identifies Chinese cultural adaptations of Soviet practices such as the tradition of the disgraced leader who becomes a nonperson. Between the names removed from history and the names always vilified, Pye observes, the Chinese have added the category of people vilified by a standardized expression but whose name is never mentioned (for example, "that sworn follower of the gang of four in Liaoning"). This use of code names strikes responsive chords among the public because in Chinese culture, Pye claims, a sense of revulsion comes from the belief that to be nameless is to be less than human. "It is easy to imagine the worst of someone who is nameless, whereas with a named individual people may instantly ask who originally vouched for him, who got him his high office, and who formerly said good things about him," Pye notes. Another fundamental cultural theme he identifies is the Chinese belief that what is hidden is usually bad and that the power of the media is to unmask and hence to destroy. In Chinese political culture, he argues, motives are easily suspect, and one must ceaselessly be on guard against the tricks of the "bourgeoisie," much as the heroes and heroines of Chinese legend had to contend with ghosts and spirits that could assume different guises.

In another brief and quite different analysis of symbols in

15. Readers interested in the world of officialdom in late imperial times will greatly appreciate Metzger's earlier work, *The Internal Organization of the Ch'ing Bureaucracy*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1973.

16. Lucian W. Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1968.

17. "Communications and Chinese Political Culture," loc. cit., pp. 221-46.

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Chinese politics,[18] Lowell Dittmer has criticized the Pye/Solomon conception of political culture as static, "making it difficult to conceptualize cultural conflict or change except in pathological terms." After a difficult semiotic investigation of Cultural Revolution rhetoric, he concludes that Chinese political culture involves more than values drifting agelessly down through time. In Chinese political movements like the Cultural Revolution, a combination of "exhortation" and "catharsis" causes norms and values to become saturated with emotion, while the gross and basic emotions become ennobled through contact with social values. As a result, "the Cultural Revolution lives on as a precedent, and its symbolism has become a part of the Chinese political culture, a public resource to be drawn upon by its people when need and opportunity arise."

Several of the studies under review elaborate the theme of cultural change further. Alan Liu is interested in the manifold effects of institutionalized aggression and hypothesizes that "the Chinese setting is unique in that the government seeks to institutionalize aggression without too much professionalization" (p. 34). Unfortunately, he does not argue the case for this hypothesis very effectively. Paul Hiniker's examination of the failure of radical political mobilization in China, which draws upon Leon Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance,[19] is a careful and disciplined empirical effort that fails to satisfy on conceptual grounds. It accepts as premises that the Great Leap Forward "failed" and that committed Maoists retreated into rigid ideological reaffirmation of the Leap's original goals ("prophecies"). Put so simply and extremely, neither premise is easily defensible. John Starr's highly regarded textbook on Chinese politics gives cultural change pride of place. Ideology in a postrevolutionary system, students are instructed, relates to the culture of that system as thesis relates to antithesis, with the long range result being "an altered ideology as well as an altered culture" (p. 44). Finally, Raymond Whitehead's universalistic Christian perspective leads him to the conclusion that some fundamental Judeo-Christian values, such as a passion for justice, are also prominent in the Thought of Mao Zedong. The cultural difference comes in Mao's rejection of "love" as a terminal value blind to economic inequality, exploitation, and imperialism, and his elevation of "struggle" as a less hypocritical instrument for eventually realizing the justice East and West both desire (p. 146).

TO SUM UP briefly, the study of China's political culture has divided itself between approaches emphasizing psychological patterns and approaches emphasizing values. Most of the psychological works are directly descended from the "national character" studies of a generation ago. So long as they continue to reflect the search for peculiarities of personal thought to differentiate Chinese from other peoples of the world, I believe they are doomed to the fringes of scholarship. The reason is simply that no good solutions appear imminent to several central problems. Psychological research is presently limited to highly unrepresentative samples of Chinese refugees. Even with scholarly access to China, connections between experiences of early childhood, on the one hand, and adult orientations toward authority, dependency, assertiveness, participation, primary-group obligation, violence, change, and ideological symbols, on the other, would still be difficult to establish. And even if such connections could be established, the question of whether they really differentiate Chinese from other nationalities would remain open. Psychological conclusions very likely will turn out to be more characteristic of regions, social classes, generations, or other cohorts found in many societies, China being just one.

A newer psychological approach, studies of individual leaders, holds more immediate promise. Biographies of Chinese personages in the "psychohistory" mold of Erik Erikson's biographies of Luther and Gandhi[20] would face many of the same problems that beset their "national character" cousins, but at least their conclusions need not be extrapolated to a broader population.

Value approaches have their own hurdles to clear; nevertheless, I think that they will prove to

18. Lowell Dittmer, "Thought Reform and Cultural Revolution: An Analysis of the Symbolism of Chinese Politics," *American Political Science Review*, March 1977, pp. 67-85.

19. Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1962. "Cognitive dissonance" refers to a perceived incongruity between attitudes and behavior. There is evidence that people tend to reduce such dissonance by making appropriate adjustments of their attitudes, and even beliefs.

20. *Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History*, New York, NY, Norton, 1958; *Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence*, New York, NY, Norton, 1969.

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be the wave of the future. "Values" (relative, general preferences) must be kept distinct from their neighbors—"norms" (standards for behavior of achievement), "attitudes" (durable opinions), "beliefs" (confidence in certain truths), "interests" (awareness of specific benefits expected to follow from favorable decisions), and "ideology" (systematic ideas with action consequences for creating and using organization). And values must be identified independently of the people who hold them. Nonetheless, as broad preferences disengaged from the day-to-day world of concrete choices, values have an undisturbed autonomous existence. And competing values can coexist even while derived positions on immediate problems are in conflict. A general predilection to attach higher prestige to civilian careers than to military ones, for example, may be held by people who also value strong state defenses to bar inroads from culturally alien lands. In a time of threat, arguments embodying the latter, hawkish value may be heard more loudly, even though the former, dovish value may suffer not at all and may reemerge unsullied in a later peaceful time. Values as relative, general preferences are real, unmeasurable, autonomous, and durable.[21] Despite all complications, focusing on political values promises to advance our understanding of China's distinctive "political culture" more effectively than other alternatives.

21. For an elaboration of the concept of "values," see Richard Wilson et al., op. cit.

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Notes & Views

Participation in China

EDITORS' NOTE: In its May-June 1978 issue, this journal carried an article by Victor C. Falkenheim on "Political Participation in China," which reported on some recent field research done among Chinese émigrés in Hong Kong. This article occasioned a lengthy commentary from a reader in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. We present this commentary and Mr. Falkenheim's reply below.

The Totalitarian Model

THERE ARE many disagreements about the People's Republic of China, but on one point there is good consensus: we all wish to know more than we do. And it is not merely a matter of curiosity about the unknown. There are urgent practical needs for more knowledge, for reasons of both public policy and a more adequately informed public opinion.

Some of the barriers to better understanding are obvious, and, under present conditions, unavoidable: the government of the People's Republic maintains a monopoly over scientific and cultural work on its territory. But other barriers are less obvious and are avoidable. These have to do with what I consider to be faulty reasoning and faulty methods on the part of many Western sinologists. In commenting here upon Professor Victor C. Falkenheim's article on "Political Participation in China" in the May-June 1978 issue of this journal, I address myself to these larger issues.

Professor Falkenheim's intention of focusing on "real, nonritual participation . . . by private citizens" promises enlightenment where there is much darkness and is especially welcome since so much of current sinology consists of speculations about differences only among the leaders. And the publication of his article in *Problems of Communism*, a journal of considerable and well-deserved prestige published by the US government, will command great attention for his work.

But, as I see it, the article contains serious ambiguities, confusions, and other difficulties which make its conclusions unacceptable. As it happens, all the issues which I am about to raise involve the application, or rather the nonapplication, of the notion of totalitarianism. I will argue that this concept, by way of a working hypothesis, is indispensable for any adequate analysis of what is known up to now of the People's Republic.[1] The first point I discuss is of a more technical nature than the others, but it too has an important place in the overall fabric of my argument.

I

Professor Falkenheim speaks of his thirty-seven informants, as indeed he is entitled to, as a "sample" (see, for example, his pp. 28, 29, 32). One dictionary meaning of "sample," after all, is merely "a finite portion of a population or universe."[2] But among social scientists, "sample" usually bears the more restricted meaning given in another dictionary definition: "a set of elements drawn from and analyzed to estimate the characteristics of a population."[3] The difference in these two definitions hinges around the question of whether the smaller part can be thought of as *representing* the larger, of whether the sample is or is not a *representative* one.[4] I feel that Professor Falkenheim is inconsistent in how he uses these two notions of sample: that he professes to the modesty of the first but in fact relies, for the validity of much of his argument, on the greater claims of the second; that, finally, fudging these two meanings is related to a fudging of the totalitarian reality of mainland Chinese society.

Professor Falkenheim has interviewed thirty-seven émigrés from mainland China. It is obvious, as much from the manner in which these informants had to be selected as from the size of this group, that no claim can possibly be made that this is a representative sample of the Chinese population. Indeed, Professor Falkenheim acknowledges this difficulty: "No claim is made that the respondent group represented a microcosm of Chinese political life" (p. 20). By way of contrast, we might note that the study of American political participation which Professor Falken-

1. I have been influenced by the classic as well as the more recent scholarly discussions on totalitarianism. Among the latter, the following have been particularly helpful: Aryeh L. Unger, *The Totalitarian Party*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1974; Leonard Schapiro, *Totalitarianism*, London, The Pall Mall Press, 1972; Karl Dietrich Bracher, "Disputed Totalitarianism: Experience and Actuality," in Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Zeitgeschichtliche Kontroversen um Faschismus, Totalitarismus, Demokratie*, (Historical Controversies on Fascism, Totalitarianism, Democracy), Munich, R. Piper, 1976, pp. 33-61.

2. *James & James Mathematics Dictionary*, 3rd Ed., Princeton, NJ, 1968, p. 319.

3. *The American Heritage Dictionary*. For discussion on samples and related problems, from the point of view of a social scientist, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Social Statistics*, 2nd Ed., New York, NY, McGraw-Hill Co., 1972, Chap. 21, pp. 509-30.

4. The distinction between representative and nonrepresentative samples overlaps but does not wholly coincide with the more technical distinction between probability and nonprobability samples. See Blalock, op. cit., pp. 510-11, 527-29.

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heim uses as a point of reference could report 2,549 interviews for a population roughly one quarter as large as that of China. Even more significant than the difference in sample size is the difference in sample selection. The authors of this American study were able to report random procedures to assure that their sample would be representative of the American population.[5]

Professor Falkenheim can surely not be faulted for his failure to duplicate American survey methods in China. Nobody else has done so; nobody else will do so in any meaningful way until the current totalitarian controls are lifted. In the face of such controls, scholars have for some time now turned to more or less systematic interviews of refugees from the various totalitarian regimes. At one stage, because of the dislocations of the Second World War, hundreds of thousands of former Soviet citizens found themselves in the West. A large-scale research project was realized by Western scholars at that time, and was able to report data from over three thousand respondents.[6] The extent to which this sample may be regarded as representative is carefully discussed by the authors. But this project was quite exceptional in its research opportunity and hence in its scope and representativeness. Nothing of the sort exists for China.

There are quite a number of refugees from Communist China in Hong Kong and elsewhere, and a number of scholars, besides Professor Falkenheim, have interviewed small groups of them and reported their findings.[7] As long as the limitations of such data are understood, there is every reason for utilizing them. Refugees, especially when skillfully questioned, can certainly be used as witnesses for what they may have seen and experienced. But the internal divisions in any one group of such refugees, under current conditions, cannot be used to project similar differences upon the large parent population of the Chinese mainland: only a probability sample, currently unobtainable, would allow for such inference.

Professor Falkenheim does, indeed, seem to recognize such limitations when he writes, in a passage just following the one I have quoted previously, that

> *. . . an attempt will be made to compensate for the skewed quality of the respondent pool by summarizing and generalizing the views expressed only on issues where a consensus existed which cut across all classes and occupations.* (p. 21)

But then, for reasons he does not share with his readers, he proceeds to do exactly what he said he would not do.

In a lengthy section entitled "Sources of Variation" (pp. 27 ff.), he discusses differences of responses within his "sample" by reference to such variables as level of education, age, and place of birth:

> *Interestingly, ethnic differences were a distinct source of variation even in this limited sample. The most clearly autonomous participants were the Overseas Chinese (N = 7).* (p. 29)

Not only does Professor Falkenheim here indicate his opinion that the findings of his "sample" can be generalized to the whole population. He does so on the basis of the following statistics, given in a table on page 28: of the 30 non-Overseas Chinese, five, or 17 percent, are rated as "high nonritual participants," while among the Overseas Chinese, two out of seven, or 29 percent are so rated. But what would happen to these figures if one of the Overseas Chinese had somehow been incorrectly rated? In that case, one out of seven, or only 14 percent, would be a "high nonritual participant," and one of Professor Falkenheim's principal findings would be reversed. This consideration alone—and in my view, many others could be adduced—shows that Professor Falkenheim's edifice of quantification is a house of cards.

Professor Falkenheim has seen fit to imitate the language and the style of American-type survey research; indeed, one wonders whether perhaps the parody is an intended one. There are complex tables, a vocabulary which speaks of samples and sources of variation, statistical symbols ("N = 7"). There are comparative references to studies on political participation in nontotalitarian countries.[8] (But there is no reference to work on other totalitarian countries—more on this later). This treatment assumes the ethnocentric notion that what goes on in China can be understood through the medium of Western categories. I have elsewhere called this approach a "normalizing" one because it seeks to portray a totalitarian society to Western readers as if, from this Western point of view, it were a most normal phenomenon.[9]

II

Political participation can take many forms, and the very meaning of these words may be interpreted in a variety of ways. But for the Western reader especially, the question of voting is of particular interest. Professor Falkenheim devotes one paragraph to this matter (p. 25):

> *Work unit elections offered significant scope both for participation and for interest articulation. Although the nomination process was controlled to a degree by the next higher administrative level, interference from above was limited by the desire to recruit natural local leaders with "standing" in their respective communities or units. Unit leadership*

5. Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, *Participation in America,* New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1972. See pp. 345 ff. for a description of the sample. It must be noted here, however, that these authors resorted to quota sampling in the last stage of their sampling procedure ("to reduce costs"), and therefore do not meet Blalock's requirements for a probability sample (Blalock, op. cit., p. 528).

6. Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen, Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1961.

7. I shall cite only two examples. (a) Ivan D. London, who had been associated with the Inkeles and Bauer Soviet project, has published a number of papers and a book on his interviews with Chinese refugees; see his "Interviewing in Sinology: Observations on Methods and Fundamental Concepts," *Psychological Reports* (Missoula, MT), June 1975, pp. 683-91, and references cited therein. (b) The book by Martin King Whyte, *Small Groups and Political Rituals in China,* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1974, analyzes interviews with 101 refugees. This work, already cited by Professor Falkenheim, is a good example of the good use to which such interview material can be put.

8. The references are to Verba and Nie concerning "particularized contacting," and to Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, *No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1976, concerning definitions of "participation."

9. Werner Cohn, Review of "Mao Tse-Tung in the Scales of History," *Worldview* (New York, NY), April 1978, pp. 53-55.

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elections in rural areas—for example, for production team heads and production committee members—elicited virtually total participation and considerable contention, including lobbying efforts. Votes often split along lineage lines, and many rusticated youth "sent down" from urban areas reported "campaigning" for candidates who exhibited the most tolerance toward them. Of 21 rural respondents reporting on production team elections, 18 characterized them as "relatively democratic," especially since the Cultural Revolution.

Previous information concerning the general atmosphere of elections in the People's Republic certainly gives a different impression from that here conveyed by Professor Falkenheim. James R. Townsend devotes a chapter to this kind of question, although he does not specifically discuss work-unit elections.[10] He makes it very clear that no popular decision-making, in any meaningful sense, is accomplished by elections in China. While ordinary people may have some informal input on who gets nominated from among the most loyal and obedient, once the nomination procedure is over, ". . . the election committee reduces the candidates to the number that are to be elected."[11] Previous to Professor Falkenheim's study it was not known that "votes often split" or that the elector is ever, let alone "often," faced with meaningful choices on election day.

Professor Falkenheim also gives a novel overall interpretation to elections in Communist China when he speaks of a ". . . significant scope both for participation and for interest articulation." Basing himelf on official Chinese Communist publications, Townsend, in contrast, reported essentially totalitarian functions for elections: the raising of mass political consciousness; the increase of production; the strengthening of unity; the "democratic education of masses and cadres"; the securing of demographic and political information.[12] To be sure, this information dates back to 1954.

Perhaps Professor Falkenheim's most startling finding is stated by indirection. Previous literature, indeed other parts of Professor Falkenheim's own article, would have led us to assume that ideological purity and absolute obedience to the party constitute a sine qua non for election—that on these points, "interference from above" is not at all "limited." But Professor Falkenheim suggests the elections to be "relatively democratic," which, presumably, means that there is scope for dissent. But the point is left vague.

Data and interpretation which conflict with received knowledge, other things being equal, are certainly of more value than further confirmation of conventional wisdom. But perhaps more so than any confirmation of the old, suggestions for new interpretations require a careful and detailed presentation of evidence. And it is here that Professor Falkenheim is a bit careless.

On the matter of votes which were "often split," for instance, we need to know the circumstances under which the voters were asked to make choices among candidates, the issues which were presented, the outcomes of the balloting. On all these questions, the informants should have been questioned most carefully and their testimony should have been presented in detail. In particular, the reader needs to be assured here that what was happening was an actual division on election day, not some maneuvering in the pre-nomination process. The reason this issue is important is that pre-nomination jockeying is easily claimed but difficult to document; claims for it are consistent with the image of a totalitarian society. Open division on election day, however, especially if it takes place "often," would not be consistent with such an image. Unfortunately, Professor Falkenheim's brevity and vagueness prevent the reader from determining what these data actually show. A scholar working with the notion of totalitarianism as a working hypothesis would, I suggest, have probed for the necessary detail and would have furnished such detail to his readers.

III

Professor Falkenheim reports that he probed for a rather wide range of possible forms of political participation, keeping in mind, more or less, Chinese conditions. But I think that it is fair to say his findings, where they are not extraordinarily vague (as in the case of voting), and with one very important exception, turn out to be negative—there seems to be almost no "real, nonritual participation" which one could report.

The exception is what Professor Falkenheim describes as "lobbying" (p. 25):

. . . *the most frequent form of citizen participation involved . . . what one study of political participation in the US has termed "particularized contacting," that is, personal contacting of authorities to voice views or demands . . . . Ordinarily, such lobbying focused on personal grievances or demands related to such matters as work assignments, job ratings, travel permits, and interpersonal conflicts. Farmers who wanted to perform contract work during the slack agricultural off-season, or young people who felt their resettlement subsidies were being misappropriated by the work team might take these matters up directly with local leaders.*

There are two problems with including this type of "lobbying" in the rubric of political participation: (a) much of such activity should never be included under Professor Falkenheim's own guidelines on what constitutes political participation: (b) the whole idea of political participation becomes trivial when it is in effect completely reduced to a pursuit of personal grievances. These two problems are closely related and overlap.

a. *The redefinition of "political participation."* We have already noted that Professor Falkenheim cites studies from nontotalitarian countries for his definitions of political participation.[13] But the very studies he cites, as well as all the other influential work on political participation which I have seen, insist that only attempts of private individuals to influence *governmental* activity can properly be thought of as political participation.[14] It is quite true, of course, that in totalitarian countries the distinction between governmental and nongovernmental functions tends to blur. Nevertheless, the formal distinction between the state and other functions remains in China.[15] In any case, pur-

10. James R. Townsend, *Political Participation in Communist China,* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1965, Chap. 5.

11. Ibid., p. 122.

12. Ibid., pp. 135-36.

13. See fn. 7 above.

14. Huntington and Nelson, op. cit., p. 3; Verba and Nie, op. cit., p. 2; Townsend, op. cit., pp. 4-5; Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation,* Chicago, IL, Rand McNally, 1965, pp. 1-2.

15. Townsend, op. cit., p. 103.

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suing a personal grievance in a factory, even in the People's Republic of China, even if we admit that there is some political element in the situation, is surely something a little different from what we would ordinarily consider to be "political participation." If Professor Falkenheim promises us, as he does, to use the definition of participation as "activity by private citizens to influence government decision-making" (p. 19), he is giving his phrase an unusual interpretation—to say the least—when it turns out that he refers almost exclusively to individuals in their individual work situations (p. 25 and passim).

b. *The trivialization of "political participation."* The influential work by Verba and Nie also takes up the question of a private citizen contacting a government official on a matter of only personal concern.[16] Verba and Nie restrict themselves to the governmental sphere, but the situation is otherwise very similar to Professor Falkenheim's cases. But while Professor Falkenheim cites Verba and Nie and uses their terminology ("particularized contacting"), he fails to tell his readers about Verba and Nie's empirical findings: such "contacting" is essentially unrelated to any form of meaningful political participation. Huntington and Nelson, whose work deals with Colombia, Kenya, Pakistan, and Turkey, and who are also cited by Professor Falkenheim, follow Verba and Nie on this point.[17]

Professor Falkenheim certainly tells us something interesting—it is a genuine strength of his article—when he gives us this glimpse into the utilization of certain grievance procedures by people who later became refugees. But when he concludes from such utilization that on the whole the Chinese citizen's "strategies appear predicated on the basic predictability and fairness of the system" (p. 32), is he not going somewhat beyond his data? His conclusions are so much more surprising in view of his information concerning "constitutionally sanctioned democratic forms" (p. 23):

To speak out at a meeting, to write a letter of complaint, to write a "big-character" poster was to run the risk of speaking or writing "incorrectly" (fan tsuo wu). *Such mistakes could carry penalties of varying severity, ranging from being asked to recant, to being required to undergo study, to being subjected to "struggle," or worse.* (p. 26)

IV

An explicit heuristic use of the notion of totalitarianism is not easily found in contemporary English-language sinology,[18] and most certainly not in Professor Falkenheim's article. Such use would explore whether, and to what extent, the People's Republic of China might exhibit features which are essentially similar to those of Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia. (And of course my comments here as a whole are written to argue for the utility of this approach.)

But the spectre of totalitarianism is not easily exorcised by those who would do so. If I read him aright, Professor Falkenheim does seem to present an implicit argument concerning it which I would summarize approximately as follows: There are those who see in China today a "fundamentally Stalinist political reality" (p. 18), that is to say, they see a totalitarian society. On the other hand, some scholars have been too uncritical, thus, in turn, causing an undesirably hostile "backlash" (p. 19). We should be reasonable, objective, balanced. Let us examine carefully whether the Chinese enjoy at least some fundamental human rights—"real, non-ritual participation" (p. 19 and passim). If they can be shown to enjoy such rights, those who speak of totalitarianism will be given the lie (implied). We have questioned certain witnesses and find on the basis of our sample that, at the very least, such rights can be found in the domain of personal grievance procedure, "informal participation: lobbying" (pp. 25, 32). It must be admitted, to be sure, that "democratic modes of participation" (pp. 25–26) are not much used. No matter. There are "alternate forums" which "allow for important, if limited, forms of genuine participation" (p. 32). In other words, purely personal matters may be pursued even if there is no popular participation in public policymaking. *In Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, by way of contrast, there were no channels at all for the pursuit of personal grievances* (implied). The conclusion? There is a "basic predictability and fairness of the system" (p. 32) in China, in sharp distinction to the totalitarian systems of Europe (implied).

Professor Falkenheim may not wish to accept the sentence I have italicized or the summary as a whole as fair representations of his views, though to me they are the most plausible readings of what he has to say, and at least some of his readers will no doubt interpret him in approximately this way. But be that as it may, much contemporary apologetic theorizing on China contains the simplistic covert assumption that European totalitarianism had excluded absolutely all rationality in the daily life of its citizens; that it had no channels whatever for the settling of personal grievances; that it tolerated no differences of any sort in any sphere of life. It is only with such exaggerated views of Stalin's Russia and of Hitler's Germany that one can reject the otherwise compelling comparisons with contemporary China.

There are not many detailed descriptions of daily life in Stalinist Russia which would enable us to see the actual limits of the regime's supposed iron rule. Edward Peterson cites as exceptional the study of Smolensk by Fainsod, a study made possible by the German capture of Soviet records.[19] But for the one totalitarian regime which has been completely destroyed, Nazi Germany, we possess tremendous amounts of captured documents and other materials which have been analyzed from this point of view by such scholars as William Allen, Karl Dietrich Bracher, Timothy Mason, and Edward Peterson.[20]

The picture which emerges from

16. Verba and Nie, op. cit., pp. 67, 75-76, 113, 398, and passim.

17. Huntington and Nelson, op. cit., p. 12.

18. In French sinology, however, matters are different. See, for example, Claude Aubert et al., *Regards froids sur la Chine,* (A Hard Look at China), Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1976.

19. Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1958, cited in Edward N. Peterson, *The Limits of Hitler's Power,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1969, pp. xii-xiii.

20. William Sheridan Allen, *The Nazi Seizure of Power,* New York, NY, New Viewpoints, 1973, original edition 1965; Karl Dietrich Bracher, *The German Dictatorship,* New York, NY, Praeger, 1970, original German edition 1969; Timothy W. Mason, *Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft* (The Working Class and the Nation), Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975; Peterson, op. cit.

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these studies is one in which the daily life of ordinary people, at least in peacetime, was not as radically different from pre-Hitler Germany as is sometimes supposed.[21] There were courts to settle private disputes as before and even Nazi Party courts to settle disputes among party members.[22] The Nazi labor organization DAF (Deutsche Arbeitsfront) was active and often successful in pressing for better pay and in settling grievances against employers.[23] There were interminable conflicts and squabbles among the various Nazi offices and ministries, even on such important matters as the persecution of the Jews.[24] The religious life of Germans was freer than anything reported from Communist China: pastors spoke out against the regime, large sections of the clergy resisted openly in one way or another.[25] Even the Gestapo and the SS could sometimes be moved or pressured. When non-Jewish wives demonstrated, in one instance, against the threatened deportation of their Jewish husbands, the Gestapo relented.[26] An especially poignant story is told by Bruno Bettelheim, who, while a prisoner in a concentration camp, was able to win a concession from an SS guard by reasoning with him.[27]

If one were to read in isolation reports of the sort I have just cited, one might well make a case that the Nazi regime was one of "basic predictability and fairness." But that would be forgetting the fate of the condemned groups in the population, the hell of the camps, the total control over press and radio, the smashing of all political opposition. No responsible scholar, in the case of Nazi Germany, has so far had the temerity of offering this kind of interpretation. But the grounds for an apologetic treatment of Nazi Germany are no weaker, and in some respects they are actually stronger, than the grounds for the currently fashionable apologetic treatment of the People's Republic of China.

21. Ibid., pp. 442-43 and passim.

22. Allen, op. cit., 239, 299 ff.; Peterson, op. cit., pp. 440, 446; Mason, op. cit., pp. 43, 321-22, 389 and passim.

23. Ibid., pp. 94-96, 340, 370 and passim; Bracher (1970), op. cit., p. 332.

24. Allen, op. cit., p. 237; Peterson, op. cit., pp. 46-47, and passim; Mason, op. cit., p. 573, and passim.

25. Bracher (1970), op. cit., pp. 379 ff.; Mason, op. cit., p. 327 and passim.

26. K. J. Ball-Kaduri, "Berlin is Purged of its Jews: the Jews in Berlin in the Year 1943," *Yad Vashem Studies* (Jerusalem), Vol. 5, 1963, pp. 279-80.

27. Bruno Bettelheim, *The Informed Heart,* Glencoe, IL, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960, pp. 218-20.

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A Rejoinder

GIVEN THE RAPID pace of change in China, and the even more rapid fluctuations in popular and scholarly perceptions of Chinese reality, it is probably useful periodically to critically reexamine our basic research premises. Approaching Professor Cohn's comments as a prod to such reflections, I must confess to some disappointment with both the tenor and substance of his critique. On the personal plane, I found it refreshingly novel after years of advocating more monolithic conceptions of the Chinese political system, to be charged, and at such length, with an "apologetic" "fudging" of China's "totalitarian reality." On a professional plane, however, it seemed regrettable that Professor Cohn's zeal to indict "Western sinologists" for "faulty reasoning and methods" and for "apologetics" should have necessitated so unfortunate a misreading of the article in question, particularly since such a "style" of criticism seems unlikely to advance our ostensibly shared concern with conceptual clarification.

Professor Cohn evidently perceives this article as incarnating the sins of an entire field, with its alleged methodological, conceptual, and substantive weaknesses leading cumulatively to a whitewash of China's "totalitarian reality." Unhappily for the credibility of his wider animadversions against the field, his critique of the article itself lacks accuracy. First, the article neither attempts nor, more important, achieves an "apologetic treatment" of citizen participation in post-Cultural Revolution China. What it does do is report neutrally on the views of 37 former residents of China who in varying degrees express cynicism and disenchantment with many of China's democratic forms. To report these views in this fashion seems a far cry from any reasonable definition of apologetics, unless one's intuitive view of China's reality (Professor Cohn's?) is bleak indeed. To justify his charge of "apologetics" he is in fact forced to the unhappy expedient of ignoring these very central, and far from flattering findings, or mysteriously deprecating them as "negative findings."

His methodological strictures are built of even finer gossamer. Not only does the article *not* overgeneralize from the data as alleged, it is, if anything, patently guilty of the opposite sin, overhedging. Contrary to Professor Cohn's assertion, the article repeatedly disclaims any intent to generalize the results to the population as a whole, and the conclusions are exceedingly cautious in appraising the wider significance of the study. Professor Cohn paradoxically acknowledges these caveats, but prefers to impute to the article a less modest hidden intent, which he *infers from the inclusion of a table relating* social background to the level of political involvement. This innocent table, however, far from implying a desire to project such variations on the wider Chinese population, simply and self-evidently summarizes variations *within* the respondent pool. Both the table and the accompanying text ("The *respondents* demonstrated clear differences in how *they* perceived and responded to . . . *constraints on participation* . . . . p. 27, emphasis added) are quite unambiguous on this point, Professor Cohn's imaginative interpretation notwithstanding.

Professor Cohn's secondary complaint with regard to the "edifice of quantification" on which the allegedly erroneous conclusions are founded reveals again a propensity, in reading between the lines, to miss the lines themselves. The text explicitly states that "the data did not allow the systematic linking of background variables to levels of participation" even for the respondent group. In other words, *no* significant conclusions of the study are grounded in this data, which is simply provided as a descriptive summary of interesting but nonsignificant intra-sample variations. This is scarcely an "edifice of quantification." On a minor point, Professor Cohn objects to the use of social scientific terminology, which, I take it, he feels might confer unwarranted credibility on questionable results. Prior to his comments, I had perhaps naively assumed that the few such terms used: "sources

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of variation," "number," "(N)," and "sample" were part of the English language and hardly arcane enough to render questionable findings credible. I am willing to stand corrected.

On substantive grounds, Professor Cohn is particularly exercised over the analysis of work-unit elections, which he found "extraordinarily vague" and worse, *"contrary to received knowledge"* (his words, my emphasis). There are two difficulties with his comments. First, though he notes the distinction between local civic elections and work-unit elections, he has inexplicably chosen nonetheless to use James Townsend's discussions of early post-1949 civic elections to question my characterization of post-1966 work-unit elections. I have no quarrel with Professor Townsend's findings, or Professor Cohn's summary of those findings. I simply point out the irrelevance of his remarks here. Second, his sense of what is "received knowledge" regarding basic-level unit elections is unhappily dated. In the past three years, five major dissertations, one book, a spate of articles, and a massive Social Science Research Council workshop have dealt with patterns of individual and group participation and interest articulation in basic-level rural China. While I apologize for assuming some familiarity with this literature, my intent in this brief gloss on the subject was simply to add the fact that 18 out of 24 rural respondents interviewed characterized post-Cultural Revolution work-unit elections as relatively "democratic" and were willing to supply concrete observations to substantiate their perceptions. To say that 18 out of 24 respondents viewed such elections in this way may or may not tell us anything about the rest of China, but it is hardly being vague!

On the conceptual plane, Professor Cohn charges the article with ignoring the descriptive and explanatory potential of the totalitarian "model." The fact is, however, that the discussion of the context of participation which identifies the party's monopolistic policy role as the critical constraint on citizen participation, draws directly on totalitarian perspectives. The utility of the totalitarian model has always resided in its insistence that the centralized power of the state had to be the starting point of analysis. The analysis of patterns and strategies of citizen influence on the other hand is grounded in a conflict perspective with regard to the political system. The well-recognized deficiency of the totalitarian model has lain in its tendency to overstate the degree of centralization of power to the neglect of a more discriminating treatment of the complex relationship between state and society. Scholars of Marxist-Leninist systems have tended as a consequence to adopt models of the political process which focus on societal sources of pressure and change, without, however, abandoning the structural insights of the totalitarian model. This of course reflects not a tendency toward apologetics, but the imperatives of probing and careful research.

To study citizen participation in a monolithic system does not and should not imply, as Professor Cohn wants to insist, a "Western," "normalizing" bias. The exercise of influence is a universal category of action, and efforts to study it do not necessarily imply a liberal democratic frame of reference or the model of the representative state as a standard of comparison. One ought to be able to study participation in any society without predisposing the findings in any particular direction. What is necessary is sensitivity to the significance and meaning of participation in each research context.

In studying participation in China, the central reality guiding research is the virtually all-embracing involvement of the government in the lives of citizens. Given that few issues in China are without political salience, and further that work-unit cadres represent the basic-level extension of state power, citizens' efforts to influence government policy and action self-evidently begin at the local and worksite level. To encompass in research the formal and informal activities of citizens at these levels is not to redefine "participation," but to include within its scope forms of action which are authentically "influence-bearing." To do so is not only empirically sound, but necessary, as Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson (whose views Professor Cohn misconstrues) have clearly argued. To dismiss citizen efforts to pursue their interests as "trivializing" the concept of participation is to miss an important meaning of participation. Professor Cohn's redefinition would be as alien to a citizen of Vancouver, I suspect, as it would be to as citizen of rural Guangdong (Kwangtung).

I agree that the choice of a research framework is central to the research process. I very much doubt that our efforts to advance theoretically or empirically will be served by arguing in general terms about whether "Western categories" have a "normalizing" thrust. The utility of any research framework lies in its ability to capture and illumine a complex reality. The test of a model will be in the results it generates. Whether the research in this article is valid or not is an open question, but the judgment is one to be made by Chinese citizens or China scholars, not armchair polemicists. If I understand Professor Cohn's view correctly, he is suggesting to us that any approach to Chinese politics that obscures China's essential "abnormality" would be a priori suspect. If this is his view, then his comments here have perhaps inadvertently illustrated a major reason for the decline of the concept of totalitarianism—its tendency to be used not as an analytic tool but as a pejorative label.

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Problems of Communism

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